THE CASE FOR THE INDEPENDENT

STATEHOOD OF SOMALILAND

INTRODUCTION

 Violent political convulsions have gripped the Horn of Africa since the end of 1990.’ While the human drama unfolds, revealing its tragic dimensions, the international community continues to linger in a haze of apathy. Few countries have experienced as much carnage, destruction and instability as Somalia.’ The economic costs of the destruction are staggering,” and the extent of human rights violations, appalling. Ironically, this chaos was not supposed to happen.

 The Somalis are a cluster of indigenous peoples who have inhabited the Horn of Africa for well over a thousand years. During this millennia, they have existed in a land devoid of peace and prosperity. European colonial powers appeared in the nineteenth century, creating yet another episode of the African scramble and placing new pressures upon the Horn of Africa. The experience of colonialism at the hands of Britain and Italy, and the political flux that marked their departure, form the core causes of Somalia’s current turmoil.

 The state of Somalia came into existence in 1960, resulting from a merger between two independent states, Somaliland, a British Protectorate, and Somalia, an Italian Trust territory. In 1969, after a few years of civilian rule, the military, led by General Mohammed Siad Barre, overthrew the government in a bloodless coup.” General Barre ruled for the next two decades, with the alleged support of the Soviet Union.” This regime, marked by internal repression and external aggression, ended when the combined might of several liberation movements, including Somali National Movement (SNM), the Somali Salvation, Democratic Front, Somali Patriotic Movement, and the United Somali Congress, deposed General Barre in 1991. Instead of salvation however, the overthrow of General Barre’s regime only worsened the situation and resulted in a Hobbesian nightmare of internal fighting. While the war raged in and around Mogadishu, the capital of modem day Somalia, Somaliland remained stable.” Taking advantage of this situation, the SNM declared Somaliland independent on May 18, 1991.  This Comment explores the legal validity of Somaliland’s assertion of independence and argues for the recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. Section I discusses the validity of such independence in a historical perspective, dealing with the nature of sovereign rights over Somaliland. Section II posits arguments under international law for the exercise of such a right by the people of Somaliland. Section III analyses the concept of recognition and its conformity with existing international law. This Comment concludes that Somaliland should be recognized as an independent nation.

1. Validity of Independence in Historical Perspective

 Before examining the legality of the May 1991 assertion of Somaliland’s independence in the light of earlier international treaties, a brief description of the complex societal forces that lie behind the current conflict is useful. Somali society is based on kinship ties that emphasize membership in clans genealogically derived from Arab ancestors.  The clans that comprise the core of Somali society are the Digil, Rahanweyn, Dir, Hawaiye, Darod, and Isaq.'” The dynamics of interaction between these clans have traditionally determined the distribution of political power in Somalia at any given moment.’

 A. THE LEGAL REGIME OF STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY

 Central to the legality of Somaliland’s assertion of independence is the extent to which such assertions manifest sovereignty over the territory, and therefore constitute a valid basis for the formation of a state.’ The acquisition of territorial sovereignty embodies several international legal principles, including sovereignty, the territorial integrity of states, effectiveness, recognition and self-determination.” To be valid, Somaliland’s assertion of independence must fulfill the operational standards of these doctrines. Of primary importance is the interplay between the doctrines of territorial sovereignty and statehood.”‘ The doctrine of territorial sovereignty remains a central element in the concept of statehood. Territorial sovereignty is acquired in one of five ways: occupation of terra nullius, prescription; cession; accession; and subjugation.’ This scheme relies upon the civil law modes of inter vivos transfer of property and does not provide for the situation where a new state comes into existence.” This hands-off approach is due to the complexities involved in evaluating the emergence of the new state according to international law or municipal law. A new state is normally born within the sphere of constitutional law or of civil strife. Accordingly, its legal status is perched perilously on the borderline between international law and municipal law. Given the traditional propensity of international law to treat statehood as existing within the walls of domestic jurisdiction, the new state’s title of sovereignty’ inevitably depends on the largesse of the doctrine of recognition.’ The rules regarding the acquisition of territory, creation of states and title, however, have been subjected to the standards of contemporary international law on the use of force” and human rights.”

 B. SOVEREIGNTY UNDER THE TREATIES OF 1884 AND THE ACT OF UNION OF 1960

 In the nineteenth century, Britain’s primary, if not exclusive, interest in Somaliland was its need to safeguard the meat supplies to Aden and to ensure the safety of the trade routes.’ Tired of Egyptian rule and faced with the prospects of expansionist moves by Abyssinia, the Somali clans readily consented to British protection.” By the end of 1884 the Ise, Gadabursi, Habar Garhajis, Habar Awal, and Habal Tol Jalo clans had signed formal treaties with Great Britain.’ These agreements were treaties of friendship and commerce, and ostensibly conceded little to Britain.’ The preamble to each clan treaty set forth that the document was designed to maintain clan independence.” No treaty contained clauses relating to cession of territory; the clans merely pledged Britain a right of pre-emption. The treaties only granted one such right; the right for British agents to reside on the Somali coast.’ Most of the treaties contained clauses expressly declaring the treaties as provisional and subject to revocation or modification. The treaties therefore left a large measure of sovereignty in the hands of the clan occupying the land. The power to enact such treaties can itself be considered as an essential concomitant of sovereignty? Thus, for example, if the Somalia which existed after 1960 refused to recognize the 1897 and 1954 Anglo Ethiopian agreement as violations of the 1884 Anglo-Somali treaties, its refusal was legitimate. Some Western nations attempted to strip such agreements with non-Europeans of any legal status.” These agreements are now, however, accepted as signifying the personality of both the ruler and the people concerned. As a result, under the Anglo-Somali treaties of 1884, the Somalilander chiefs and their peoples retained considerable residual sovereign powers and certainly existed as international persons. The seminal document of the twentieth century was the Act of Union which established Somalia as a separate state in 1960.’ Several factors, however, undermined its chances for success. Civilian rule, re-established in the North in 1948, did not exist in Southern Somalia, which had been under a ten-year Italian Trusteeship since 1950.” The two territories were separated institutionally, linguistically and historically. As a consequence, the two territories qualified as two individual countries.’ With little binding them together, there was no driving force to create a single country. Two events, however, are credited for inspiring the 1960 unification. First, in 1946, the Bevin proposals suggested that British Somaliland and Italian Somalia as well as part of Ethiopia should be grouped together to ensure that the nomads’ way of life continue in an unobstructed manner.” These proposals directly influenced the Somali Youth League (SYL),” inspiring the ominous campaign of “Greater Somali” irredentism.” The second factor was the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty, which permitted the British to cede parts of Somalia to Ethiopia.’ The ensuing outcry stimulated political activity in an otherwise dormant Somaliland,’ and led to a campaign for unification and independence.’ Political parties, however, were unable to capitalize fully on the mobilization of political emotion. The leadership of Somaliland National League (SNL) preferred to postpone unity, the SYL experienced internal divisions,” and the Somaliland Isaq clans were generally apathetic towards the aspirations of the SYL. As part of the process of decolonization, the British government announced that the Protectorate would become independent on June 26, 1960. The Italian government later announced that the Italian trust territory would gain independence five days later, on July 1, 1960.” These dates reflected the United Nations’ desire for more speedy independence.  The advancement of the independence dates put undue pressure on the internal administrations of both territories. Furthermore, with no one responsible for laying the legal foundations for the Union and few consultations between the Somaliland and Somalia, ‘ the result was the “precipitate Union”.” Delegates from Somaliland and Somalia were to sign an international treaty between the two states to form a union, after which the Mogadishu Legislative Assembly was to approve the document.’ Subsequently, the National Assembly should have elected a Provisional President.  On June 27, 1960, the day after its independence, Somaliland’s Legislative Assembly passed the Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law.  Since the authorized representative of Somalia never signed this treaty, however, it remained without force in Somalia.” Instead, on June 30, 1960, the Legislative Assembly of Somalia approved the Atto di Unione (Act of the Union) in principle, which was significantly different from the Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law.’ At midnight on June 30, 1960, the Italian Trusteeship Agreement expired and the President of the Legislative Assembly, acting in his capacity as the Provisional President of the Republic, proclaimed the independence of Somalia.” On January 31, 1961, the National Assembly proclaimed a new Act of Union, repealing the Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law and made the Act of Union retroactive as from July 1, 1960.’ The act of “repealing”, however, was not effective in all of Somalia.’ Furthermore, since Somalia, in negotiation with Italian officials, drafted the constitution, Somalilander politicians could make only marginal changes.” The referendum on the Constitution in June 1961 reflected Somalilander resentment of Somalia power. The SNL successfully campaigned against ratification, contributing to the low turnout in Somaliland; only 100,000 voted,’ and they overwhelmingly rejected the Constitution. ‘ In contrast, almost 1,852,660 voted in Somalia.

II. Arguments for Independence Under Contemporary International Law

 The state of Somaliland and its people existed as sovereign international persons” until the Act of Union, at which time Somaliland sought unification with Somalia. The unification effort, however, fell short of the legal requirements mandated by domestic and international law.’ With nothing more than the recognition of other states to testify to the existence of Somalia as a unified state,” it is necessary to consider the legal grounds on which Somaliland can reassert itself on the international plane.

 A. VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

 An accepted, enduring maxim in legal and political theory is that the deprivation of basic human rights justifies rebellion.” Although international law justifies rebellion, domestic law does not, and indeed cannot, entertain such possibilities.” Domestic law, however, is not dis positive of the existence of such a right under international law.’ International law lacked a theoretical and normative basis for the articulation and expression of the right to secede” until the development of the human rights jurisprudence in general, and more specifically self-determination. Self-determination is the only norm which can simultaneously destroy and build. The Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the right to rebel against a government guilty of egregious violations of human rights.” Various international instruments enumerate international human rights. These include the International Bill of Rights, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,’ several regional instruments,” and pieces of national legislation.’ These documents clearly set forth certain rights such as freedom from torture, detention without charges or trial and rights to life, liberty and security of persons; these rights are not to be violated under any circumstances because they constitute rules of jus cogens.  Accordingly, if the political establishment engages in violating these rights on a genocidal scale, the people may claim a right to self-determination through secession.’ In addition, this right to se cede acquires greater legitimacy if the pattern of human rights violations indicates an attempt by the state to decimate a distinctly identifiable group.” Siad Barre’s regime killed, tortured and imprisoned thousands of Somalis over the years.’ His government looted and destroyed private property through the security apparatus established with the help of the former German Democratic Republic and the KGB.” Barre unleashed the full fury of his regime’s thuggery against the wealthier and independent Isaq clan in Somaliland.” The human rights violations included summary executions, rape, torture, imprisonment, or detainment without charges or trial, and the theft of private property.’ The genocidal attack on the Isaq clan intensified with the military bombing and shelling of the northern cities, Hargeisa and Burao. The government staged a selective campaign to bum down Isaq towns.’ During the course of the 1988 civil war, 50,000 people were killed and another 500,000 were forced to flee to Ethiopia.’ Government forces also laid over a million unmarked land mines in the North. These acts flagrantly violated not only human rights norms but also humanitarian norms relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts. The attempt to annihilate the Isaq also had economic dimensions. The government diverted development investment ” and livestock trade from the north.”

 B. SELF-DETERMINATION

 In light of these massive and egregious violations of human rights and the genocidal repression of the North, the people of the former state of Somaliland declared independence in 1991. By declaring independence, the people of Somaliland exercised their inherent right of self-determination.

 1. Nature of “Self” in Self-Determination

 The difficulty in defining “self” in self-determination is evinced by a comment by I.W. Jennings who said that self-determination is nonsensical because the people cannot exercise the right to decide until someone else determines who constitutes the people. ‘ Such a claim stems from the positivist belief that the membership in the international community is restricted to already-existing states in law and fact.” The right to acquire legal status creates, in Fitzmaurice’s words, a “logical impasse” because such a right cannot vest in any extra-legal entity.’ As a result, the birth of a state lies outside international law until a new situation has been definitely established, and the situation is normal in terms of territorial sovereignty.’ Once such a definitive new situation has been established in law and fact, a state becomes a member of the international community.’ This view leads, in turn, to the constitutive view of recognition whereby the act of recognition determines temporally the birth of a state.” Despite the seemingly irrefutable logic of the positivist argument, the inevitability of a logical impasse is not readily apparent. If only entities that are already members have a right to become members, the existence of such a right becomes redundant.” In other words, a right to acquire legal status – a right to self-determination- can by definition, vest only in an entity that lacks legal status.”  Viewed this way, no logical impasse occurs and the positivist objections seem less relevant. Similarly, Lauterpacht argues, that the duty to recognize carries a correlative right that, although imperfect, can still vest in an entity not yet recognized’ At the other end of the spectrum lies the claim that the right to self-determination must be viewed as a distinct historical phenomenon, and that its validity depends on the extent of domination.’ The Fitzmaurice thesis views international community along a horizontal axis, whereas the latter postulates a vertical approach.'” The historical approach, while conceding that people of a given territory could claim the right to self-determination, introduces “subjugation” as a prerequisite to self-determination.” Such a view suffers from the logical inconsistency that subjugation exists only in the context of colonialism and that colonialism no longer exists.”‘ If correct, using subjugation as the prerequisite for self-determination is pass unless subjugation extends to non-colonial situations.

 These two theories about the nature of self-determination coincide with the competing definitions of “self”: one subjective and the other, objective.” The subjective view considers factors internal to a people,’ and the objective approach depends on external criteria that apply to a new state whether or not the people consent.” The Fitzmaurice thesis would seem to fit in well with the objective conception of self, since criteria such as territory, culture, recognition and the like, qualify a people for the right to self-determination.” On the other hand, a subjective theory would accept such factors as political struggle and domination.” Yet, each category is not impervious to the other. There exists a complex dynamic in the tension between the subjective and objective theories. This tension suggests alternative solutions to controversies such as that of Somaliland where traditional law suspends its operation. Indeed, the debate about “self” contrasts alternative forms and bases of international law.”

  The concept of self-determination has been part of intellectual discourse for centuries. The French Revolution provides early examples of arguments over the principle of self-determination.”‘ Both Woodrow Wilson of the United States” and Vladimir Lenin of the former Soviet Union” popularized the concept around the turn of this century. After lying dormant during the period between World Wars I and II,’ the principle again acquired currency in the Atlantic Charter in 1941 and was incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations.” Numerous U.N. General Assembly Resolutions, the International Bill of Rights,” and many decisions of the International Court of Justice” recognize the right of self-determination. Despite the convincing argument that self-determination should be a general right, ” a penumbra of uncertainty still surrounds the concept.” International jurists agree generally that peoples dominated by geographically distant powers have a right to self-determination.  The traditional anti-colonial interpretation of self-determination,”‘ however, was inappropriate when colonialism disappeared 3’ even though claims to self-determination continue to arise throughout the world.” In order to retain its place in the realm of international relations, self-determination doctrine must adopt to modem circumstances where local governments, not distant powers, repress independent peoples.'” The subjective and objective notions of self-provide a basis for discourse.” Neither notion of self-taken individually, however, explains the rhetoric and practice of self-determination, especially in the context of Somaliland. The following sections propose a three-tiered argumentative structure that accommodates the peculiarities of Somaliland. First, even when a state forms through processes of severe international political dislocation, international law has competence to determine the state’s status through the tool of self-determination. Second, during such determination, the unit seeking international status is quasi-sovereign in nature. Third, the subjective and objective theories of self are complimentary rather than mutually exclusive.

2. The Argumentative Structure and Application

 In 1920, a distinguished Commission of Jurists appointed by the League of Nations gave an opinion on a dispute between Finland and Sweden over the Aaland Islands.”  Finland objected to international jurisdiction, arguing that questions of territory were matters of internal jurisdiction, whereas Sweden argued that Aaland Islanders had shown their desire to be united with Sweden through their political and military struggles.'” The Jurists rejected Finland’s objections and set forth certain observations about the nature of self-determination.” While acknowledging the complementary nature of fact and law in sovereignty during normal times,’ they applied a distinction between fact and law during political upheavals. According to the Jurists, the “essential basis” of law is sovereignty during normal times, but at cataclysmic moments of a sovereign’s birth or death, the legal situation is “obscure and uncertain”, and there is a transition from fact to law.  During this transition, the right to self-determination of people may come into existence.” To determine how the right can be exercised, the Jurists recounted the historical facts that indicated the nature of sovereignty over the Aaland Island.” This argumentative pattern may be described as a mixture of subjective and objective views of “self”. In order to explain subjective facts, the Jurists employed objective criteria. This method is uniquely applicable to the crisis in Somaliland where there is a transition from fact to law. Verzijl remarked that the Somali protectorate enjoyed a quasi-international status.  Such status derived from an inherent sovereignty in people,’ a sovereignty that lies dormant until it expresses itself through the medium of self-determination. This argument is analogous to Judge McNair’s opinion in the International Status of West Africa,” which discussed the nature of sovereignty over a mandated territory.” Judge McNair declared that the goal of the mandate system is to revive sovereignty in the dependent peoples.”‘ Since the ultimate goal of the mandate system was the self-determination and independence of the peoples effected,” a fortiori, one can conclude that the denial of human rights leads to the people’s revival of their sovereignty through self-determination. In other words, the denial of a people’s internal self-determination”‘ leads to the revival of their external right of self-determination. As discussed above, this analysis of self-determination can be usefully employed in the political vacuum created by former Somalia’s disintegration and Somaliland’s declaration of independence. Objective criteria reveal the people of Somaliland to be ethnically distinct,” culturally separate,” and historically unique.’

Subjective factors also exemplify the uniqueness of their battle, first against the British colonizers and then against Said Barre’s despotic regime. Both the objective and subjective factors combine to influence the discussion concerning the right of the people of Somaliland to determine their legal status.’ Since Somaliland is entitled to exercise the right to self-determination, the appropriate mode of self-determination needs to be addressed. General Assembly Resolution 1514 provided for three legitimate methods of decolonization.  In addition, a strong presumption exists in favour of independence and bestowal of statehood in self-determination situations.'” There is no reason to deny Somaliland statehood. Somaliland’s need for self-determination and independence is especially valid because nationhood may assist Somaliland in resolving longstanding regional disputes with Ethiopia and Djibouti.’

 C. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

 The U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations wants to declare 1993 as the Year of Indigenous Peoples. The current interest in indigenous rights is not a fad,” but is traceable to Vitoria.’. and Grotius.”‘ The early decisions of Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States Supreme Court also contained these broad and universalist conceptions.” The wave of positivism that followed stifled interest in indigenous rights by stressing state-centred, consensual, sovereign bases of international law.’ The positivist doctrinal tools used to exclude indigenous peoples included recognition’ and occupation of terra nullius.” The efforts” to exclude indigenous peoples from the political decision-making process were contrary to earlier international scholarship and judicial decisions.” The reemergence of interest in indigenous rights is an effort to restore international law to its roots. The inclusion of self-determination in the international legal lexicon and the anticolonialism drive in the 1960s are arguably the intellectual origins of this restorative process.’ As a result of increased activity by advocacy groups, indigenous rights began to emerge as a legal norm after 1972.’ The norm, as it emerged, emphasized cultural protection, aboriginal land issues, welfare programs and self-determination.” The International Labor Organization (ILO) amended an earlier 1957 Convention to reject that Convention’s assimilationist approach to indigenous populations. Additionally, a Working Group on Indigenous Peoples by the Economic and Social Council was established in 1982.'” A recent United Nations study” defines an indigenous population as non-dominant sectors of society, distinct from minorities, who emphasize their ties to territories based on their original occupation and historical experience.’ The people of Somaliland fulfil all the criteria of an indigenous people. Somaliland is mainly comprised of one big ethnic group, Isaq, that has lived there for more than 825 years to millennia.  Members of the Isaq clan possess a unique history and are culturally distinct.’ As a result, the people of Somaliland can exercise the right of self-determination that inheres in every indigenous group.”

 III. The Arguments for Recognition

 Recognition is one of the central elements of a consensual international order.’ As a tool of international relations, recognition has played a critical part in the history of colonization by providing an exclusionary mechanism for European states.'” In contemporary international law, the role of recognition is much less significant, and is pertinent only insofar as it allows a people to internationalize their claims.

 A. THE ROLE OF RECOGNITION

 Traditionally, two theories of recognition exist. Under the constitutive theory, new states derive their existence in accordance with the will of those already established,'” so a state becomes an international person only through recognition.”‘ The declaratory theory, on the other hand, holds that once a state satisfies the criteria of statehood it becomes a subject of international law,” and recognition merely serves as a political act of no legal significance.” The constitutive view as formulated, suffers from several defects. State practice seems to contradict the view that prior to recognition no legal person exists,'” and the constitutive view does not cope with the status and obligations of an unrecognized state. ” ‘ The main weakness of the declaratory view is that it relegates the act of recognition to that of a mere act of political will and makes it superfluous.'” Other variants of these theories exist. Lauterpacht suggested that once a state satisfies the criteria of statehood, a legal duty to recognize arises,” but state practice does not evidence this duty.” Nevertheless, as long as recognition remains discretionary, it remains outside the scope of law and, as a result, the characterization of recognition as constitutive or declaratory lacks utility.” Nonetheless, even though a duty to recognize may not exist, if an entity possesses attributes of statehood, other states may put themselves at risk if they fail to recognize the entity.’ This discussion of recognition leads to the question of whether Somaliland possesses the indicia of statehood. The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States provides the classic definition of a state.’ Under this convention, a state should possess a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.'” One may also add the qualification of self-determination to this definition.” Somaliland clearly possesses all of the above qualifications. Finally, one must consider the question of whether the recognition of Somaliland constitutes premature recognition.’ Many states consider premature recognition an unfriendly act amounting to intervention.” The situation in Somaliland defies even a consideration of premature recognition, because a mother state does not exist to reassert control, and the SNM clearly has effective control over the territory.”

 B. CONFORMITY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW

 Given Somaliland’s strong claim for recognition under international law, one must briefly consider the possible objections to such recognition. For example, dismemberment of an existing state violates the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) policy of adherence to colonial boundaries for recognition may trigger a Balkanization which would completely upset the existing boundary arrangements. Such a fear, however, is unfounded for many reasons. First, the OAU doctrine seeks to preserve colonial boundaries; the 1960 Somaliland “colonial” boundaries do coincide with the boundaries of Somaliland as it exists today. Second, the OAU doctrine concerns itself with the preservation of boundaries and not with units of self-determination.’ In other words, as long as there is no threat to interstate peace, OAU policy remains irrelevant to the discussion. Third, even if the colonial boundary policy is relevant, Somalia had rejected this OAU doctrine by its irredentist policies regarding the French Territory of the Afars and Isaas (Djibouti), the Ogaden (Ethiopia) and the North Eastern region of Kenya.’ Somaliland’s emergence conforms with the OAU policy and could contribute to much needed regional stability, cooperation and economic development.” Some experts argue that the recognition of Somaliland may violate the territorial integrity of Somalia, an act that international law prohibits.”  Such an objection also seems to have no basis. First, the question of whether recognition will violate territorial integrity is necessarily bound with the issue of whether such recognition will be premature, and the previous section answered that question in the negative.” Second, when claims of territorial integrity clash with those of self-determination, United Nations practice allows the latter to trump the former.

This means that in self-determination situations, the wishes of the people concerned are the only relevant factor. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the international community to recognize Somaliland. Any effort to deny or delay would not only put the international community at the risk of ignoring the most stable region in the Horn, it would impose untold hardship upon the people of Somaliland due to the denial of foreign assistance that recognition entails.

 Conclusion

 The tragedy in Somalia is apocalyptic in its dimensions and yet the international community has not stirred from its soporific stance of apathy. Andrew Natsios, the Assistant Administrator for Food and Humanitarian Assistance has expressed disappointment in the United Nations’ failure to become engaged in Somalia.” While such humanitarian concerns continue to mount, the reduced strategic value that Somalia holds after the end of the Cold War explains the neglect displayed by the Western powers.’ Such factors, however, should not obstruct the recognition of Somaliland as an independent state due to the internal and external peace-generating potential it holds. The birth of Somaliland inevitably resulted from a combination of a distinct colonial experience, extreme economic exploitation and human suffering.”‘ The irredentist policies of Somalia and the systematic discrimination bordering on genocide alienated the northern populations which never acceded to the Union in the first place. The international community has a rare opportunity to bring peace and prosperity to the Horn, before the warlords of butchery in Mogadishu wipe out the evanescent hopes of independence in Somaliland.”

By a single act of recognition, the international community can end the sad saga of human suffering, enhance the prospects for peace in the region by putting an end to the Greater Somalia concept, and enable the people of Somaliland to reclaim their future.

By Anthony J. Carroll & B. Rajagopal