Project: Addressing legitimacy issues in fragile post-conflict situations to advance conflict transformation and peace-building

Addressing legitimacy issues in fragile post-conflict situations to advance conflict transformation and peace-building:

Somaliland Case Study Report

BACKGROUND SECTION

Since 1991 Somaliland has been a de facto state within a de jure state; an internationally unrecognized political unit emerging out of the recognized though fundamentally disintegrated state of Somalia. This section provides a historical account of some of the key processes that led to the declaration of independence.

1.      Different historical trajectories in north and south Somalia

The pre-colonial stateless society was a rather egalitarian one, in which social relations (on the group level as well as individual level) were managed through the xeer. The xeer constitutes Somali customary law, and in combination with Islam prevented disintegration of the lineage system (Samatar 1992). As explained by Samatar (1992) “What gave the xeer staying power in the absence of centralized coercive machinery was the voluntarism associated with the absolute necessity of relying on one‟s labor/livestock rather than exploiting others” (Samatar 1992:631).

With colonization in late 19th century Somalis were for the first time subordinated to a central state, ruled by the Italians in the South and the British in the North which led to a shift of the locus of power and politics. While politics in traditional Somali society was taking place on the community level, during colonialism politics and power were transferred to the urban administrative centers.

The colonial experience of the North and the South, becoming a British protectorate and an Italian colony, respectively, differed in important respects (Spears 2003; Jhazbhay 2007; Reno 2003). Since the main interests of the British forces in Somaliland was to secure food supply – Somali mutton – for their military garrison in Aden, and to prevent other colonial powers from taking control, they pursued a strategy of minimal economic and political interference3 (WSP 2005; Reno 2003; Spears 2003). To the extent that the British colonizers did exercise authority over the rural population (the vast majority of the population) they did so through the traditional leaders (Bradbury 2008;Reno 2003). This method of indirect rule created some degree of „decentralized despotism‟ (Mamdani 1996) since some of the traditional leaders became intermediaries between the colonizers and the communities (WSP 2005).

Accounts of the colonial experience of Somaliland suggest that while the British left the territory economically underdeveloped and marginalized, they also left the traditional structures – which later became the basis for peace-building and state formation – largely intact (Spears 2003). As put by Prunier, during colonial time Somaliland “suffered only from “benign neglect‟” (Prunier in Spears 2003:93).

Quite differently, the Italians pursued a strategy of direct rule, and accordingly imported a whole new political system to southern Somalia, with centralized economic planning, state appropriation and substantial support for big enterprises. The colonizers followed a strategy of uprooting local producers to force them to integrate with the increasingly centralized national economy. As for the cultural sphere, Somali practices, values and language were perceived as inferior and something to be „overcome‟ in order to „modernize‟ the society (Jhazbhay 2007; Reno 2003).

2.      The post-colonial state(s) – from dysfunctional democracy to military dictatorship

By the time of independence Somalia was expected to be one of the countries in Africa with the best chance of consolidating peace and statehood, due to its homogenous population in terms of ethnicity, language, culture and traditions (Spears 2003). However, the economic and political reorganization of Somali society during the era of colonialism had strengthened lines of inclusion and exclusion, and as in most countries which have been under colonial rule, the colonial legacy laid the structural foundation of the post-colonial state – a state which became the source of immense suffering for the Somalis (Doornbos & Markakis 1994).

The nationalist movements and parties emerging in the 50‟s both in north and south increasingly pushed for independence, which finally was granted by the British on the 26th of July 1960, and a few days later, on the 1st of June, by the Italians. The 1st of June was also the day when the two territories united into the new „Somali republic‟. Pan-Somali sentiments were relatively high in the north, and by some the unification was seen as the first step towards a „Greater Somalia‟ also including the Somali-inhabited areas in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya –an ambition which never materialized (WSP 2005;Spears 2003). The five days in which Somaliland was independent and received recognition from some 35 states, counting some of the permanent five of the UN Security Council, are of great importance for the currently unrecognized republic (Jhazbhay 2003). According to Somalilanders, and people who sympathize with their quest for international recognition, the period of independence, however short, “is what sets Somaliland apart from the type of „secessionists‟ abhorred by the African Union and from the various clan-based „lands‟ that have mushroomed in Southern Somalia since the collapse of the central government” (Bryden 2003:2).

While the political elite in Somaliland, developed during the British protectorate in the dawn of independence, favored unification and „sold‟ this preference to the population with the use of nationalist rhetoric, the new Somali Republic was only a few months old when northern dissatisfaction with the merger started to rise (Bryden 2003;WSP 2005;Ahmed 1999). There was a perception in the north that it was being politically underrepresented, and the hasty merger of the two different systems of administration left little room for articulation of northern interests and did little to address the British legacy of severe economic underdevelopment in the north (Ahmed 1999). The northern dissatisfaction with the union became evident when the new joint constitution was sent to referendum in June 1961, and disapproved by the regions of the former British Somaliland. However, as the majority of the republic consisted of southerners, the vote in total approved of the constitution (WSP 2005).

The first independent regime in Somalia – ill-equipped to create and implement a viable developmental strategy – took over a country with a frail economy, an imposed system of multi-party politics and increasing competition for resources among the different groups in the population. In this process, the north suffered further economic decline and the discontent with the south increased (Bryden 2003;WSP 2005).

The failure of the new regime to improve traditional sectors of livestock and agriculture and to create a new domestic basis for accumulation perpetuated a mismatch between the needs on ground and the incentive structures produced by the state and the market (Samatar 2006). This resulted in the state being the main source of funds as well as the main bone of contention. “It was the competition among the elite for these resources that ultimately led to the degeneration of the major political parties and the demise of parliamentary governance”(Samatar 1992:633). The process of disintegration of the political system into clan-based competition – described as clanism by Samatar who emphasizes the difference between that and traditional kinship (Samatar 1992) – was reflected by the increase in parties and candidates: at the election in 1964 there were 24 parties staging out 793 candidates (for a number of 123 parliamentary seats), while in 1969 these numbers had increased to 62 and 1002 (Samatar 1992).

The high level of disintegration, corruption and increasing „clanism‟, made a bloodless military coup possible. The 1969 coup initiated the more than 20 years‟ dictatorship of General Mohamed Siyad Barre, and for Somalis in general the situation gradually worsened (Samatar 2006), while in the north, the population was particularly marginalized – and in the end massacred under Barre‟s dictatorship(Spear 2003;Ciabarri forthcoming). As Barre seized power the constitution was immediately suspended, the National Assembly dissolved, political parties and professional associations were prohibited, „clanism‟ officially outlawed while unofficially manipulated (Omaar 1992), and the state became increasingly centralized – ending up as the sole center of power and resources. Soon the state had become a direct counterforce to development (Omaar 1992; Samatar 1992; Samatar 2006; Webersik 2004). To consolidate his power, Barre pursued a divide and rule strategy using the military and the state to support certain groups and exclude others (Webersik 2004). For a period a coalition of the three clans Marehan, Ogaden and Dolbahanda (all from the Darod clan family) rose to political hegemony (Menkhaus 2000).

The best chances for many young men to find relief from poverty, was to go to the city and become members of the centralized networks of the regime. As part of his political strategy, Barre armed many of these young men who – freed from the customary social ties of their communities – proved especially effective as means of predation or even as regular fighters (Reno 2003). This led to a situation in which an urban minority exploited a rural majority (the nomads and farmers); competition for centralized resources became increasingly „tribalized‟ and the repression of opposition increasingly violent (Webersvik 2004;Samatar 1992). Traditional kinship and customary law were, through a process of centralization of resources and power, separated and subsequently replaced by increasingly unregulated and „tribalized‟ competition (Doornbos & Markakis 1994;Samatar 1992). As argued by Samatar “The most important lesson to be learned from the present tragedy [in Somalia] is the recognition that Somali society has been torn apart because blood-ties without the xeer have been manipulated by the elite in order to gain or retain access to unearned resources” (Samatar 1992:640). Whereas adaptation to the centralization of the predatory state in the south led to disintegration of the social structures, the development in the north took a somewhat different turn.

Politically, militarily and economically marginalized and geographically located far away from the economical hub of Mogadishu, the clans from the north had little chance of effectively tapping into the state resources and were largely excluded from the patron-client networks of Barre (Reno 2003). On this basis the northern political elite adopted a strategy of resisting rather than adapting to the state (Doornbos & Markakis 1994;Simons 1998) – a development which created a significant measure of social cohesion in terms of alliances and networks developing outside the reach of Barre (Reno 2003).

Simultaneously the marginalization of the northern clans (in particular the Isaq and Dir) markedly worsened, and became increasingly violent in its expression, especially from the late 70‟s and onwards. In the aftermath of the Ogaden war in 1977-78 – a war in which Barre reclaimed the Somali Ogaden region in Ethiopia, but was defeated – the social relations between the Ogaden clan and the clans in the north-west underwent serious changes. The amount of Somali Ogaden refugees fleeing the fighting made Somalia host to the greatest refugee population in Africa, amounting to roughly 1,5 million, and a substantial part of these refugees were settled by the government in Somalia‟s northeastern region (Bradbury 2001;WSP 2005;Webersik, 2004). Consequently, the Isaaqs and the Dir, the dominating clans in this region, became further marginalized, as the Ogaden refugees were strongly favored by the government with jobs, educational opportunities and land (Omaar 1992:323). That is, the Ogaden refugees were “brought into direct competition with the local Dir and Isaq residents, who were already poorly served in the delivery of state services” (Lewis 2004:502) and some were subsequently armed by the regime to repress northern resistance (Bradbury 2001).

The Ogaden war and its aftermath is widely regarded as a watershed in the history of Somalia, symbolizing the beginning of rapid disintegration of the state as well as society (WSP 2005; Bradbury 2008). In the 70‟s Somalia had been allied with the Soviet Union, but as Barre attacked Ethiopia and reclaimed Ogaden, Soviets withdrew their support. Consequently, Somalia ended its alliance with the Soviet Union and switched to an alliance with the United States, thereby becoming the recipient of huge amounts of development aid attached to conditionalities of economic liberalization. By the second half of the 70‟s the growing dissatisfaction with Barre‟s regime had made it increasingly difficult to rule through manipulating clan-lineages, and altogether Barre gradually lost political as well as economic control, and thus increasingly relied on violent oppression rather than strategic manipulation (Bradbury 2001). This resulted in the formation of armed opposition, the first being the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in 1978. In the same year the Fourth Brigade –also named Afaraad – evolved as a fighting unit consisting of Isaaq opposition later joining the ranks of Somali National Movement (SNM) (Bryden 2003). The SSDF was followed by formation of the SNM, and in the late 80‟s by the United Somali Congress (USC) mainly based on the Hawiye clan, and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) mainly based on the Ogaden clan (WSP 2005).

3.      The driving forces of northern resistance and the end of Barre’s regime

The SNM was formed in 1981 in London – drawing together groups of individuals from within Somalia as well as from Saudi Arabia and United Kingdom– and came to play a crucial role not only in the defeat of Barre but also in state formation processes in Somaliland (Jhazbhay 2007;Bryden 2003;Davies 1994). The movement was regionally based and mainly, though not exclusively, represented the Somalis belonging to the Isaaq clan-family4. Not receiving any substantial external funding and excluded from access to state resources, the SNM became highly dependent on cooperation with the traditional authorities who had remained strong in the north and thus proved particularly invaluable as driving forces behind the mobilization of support for the resistance amongst the northern Somali community in general and amongst the northern business community and diaspora in particular (Reno 2003; Jhazbhay 2007; Bradbury 2008; Prunier 1994).

Moreover, this alliance gave these authorities substantial control over the movement‟s economy as well as its politics (Jhazbhay 2007;Reno 2003;Bradbury 2008;Prunier 1994). Thus “the SNM functioned not as a guerilla „front‟ distinct from the population but rather as an armed expression of the Isaaq people” (Prunier 1994:62). According to Prunier (1994:62) the strong connections between SNM and the northern Somali society in general and the traditional authorities in particular had both its pros and cons. On the positive side were characteristics such as a high level of democracy in decision making processes as well as a good understanding of the needs and grievances on ground. Amongst the disadvantages were the tendencies of disorganization and lack of discipline (Prunier 1994).

However, as the struggle against Barre dramatically intensified by the late 80‟s, the movement rapidly organized and expanded (Bryden 2003). In 1988 Ethiopia‟s president Mengistu made an agreement of convenience with Barre to stop supporting opposition movements operating from within their country, launching cross-border attacks on the other country. SNM subsequently moved their bases to within Somalia, and by surprise captured Burao and Hargeisa (Davies 1994;WSP 2005). Barre reacted to these surprise offences with an indiscriminate bombing of Hargeisa, literally turning the city into ruins, with a brutality that served as a trigger for overnight mobilization of unconditional large-scale support for SNM (Bryden 2003; Bradbury 2001). As a response to this mass mobilization the SNM and the traditional leaders constituted a council of elders (a national Guurti) which organized and made more effective the latter‟s support and counseling of the central committee of SNM.5 It is this council which later became the Upper House of parliament in the hybrid government- structures of Somaliland. The attack in 1988 became a collective memory of the Somalis in the north, furthering the gulf between them and the south and counting as one important factor behind the northerners‟ wish for independence (Spears 2003). Moreover, it dramatically intensified the conflict between opposition and the government, and resulted in withdrawal of external support for Barre, who eventually in 1991 was forced to flee the country (WSP 2005).

4.      Somaliland’s declaration of independence

Within a month after the defeat of Barre in January 1991 the SNM convened the first of many clan conferences aimed at peace and reconciliation: the Shirka Walaalaynta Beelaha Waqooyi (the brotherhood conference of northern clans). This first conference held in Berbera was aimed at addressing the grievances and mistrust between clans resulting from the civil war, and signaling politics of reconciliation –i.e. publicly committing to abstain from any revenge against former pro-Barre clans. At the Berbera conference the participants – prominent traditional authorities from the different northern clans – agreed to convene a greater and more inclusive national clan conference, the Shirweynaha Beelaha Waqooyi (Grand conference of Northern Clans), in Burco between 27th April and 18th May (WSP 2005; Ahmed 1999). The Burco conference culminated in the declaration of Somaliland‟s independence on the 18th of May 1991. A decision unilaterally declared – though based on popular pressure – by the traditional leadership of the north together with the SNM liberation elite. Moreover it was agreed at the conference that the SNM central committee should function as a two-year transitional government, with Cabdiraxmaan Axmad Cali (also called “Tuur‟) – the incumbent chair of SNM – as president (Jhazbhay 2007; WSP 2005).

5.      Country data

Somaliland lays claim to the territory of the former British Somaliland and covers an area of 137,600 square kilometers, with a northern littoral of 850 kilometers (Source: WSP 2005).

Due to Somaliland‟s unrecognized status, its recent history of war, migration and displacement, as well as nomadic culture, it is not possible to accurately estimate the size of the population with any accuracy. In 1997 the Ministry of National Planning and Coordination has estimated the population at three million people. About 55% are thought to be nomadic. The urban population has increased rapidly, and was in 2002 estimated to be between 748,00 and 1,2 million.

With low levels of foreign aid (Somaliland did not benefit much from the high levels of aid to Somalia in the 70‟s and 80‟s) and an embargo on livestock exports, Somaliland has, nevertheless, formed a system of basic public administration, rebuild its security structures, its public and private infrastructure, and absorbed hundreds of thousands of returnees, as well as held three elections. A major part of the reconstruction work has been financed locally, through diaspora remittances and trade networks. While the low levels of public revenue and the limited control of the state over sources of livelihood (in particular remittances) have decreased the contest over the state, the prospects of consolidating the Somaliland state as a state which can provide social services, infrastructure etc. remain particularly challenging in the absence of recognition (Source: Bradbury 2008, pages 253-255).

ACTORS/INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY

1.1.  International actors and legitimacy: key themes discussed during fieldwork

Nairobi based decision making

The fact that most key decisions (on how international support should be provided, to whom and according to which priorities) are taken in the regional offices in Nairobi, in the absence of Somaliland leaders, decision makers and beneficiaries significantly compromises the process legitimacy of international actors and support. This is a problem all over Somalia. Yet, in the case of Somaliland the lack of state officials holding international (normative) legitimacy makes it especially difficult for Somaliland leaders to demand to be included.

One interviewee noted: “One of the major issues is that the communication of international organizations happens in Nairobi. That takes away the linkage or the contact between those who make decisions and the local communities. There is a wide gap. There is all that talk about consultation but in the real sense it does not take place. There are decision makers in Nairobi, who have local agents in the field who do the work for them and write reports, and the reports are used for justifying the work that has been done (…). If we look at those meetings in Nairobi; are the people who attend also those who represent the communities or even the local administrations, are they there when the decisions are taken? Nobody is represented from Somaliland”.

In addition to the lack of participation and representation it was also highlighted that such “detached‟ decision making easily ends up being misguided and not suited to respond to local challenges: “Decision making happens in Nairobi, and people there are confused…they are confused about the situation on the ground, confused about security issues, sometimes they even confuse Somaliland with Somalia”. The interviewee also indicated that the previous Somaliland minister of planning drafted a policy, which would make it obligatory for international aid offices in Hargeisa to be staffed with people holding decision making power, as this would provide direct access for local people and leaders to the decision makers in the aid community. According to the interviewee this policy has not yet reached and been endorsed at parliamentary level.

In fact distant Nairobi-based decision-making (including decision-making on issues of key significance for governance and institution building) can be seen as part of the production of contested overlapping sovereignties (in particular when considering the amounts of money involved) and accordingly local reactions indicate attempts to reassert the right to self-determination.

The pitfalls of external legitimation and funds

Another central theme in the discussion of international actors and legitimacy is the issue of how external legitimacy granted to selected actors or institutions – and the attendant supply of resources to these actors/institutions – affects local agendas and balances of authority and power; and how such externally granted legitimacy and resources can create gate keepers that do not necessarily hold local legitimacy.

The problem of externally granted legitimacy and resources derailing locally legitimate agendas is symptomatic in the Somali context and plays out on various levels (state and non state).

One example (also briefly addressed in part 4) is in the domain of international support to local NGOs in Somaliland. An interviewee explained “They (LNGOs) see the availability of funds, they focus on getting more and more funds … so, you will see local NGOs as hungry cats jumping from project to project, instead of building their capacity and expertise within specific areas”. In brief, supply-driven projects rather than locally legitimate processes and outputs become the driving force: “They will lose funding if they don‟t spend what they need to spend by the end of the project cycle, so international agencies will ask the local partners to do projects where the money can be used, rather than projects that are asked for by local people”.71 Similar logic, also plays out on the level of government in the context of South Somalia, where the international insistence on „state building‟ since 1991 has produced external legitimation and funding of government actors who lacked any local legitimacy, but nonetheless came to act as gate keepers for resources and decision making. The consequences of this, including escalation of conflict dynamics and radical de- legitimation of both the Somali government and of international actors, have been well documented by several researchers and policy analysts (see for example Hagmann and Terlinden 2005; Menkhaus 2008; Moe 2012; de Wall 2012 ). The issue has played out differently on the level of state institutions in the context of Somaliland (and in a sense represents the flipside) because the state is not internationally recognized. In this case state institutions have often been bypassed in internationally funded development projects because of “the legacy of the refusal of donors to channel funds through a government they do not recognise” (Elmi & Walls 2001:81). This has on some occasions left Somaliland line ministries severely under-capacitated to follow up on or maintain externally funded sector developments thus undermining state output legitimacy.72 The positive side to the lack of external recognition of state institutions, however, has been that the state in Somaliland historically has had to rely to a much greater extent on internal support and consent. Yet, recently, as institutional/governance aid to Somaliland (and other sub state polities) has become gradually more „acceptable‟ internationally, the issue of externally legitimized state-labelled „gate keepers‟ (with limited downward legitimacy) may also arise in Somaliland as will be indicated below.

The point is, in brief, that the issue of who, in the local context, are ascribed external legitimacy and accepted as „partners‟ (be it „state labelled‟ partners, or NGO/‟civil society‟ partners) in managing international funds and projects, is a deeply political and contested issue with profound local implications.

International blindness to everyday self-governance

A final key theme occurring in several of our interviews, is the issue of most international actors failing to engage with community capacities for self-governance and with local institutions that hold substantial legitimacy but fall outside the domain of „liberal civil society‟ (primarily NGOs) or „state authority‟.

As noted in part two (above), in Somaliland community leaders, institutions and traditional authorities are the key providers of everyday governance for local people, and offer mechanisms for community decision making processes and mobilisation. They also take care of about 80-90 % of conflicts, disputes, and crime (Gundel 2006: iii). Nevertheless, support to peace building and governance has largely ignored existing communal and customary institutions in the Somali context. Even international programs specifically targeting local level governance and peace, tend to suffer from insufficient participation of communities and their leaders, and lack of attempts to support linkages between local state institutions and traditional community institutions (see for example Gundel 2008). This is particularly problematic in the light of past years‟ increasing disconnect between district councils and local people.

Recent support to local governance in Somaliland and Puntland illustrates that while international reconstruction programs may have shifted towards sub-state polities, international actors continue to pursue „conventional‟ governance agendas aimed at installing (what at least approximates) rational legal authority, now just on a lower level.

One of the larger longer term and program-based international engagements that includes support to the Puntland and Somaliland administrations, is the Joint Program for Local Governance (JPLG) launched by the UN in 2008. The aim of the JPLG is to establish „good governance‟, improve social service delivery and enhance the credibility and legitimacy of local government (JPLG 2012). The program is seen to be “stretching the mandate of the UN” by launching an approach of engaging systematically with local government structures that do not have normative external legitimacy (as they operate under non-recognized political entities).73 While this may be an attempt to work „bottom up‟ (i.e. focusing beyond the central government) the program nevertheless, in line with mainstream approaches, relies on the notion that enhancing „efficiency‟ and seeking to strengthen rational-legal, bureaucratic authority, will automatically lead to empirically legitimate local governance. The approach focuses on „building the capacity‟ of local state institutions. The participating actors are therefore the mayor and deputy mayor, and the executive secretary who is appointed from the Ministry of Interior.74 The role of community members and community leaders is reduced to endorsing governance and development priorities pre-determined by the district authorities and the JPLG cycle. A JPLG officer interviewed in Hargeisa noted that „it is a matter of efficiency‟, i.e. decision-making with the communities is simply too time consuming. He also noted that firstly, „legally the district authorities have the mandate to provide services‟, secondly, that they have the overview and, thirdly, that „most communities have the same needs in any case‟. As for lower levels of authority, which are more rooted in community life, such as the councils of village elders/Village Councils76, he noted that JPLG does not prioritize the VCs because they are not there most of the time. What he referred to was that the VCs are often not established as per a legal framework, they typically don‟t have a clear structure but a more ad hoc composition, and the members tend to be selected not elected. They are therefore not seen as legal or representative/participatory. Paradoxically, the flexible composition of the VCs is what allows for the participation of different community members depending on contextual needs and human resources (see part two). However, „the local government program is not designed to work with them‟ but instead focuses on the district authorities, i.e. the institutions that have been ascribed at least some level of rational- legal legitimacy.

Strengthening and supporting the District Councils is no doubt crucially important for advancing local governance. Yet, the assumption that the legitimacy of the councils is given, because of their (semi)rational-legal status as elected state institutions, does not resonate with the findings of the in-depth study (of the Somali research institute SORADI quoted above) of people‟s perception of the DCs. As discussed, this study highlighted the lack of connection between the district councils and local people/institutions/community leaders, and the resulting legitimacy deficit of the DCs. The study explicitly states “The solution to this crisis is not simply a matter of improving the skills or technical capacities of local councillors or of pumping extra money into the system” (Yusuf & Bradbury 2011:9). In fact, treating district councils as the sole legitimate recipients for money and externally granted legitimacy can over time contribute to a gatekeeper problem (as discussed above), i.e. a situation where district authorities become „gate keepers‟ who promote their own agendas, while not responding to the needs of the communities they are supposed to represent. Also, an approach that presupposes the presence of legitimate district councils constituting the sole entry points for support to development and governance is ill suited to areas where the legitimacy of state authority is profoundly contested.79 In the absence of „state labelled entry points‟ these areas tend to be left out of support schemes. Accordingly international agencies have in border areas of Sool and Sanaag gotten the nickname „Boor iyo habaas‟, in English „dust and nothing‟, referring to the clouds of dust, visible from afar, that surround the land cruisers of international agencies who “come with a block of paper to make assessments, but then never return”.

As also indicated in previous sections, several interviewees argued (in line with the study by Yusuf and Bradbury 2011) that rather than simply supplying funds to strengthen rational legal and bureaucratic processes there is a need for widening community participation in decision-making and strengthening constructive linkages between existing authorities and processes embedded in communal and customary life, and the newer institutions of state authority.81 Gundel (2008) notes how this would entail pursuing legitimation of local governance not simply through a decentralization process (devolution of state power from above) but through a decentral process (also engaging with net-works of self-governance).

This poses challenges of both a normative and a practical nature to international intervention. The example of JPLG above illustrates how the tendency of international actors to think of legitimacy and authority in rather static, monolithic and exclusionary terms can be a barrier for engaging with or even noticing local everyday forms of self-governance and legitimate authority as this is enacted in more flexible and networked ways.

Exceptions to the rule: examples of international support to self-governance and hybridization of legitimacy

Examples of international programs supporting decentral processes, and providing support to already existing linkages between different forms of authority, so as to advance locally supported and legitimate governance, are scarce. They do exist, however, and some have been documented. They include for example: Action Aid‟s program for supporting community peacebuilding through engaging with the Council of Elders in Sanaag (Yusuf 2007); the participatory action research project on community peacebuilding and development in Daraweyne (Somaliland), documented in the field guide „Nabad iyo Caano‟ (Ford et al. 2002); the peace and justice partnership between Somaliland traditional leaders and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) (Moe and Vargas Simojoki, forthcoming). We will briefly outline these three examples, and then discuss their significance for the issue of legitimacy and international intervention/support.

Action Aid started working in Sanaag region in the early 1990s. An interviewee who used to be involved in the work explained: At the time there was no local government (state) in Sanaag region. It was the elders who were managing the affairs of the region and the people. So recognizing the elders as the legitimate authorities, Action Aid worked with and helped strengthen a regional guurti (a Council of Elders in the customary sense of the word, see part 1.2. above) that took on roles of coordinating development activities, driving reconciliation processes  and  managing  the  interaction  with  the  international  community. In the early phases, reconciliation was the key concern, because the sub-clans in Sanaag had been supporting different sides during the conflict (the Siad Barre forces versus the resistance movement, the Somali National Movement). In the beginning negotiations took place through intermediaries since the situation was too tense for conflicting clans to meet directly –women especially played a key role as messengers – but eventually the different sides agreed to come together in the rangelands. “That was how the Peace meetings started. We (Action Aid) were not organizing them, but supporting them. Whenever there was a peace meeting happening, we knew what they needed; they needed transport and they needed food, because they would be there sometimes for weeks. So we donated some food and fuel, that was all”.

Once the peace meetings had established some level of stability, Action Aid supported processes of exchange and dialogue between different communities, discussing development priorities and starting up cooperation around development activities. The interviewee explained that “development activities brought people together and became a means for cementing peace across clans and sub clans”. This is an example of international actors playing a low key, locally legitimate, role in the early processes of reconciliation and reconstruction in Somaliland –by facilitating “local institutional problem solving capacities” through support to “the communities‟ own cycle of action-experience-knowledge as stakeholders of a problem”.83 Since then, Action Aid has acted as a facilitator and channel for funding to Sanaag, but “without becoming an operator or producer of services” (Yusuf 2007:2).

Along very similar lines, the approach documented in the field guide „Nabad iyo Caano‟ (Ford et al. 2002) suggests a role for external actors facilitators of existing local communities‟ processes and capacities, and linking peacebuilding, development and governance. The field guide was developed through an engagement between the people of the community of Daraweyne and a group of activist researchers from a British NGO and an American university. The point of departure was to learn from how community members, local institutions and traditional authorities had managed to maintain relative peace through periods of high insecurity and conflict dynamics, how they had managed to balance clan relations, and how they had maintained their integration as a community. These insights were then developed into lessons/guidelines that can inspire development, peace and governance/local government work, and inform international engagement. In fact, the consultant report evaluating the first phases of the JPLG recommended the‟ Nabad iyo Caano‟ approach to assist in making the governance support more participatory and locally legitimate (Gundel 2008).

A third example is an international-local peace partnership that started up in 2003. That year a small group of traditional leaders in the Toghdeer region of Somaliland got together and discussed their concern over increasing insecurity and clan based revenge killings. They approached the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) to ask for support in starting dialogues and experience sharing among the traditional leaders from the different regions, and among customary actors and security providers from the state (police officers, judges and representatives from the ministries of interior and justice). Their aim was to improve cooperation and coordinate stronger joint efforts between the different justice and security providers to deal with the increasing insecurity. Recognizing the significance of the traditional system as the key system for conflict resolution, and its role in the interface of state security and justice provisions and traditional law, the DRC agreed on supporting the initiative. Similar to the example of Action Aid described above, DRC‟s support took the form of funding of transportation, food, and planning (often peace dialogues do not take place because the communities involved in the conflict simply do not have the resources to host the often lengthy meetings). The dialogues, and the improved cooperation between traditional leaders and state security providers, helped to significantly bring down the number of revenge killings, through building on, strengthening and further organizing existing forms of cooperation. The support to the creation of small-scale networks between community actors and leaders and the local state officials also resulted in partnerships between district authorities and peace committees of Aquils, in community policing institutions, and in the establishment of women‟s peace platforms in Sool and Sanaag. This shows possibilities for supporting relations between different providers of governance and security but also for strengthening possibilities for „ordinary‟ members of the communities to access the multi- layered governance and security architecture, and become actively part of the processes of contestation and negotiation that shape and reshape this architecture (see Moe & Vargas, forthcoming 2013). From 2008 DRC has initiated a more extensive and program based support to community driven recovery and development (CDRD). Similar to Action Aid and “Nabad iyo Caano‟, CDRD is intended to facilitate peacebuilding by enhancing trust and improving community cooperative governance around defining and implementing the development projects, and, where possible, engaging District Councils in oversight of the projects. CDRD also built on the achievements of the partnership with the traditional leadership and may offer pathways for strengthening the connection between local state government and community self-governance.84 In the organisations‟ own words its projects aim to “support the hybrid governance arrangements that exist across Somalia and that have helped manage conflict and provide basic order and security” (DRC 2010b: 14 with reference to forthcoming World Bank report). 85

1.2.  Prospects for multi-track support to peace and governance building: legitimacy, relationality and customary spaces for external engagement

The above examples illustrate possibilities for international actors working with the ongoing hybridization of legitimacy to find ways to avoid imposing (deliberately or unwittingly) one type of legitimate authority (the rational-legal legitimacy of state institutions). Facilitating hybridity means, inter alia, to open space and support fora for local people and political leaders to engage in dialogues about avenues for the improvement of the collaboration of different types of legitimate authorities and for the provision of socio-political frameworks in which the hybridization of legitimacy can be processed in a way that fosters peacebuilding and the non-violent conduct of conflict.

The forms of peace and order evolving through for example engagement and exchange between INGOs and community institutions and traditional conflict resolution actors are qualitatively different from international mainstream notions of (liberal) peace. Such exchange indicates possibilities for on-going networked forms of peace making rather than a “fixed‟ peace organized around statehood and territory. These possibilities are particularly promising in the Somali context where state power throughout history has been deeply contentious, and where attempts to exercise centralized authority are still met with profound distrust.

This is not to say that such exchanges are straightforward, or that custom and traditional leadership hold uncontested local legitimacy that can simply be tapped into in governance initiatives. As noted in part 1.2 and part 3 (above) traditional authority is at times profoundly politicized or presents violent contestation of state authority. Constructive international engagement with local and customary processes of self-governance needs to be based on an awareness of the socio political dynamics and relations, and must avoid taking over the process or inadvertently adding to politization through predetermined agendas or disproportionate funding. As noted by one interviewee “If you support a peace meeting and provide per diem the negotiation never ends –or new issues and conflicts will be created” 86. Moreover, traditional leaders, and local structures more widely, have on various occasions been instrumentalized as a means for reinforcing and „legitimizing‟ internationally-driven state building agendas, and along similar lines, state-centric approaches have in some cases been replicated on local/sub-state levels (and represented as „bottom up‟). In other words, the issue of how international actors can play roles that support the formation of locally legitimate political order and peace is complex and cannot be couched in clear and unambiguous   terms   of   support   to   „rational-legal‟/liberal   authority   versus “traditional‟/communal (ideal types of) authority, or in terms of „top down‟ versus „bottom up‟ (or similarly „dual track‟ and „building block‟) approaches.

It may, however, be worth reflecting on the ways in which underlying assumptions flowing from different concepts and experiences of political community (state-based, territorial, customary, relational) permit or conversely impede processes of exchange, contestation and participation.

As for state discourses, it is important to note that the critique of state-centrism (of mainstream international approaches) – a critique that runs through our analyses in this project – is not based on an argument that state authority and rational-legal procedure are not sources of legitimacy.87 Yet, colonial history as well as contemporary International Relations theory and „on the ground‟ experiences of international intervention demonstrate that when territory, sovereignty and state-based order/procedure are invoked as the dominating or sole referents for legitimate authority and come to establish the parameters for „permissible‟ public activity, then spaces for participation, contestation and exchange tend to become significantly reduced, and the „everyday‟ life of people left out. 88 As a result, international “state building actors‟ are often seen as “distant, unwilling to invest in meaningful engagement and subject to questionable motivations” (Elmi & Walls 2011: 79).

The potential of „hybrid‟ approaches, of the type discussed above, lies exactly with an engagement with the „everyday‟, in which legitimacy is pursued as a continuing process of exchange, tension, and participation, rather than as a status (of state institutions) that can be arrived at.

If the question of legitimacy is approached in these terms of exchange, participation and contestation, then Somali custom (understood in a much wider sense than a Weberian notion of „traditional authority‟) may offer opportunities for constructive and legitimate roles for external actors (supporting local initiatives as well state formation).

Elmi & Walls (2011) outline a set of cultural norms that suggest that a role for external actors “has always been permitted in Somali custom”. These norms comprise key aspects of the Somali Xeer (Le Sage 2005, Gundel 2006) setting the code for the conduct of war and conflict. They are summarized under the principle of biri-ma-geydo, which has been translated into English as „spared from the spear‟ (Bradbury 2008; Gundel 2006; Elmi & Walls 2011). This code provides protection for elderly, children, women, religious leaders as well as mediators intervening in good faith to halt the fighting (Gundel 2006; Elmi & Walls 2011).

Elmi & Walls (2011: 73) note that “These principles open a customary avenue for the intervention (and protection) of those engaging in mediation efforts; a position that could conceivably be extended to non-Somalis should they be seen as respected and appropriately informed in the context of the intervention. Where a constructive redefinition of „conflict‟ extended to the political realm, then it could be argued that the protection accorded to mediators in physical confrontation should also be available to those playing an equivalent role in political or developmental stand-offs” [our emphasis]. Within this frame of reference non-Somali external actors could strengthen the legitimacy of their role by operating within, and drawing flexibly on, norms and principles that are valued, legitimate and embedded in Somali society and customary life. These include for example: displaying transparency about the grounds for engagement; pursuing long-term sustained engagement; allowing for flexibility in terms of time frames; leaving key decisions to leaders whose legitimacy and authority is directly dependent on the support of their constituency; accessibility and immediacy of engagement, and, flowing from this; appreciating the significance of relationships and relationality (see part 2 above, on sources of customary legitimacy, see also Elmi & Walls 2011; Gundel 2006).

In a recent discussion of customary and indigenous resources for advancing peace building practices Brigg (2008) elaborates on the notions of relationality and networks. His analysis also engages with the issue of how different concepts of political life (and resulting models of engagement) may impede or, conversely, facilitate the development of viable and legitimate approaches to support peace and governance building. He notes that Western social and political science as well as international peace building models tend to rely on conceptualizations of governance as hierarchical and pyramidal institutional arrangements coordinated by a centralized authority. These conceptualizations reflect experiences of Western political life as it has evolved over centuries and foreground discrete entities (parties in a conflict, self-interested rational individuals, the sovereign state etc.) over relationships. This modelling of selfhood and political community is however culturally specific and can be rather “peculiar in the scheme of world cultures” (Brigg 2008: 3). As demonstrated in most peace building settings, including Somalia, the approaches based on these models tend to have significant challenges in coming to grips with the complex and heterogeneous connections and interactions of actors they encounter and therefore often end up reproducing the problems they set out to address. Along somewhat similar lines as Elmi & Walls (2011), Brigg (2008) argues that instead of searching for solutions in the conventional international “peace building toolbox‟, alternative and more viable and legitimate approaches may be pursued through engagement with local indigenous models of social and political organisation. Drawing on insights from fieldwork in Melanesia, Brigg (2008:2) introduces the notion of „networked relationality‟ to explain how “in contrast to western approaches, Melanesian people have prioritized relationships over entities to develop durable yet flexible systems for governing social and political life. Central here is the way local relationships contribute to an un-orchestrated yet recognisable order”. These notions of networked relationality and emergent order resonate significantly with the experience of locally driven peace building and reconstruction in the Somali context. As described in part 2 above the restoration of networks and interpersonal and inter-clan relationships is central for the legitimacy of customary mediation processes whether in cases of mediation or conflict resolution. While traditional leaders guard the interests of their clan, peace is approached within a broader shared frame of connectedness where pursuit of wider consensus and communal balance is key. Customary conflict resolution approaches were central for creating the conditions for the emergence of state institution. In line with Brigg‟s (2008) account of networked relationality, these developments in Somaliland involved a type of emergent organization in which integration and legitimate order occurred through micro-processes of restoring peaceful relationships “rather than through the actions of a superordinate and overarching coordinating entity” (Brigg 2008:5). It signifies a qualitatively different approach than the prevailing international approaches to Somalia which have persistently focussed on reviving central state authority in Mogadishu while lacking the means or will to provide for the dialogues, deliberation, and public participation that could have contributed to lay the foundations for legitimate political order.

The metaphor of network and the significance of interdependent relationality and emergent order also resonate with how processes and institutions of self-governance currently play out in Somaliland. As discussed in part 2 in this context custom is expressed for example as networks of support, reflecting a social reality in which vital linkages exist between individual experience/livelihood/protection and interpersonal connections and communal belonging.

Networked and relational approaches to peace and political ordering need not be antithetical to legitimate state based order –as is evidenced by the interplay in Somaliland between micro-processes of reconciliation and Somaliland-wide processes of institution building. Also, our interviews indicated that approaches that focus on strengthening connections, which span state institutions/hierarchy and customary self-governance/networks could be part of addressing the legitimacy deficit of the „local state‟ and help to produce more integrated socio-political frameworks for order and peace (part 2 and 3 above).

We do not wish to romanticize „traditional authority‟ or advocate for a „return‟ to past forms of authority and political organisation. We do want, however, to direct attention to models of social and political order that unsettle the emphasis on centralized coordination and discrete entities and instead also prioritize connection and interdependence and self-organization (Brigg 2008; see also Englund 2004). This does not counter-position Western and „non Western‟ notions of legitimate political community, but point to possibilities for pursuing legitimacy and order as relational issues, and for connecting government with networked and horizontal forms of organisation to in this way maintain channels for engagement between state and society. In the wake of the increasing critique and scrutiny of international approaches to peace and state building, a number of scholars (and scholars also working as practitioners) have in fact started to engage with models of networks, emergent order and relationality, as sources of inspiration for alternative approaches to peace building. Picking up on these developments Brigg suggests that “exchange between indigenous approaches and theories of complexity may be one avenue for both integrating peacebuilding efforts and pursuing a closer and more genuine and meaningful exchange with local peoples” (Brigg 2008: 9).

By Louise W. Moe