Ethio–Somaliland Relations Post-1991: Challenges and Opportunities

ABSTRACT – The purpose of this paper is to present some critical issues related to the challenges and prospects of Ethio–Somaliland relations regarding in economic and political aspects. The central idea of the paper is that the current governments of Ethiopia and Somaliland managed to overcome the serious challenges against peace, development and economic cooperation keeping in mind that the two neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa – Ethiopia and Somalia – were having distressed relations. The collapse of the Somali state and the subsequent separation of Somaliland from Somalia, Ethiopia established both diplomatic and economic relations and is not the only country that maintains a significant diplomatic presence in Hargeisa but it is one of Somaliland’s most important bilateral partner. The two countries normally have friendly ties, with landlocked Ethiopia providing training and security assistance to Somaliland in return for using Somaliland’s port of Berbera.

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War and demise of the two socialist-oriented regimes of Ethiopia and Somalia, there has been a series of changes and substantial improvements regarding Ethio-Somaliland relations following the collapse of the Somali state 1991. These relations led the two countries and their respective peoples to be better involved in the development of the relations and other important advancements taking place.

The focal point of this paper is to understand the growing relations between the two neighboring countries of Ethiopia and Somaliland, their collaboration relating to mitigate conflict and to build peace in the region. The analysis is aimed at gaining a better understanding of the issue, explaining fundamental concepts, and developing the approaches which Ethiopia and Somaliland has utilized to put cornerstone for a functioning peace and collaboration in a volatile region bearing in mind the former uneasy relations of Ethio-Somalia.

The bulk of this paper was carried out in the capital Addis Ababa, Hargeisa and Togochale. However, this paper is not going beyond indicating the relations between the two countries and critically highlights the challenges and opportunities of these relations. Similarly, it optimistically tries to understand the mutual concern of these relations.

The paper discusses the current political realities of the two countries, including some of the recent efforts in improving the cooperation, the implications of the war against terrorism, and the prospects and the challenges of the relations. The paper concludes by suggesting a move toward maintaining the growing relations between the two countries and societies which can build on an existing regional stability that could escort the region to peace, prosperity and development in the long run.

3. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

The uneasy relations between Ethiopia and Somalia basically emanate from claiming people and land in the adjacent area (irredentism), which led the two neighboring countries to go to bloodiest wars ever-witnessed in the Horn of Africa during the Cold War era. Although, the Haud, Reserve Area and surrounding areas are inhabited by Somalis, they were incorporated into the Ethiopian Empire during the „Scramble of Africa‟, on the basis of treaties and agreements signed between Ethiopia and its European „neighbors‟. This historically determined status quo has been rejected by the newly independent Somalia, which has made it a sacred obligation to struggle for the decolonization‟ of the whole region (Amare, 1989). However, for over four decades, relations between successive Ethiopian governments and Somalia have not been smooth and easy. Principally, Ethio-Somali relations were full of mistrust and political hostility between the two regimes. Consequently, every regime was plotting against one another and hosted their respective dissident groups (tit-for-tat) such as, the Somali National Movement (SNM), the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and United Somali Congress (USC) sponsored by Ethiopia; while Somalia sponsored the Tigray People‟s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the Eritrean Popular Liberation Forces/Front (EPLF). The major concerns of these two regimes were to weaken and ultimately destroy each others‟ government respectively.

The conflict in the Horn has involved swiftly changing series of cross-cutting alliances which has made the outcome uncertain. For example, at one time both the Soviet Union and Israel were on the Ethiopian side, giving considerable military aid. While the Soviet Union also maintained a military presence in Somalia during the early part of the confrontation, and the Saudis promised unlimited petro-dollar support if the Somali government would abandon its Socialist-oriented policy in favor of Islamic ones (Bereket, 1980). However, historically Saudi involvement in Somali politics has been deep (Medhane, 2002). In the same way, the strategic content of U.S. policy in the Horn of Africa must be seen in terms of the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, predominantly Southern Africa, for two reasons: The first has to do with the position toward the struggle in the Horn adopted by the dominant Arab states, in particular Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and the second with position expressed in the Organization of the African Unity (OAU) by the black African governments. U.S.-Arab cooperation in the Horn is determined by a mutual interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict and in the Arabs‟ long-term policy on oil (Bereket, 1980). As for the African consideration, the African governments‟ interest in preserving the postcolonial status quo puts them on the side of Ethiopia to Ethio-Somalia conflict, which Somalia viewed as an aggressor. However, the Soviet turned to Ethiopia‟s side over the Ethio-Somali conflict stole the tactical political thunder from the United States of America (Ibid).

In the late-1970s, the Ethiopian government at that time gave support to two movements that began sporadic armed opposition to the Siad Barre dictatorship in Somalia. The first was the Somali National Movement (SNM) which operated in the northwest, in part of what had been British Somaliland, essentially among the Isaq clan. The other movement to benefit from Ethiopian assistance was the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which operated in the northeast, largely appealing to those clans, particularly Majerten, of the Darod clan other than Siad‟s own, the Marehan, which also saw themselves as marginalized (Lionel, 1999: 91). Ethiopia‟s support to the above-mentioned two Somali rebellious groups, especially the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the Somali National Movement (SNM), was to use against its enemy Siad Barre. Somalia retaliated by giving support to the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) – a guerrilla organization sponsored by the Somali government (Berouk, 2004). In addition, the Barre government was also the major sponsor of other Ethiopian armed rebellious groups. The current ruling party of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Peoples‟ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) which is an umbrella of different parties such as Tigray People‟s Liberation Front (TPLF) that took part the overthrow of the Derg regime, received assistance from Somali authorities and a number of the EPRDF leaders reportedly carried Somali-issued passports (Ted, 2009: 18). Other rebel groups, including the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), also received assistance from Somalia.

On the other hand, the down fall of the Siad Barre government and the absence of a central authority in Somalia ended support for Ethiopian armed groups. Although Somali factions continue to support the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Ethiopia‟s major concern was preventing the growing influence of the Islamists in Somalia which it sees as potential threat to its security and that gets support from particular Gulf States like Saudi Arabia. In the same way, Saudi Arabia was uneasy about the emergence of the EPRDF and EPLF which it saw as movement of leftist orientation. It was then seen as sympathetic toward the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) and the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO) which operated in eastern Ethiopia (Kinfe, 2004).

As it was discussed above, following the collapse of the Somalia central authority in 1991; Somaliland which previously united with the Italian Somaliland in 1960, declared its independence from the rest of Somalia, claiming the boundaries which the British government handed over on 26 June 1960. Although unrecognized by any country or inter-governmental organization since its unilateral declaration of separation from Somalia, Ethiopia maintains close relations with that de facto Somaliland. Ethiopia became the first State that de facto recognized it by opting to send diplomatic mission to Somaliland and opened a trade office that serves as a Consulate in Hargeisa.

4. ETHIO–SOMALILAND RELATIONS: DECADES OF RELATIONSHIPS

4.1 Ethio–Somaliland Relations Pre–1991

The most important factor which determines Ethio-Somaliland relations is the strategic location where Somaliland situated. Furthermore, there were no political relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland. In this regard Somaliland was part and parcel of the Somali state, before an armed clan-based militias managed to overthrow the long-time ruler General Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991. In the same manner, Somaliland’s location in the northern part of the Somali state made it subject to the successive conflicts erupted between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1964 and 1977-19782. Contrary to this, the political vendetta and antagonism between the two governments of Ethiopia and Somalia did not have an effect on the Ethiopians and Somaliland societies; however, as one of Somaliland former ministers argues that even while the two communities were overseas, both Ethiopians and Somaliland people were friends with the existence of the political vendetta between the two regimes.

On the other hand, although Somaliland was not separate from the rest of Somalia before 1991, due to the existence of the geographic proximity, there were both people-to-people and Muslim-to-Muslim (faith) relationships. Hence, the major factor that serves as a bandage between the two communities as indicated earlier is the Somali Region of Ethiopia which connects the remote heartland of Ethiopia to the Somaliland cities. It deserves to mention century’s long trading system between the two neighboring communities, such as trade transactions between the cities of Berbera on one hand, Dire Dawe, Harar, Jijiga and Wardher on the other. Moreover, the emergence of the armed movements against the Barre regime; particularly, the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), diminished the hostility between the two nations, and downgraded the Somalia’s irredentism and its claims to the eastern part of Ethiopia inhabited Somalis4. Furthermore, the Somali National Movement (SNM) managed to break up the political hostility, suspicion and the standoff between Ethiopia and the Somaliland people by breaking the shield of the conflict.

Even though Ethiopia served as the base of the Somali National Movement (SNM), there were no political or state-to-state relations between the two sides before the emergence of the armed movements. Moreover, it was proxy relations since the armed movements were getting sanctuary from the Ethiopian government. The only durable relation which this movement restored and created is the people-to-people relationship and communication. This laid down the foundation for future relations both before the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 and afterwards6. On the other hand, since Somaliland is strategically close to the strategically sensitive places of Ethiopia such as Dire Dawe, Harar and Jijiga, both Ethiopia and Somaliland are vulnerable to any conflict which could erupt and destabilize the whole region. Therefore, Ethiopia is prone any conflict from the northern Somalia (Somaliland) than the southern Somalia, since the later is too far from the strategically sensitive locations of Ethiopia.

4.2 Ethio–Somaliland Relations from 1991–1993

As soon as the clan-based armed movements managed to remove from power the long-time ruler of Somalia, General Mohamed Siad Barre, Somalia which was the makeup of British and Italian colonies united to form the “Greater Somalia” disintegrated into regions, and heavily armed warlords emerged in mainland Somalia. Somaliland which was British Protectorate proclaimed its independence from the rest of Somalia, claiming the colonial boundaries inherited from the British government in 1960. Furthermore, Somaliland adopted a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the neighboring states. In addition, Ethiopia de facto recognized the peace and stability in Somaliland as a stable region compared to the hostility going on its neighboring southern part of Somalia. Ethiopia pursued a policy which maintains that if the conflict in the southern part of Somalia continued it may affect the relative peace and stability of Somaliland.

In the same way, when the people of Somaliland defeated the autocratic rule of Mogadishu, the current ruling coalition of Ethiopian Peoples‟ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) also managed to overthrow the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia. This means the dissident groups both in Ethiopia and Somalia succeeded to defeat the two Socialist-oriented regimes in the Horn of Africa9. Subsequently, when the Somali National Movement (SNM) managed to end the rule of Barre, and declared the independence of Somaliland from the remaining part of Somalia, the Somali National Movement (SNM) Chairman Abdirahman Ahmed Ali was inaugurated as the first President of Somaliland. Nevertheless, from 1991 to the end of 1992, there were no official relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland, because there was civil war which was going on in Somaliland. That civil war was the major challenge which obstructed the foundation of official relations between the two neighboring countries10. Therefore, although Ethiopia and Somaliland maintained close relations in different sectors; these relations started officially after the formation of the second administration of Somaliland led by Mohamed Ibrahim Egal in 1993. Since then, Ethiopia strategically regards Somaliland as its closest ally in the Horn of Africa11.

4.3 Ethio–Somaliland Relations from 1993–2002

Somalia’s state collapse caused the dismantling of the state institutions throughout the country. At this stage it is important to note that, Somaliland was the region which spearheaded the Somalia’s state collapse and its disintegration. After it separated from the rest of Somalia, Somaliland established its own institutions, by putting aside and ignoring the prolonged state collapse in the south. Therefore, after the cessation of the civil hostility which erupted in Somaliland post-1991; Ethiopia and Somaliland started to establish their relations.

In May 1993, when the late Mohamed Ibrahim Egal came to power, relations between the two sides started to take shape. The activities carried by Egal were the founding-stone which created the current bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland. This move also made the military commanders of the Ethiopian armed forces in Hararghe to contact their counterparts of Somaliland to collaborate in order to maintain peace and stability along the border areas between the two sides. But, relations were weak and ineffective at that time, since Somaliland was emerging from the ashes of prolonged civil conflict.

Since the beginning of the 1998, the relations between the armed forces became strong, particularly, the Central Command of the two armed forces, backing by the civilian officials of the two governments. This shift also accelerated the people of the two to interact and exchange visits across the borders. The confidence created by the two armed forces, led the Ethiopian government to trust Somaliland and regard it as an ally and friend in a volatile region. As an expression of the good relationships, the Ethiopian government invited President Egal several times to visit Ethiopia, where Ethiopia‟s State Minister of Foreign Affairs Tekede Alemu (Dr) paid several visits to Hargeisa.

It worth to mention that once President Egal was elected in the Borama Conference in 1993, Egal administration changed the political balance and took political risks by eliminating the political antagonism and the legacy of the two military regimes which created suspicion between Ethiopia and Somalia in general and Somaliland in particular. Moreover, the relations between the two sides reached its peak.

4.4 Ethio–Somaliland Relations from 2002–Present

After one decade of the establishment of Somaliland in the Grand Conference in Buroa, and one year after the Constitution was approved in a public referendum, it managed democratically transfer power to the Vice- President, as the President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal passed away in South Africa in May 2002. The new interim President promised to continue and pursue the policy of his predecessor. Similarly, it deserves to mention that Egal’s domestic, regional and international policy is the core philosophy of the interim President. Regardless of minor differences between the two successive governments of Somaliland, regarding their positions to the neighboring Djibouti, the two leaders maintained similar policy in their relations with Ethiopia, by acknowledging Ethiopia’s role both at the regional and international levels. Ethiopia and Somaliland have experienced dynamic relationships, and Somaliland regards Ethiopia as one of its closest friend and ally in the Horn of Africa.

In this regard, it deserves to mention that when Somaliland failed to resolve their internal problems related to the successive postponements of the presidential election that led to the eruption of bloody riots in Hargeisa in the late of 2009, Ethiopia also supported by the international community, particularly British government, was the first state which came to help Somaliland by bringing together the contending ideas of the political parties using shuttle diplomacy that eventually ended the standoff between the government on one hand and the political parties on the other.

5. UNDERSTANDING ETHIO–SOMALILAND RELATIONS: FROM ECONOMIC TO POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW

5.1 Ethiopia’s Relations with Somaliland: Political or Economic?

Due to globalization and the current international system it is difficult to separate the politics from economics and vice-versa. It appears that each of these two factors is complementing one another. The growing relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland initially originated from political relations which later involved economic elements. Politics is the key for people-to-people relationships and no one can dare to invest in the economy of another country without understanding the political situation of that country.

Since the mid of the twentieth century, there were economic transactions and trading system between the two societies of Ethiopia and Somaliland19. But, the political antagonism between the successive governments in Ethiopia and Somalia derailed those transactions by blocking the cross-border activities of the two neighboring societies. When Somaliland declared its independence from the rest of Somalia, both Ethiopia and Somaliland opted to create political relations. In this regard, economic relationships have been evolving following the use of the port of Berbera by Ethiopia and Ethiopian Airlines launched its direct and official daily flight to Hargeisa in 2001. Ethiopian businessmen have been coming to Somaliland to buy different commodities.

Following these developments, Ethiopia and Somaliland exchanged low-level diplomatic relations; Ethiopia opened a trade office which serves as a Consulate in Hargeisa, where Somaliland established its liaison office in Addis Ababa. Therefore, Ethiopia offered to Somaliland various kinds of assistance such as military trainings and scholarships both to military officers and students who finished their secondary education. It deserves to mention that Somaliland officials have regular contacts to their counterparts in Ethiopia and the intelligence agents of the two sides also have close cooperation.

With the existence of the political hostility between Ethiopia and its neighbor Eritrea and non-feasibility of its ports, and the Djibouti port which cannot handle the magnitude of Ethiopia’s imports and exports; as well as the increasing charge of the Djibouti port, Ethiopia opted to seek other sea outlets. In this regard, it realized the importance of the port of Berbera, if the port and the road connecting to Ethiopia were upgraded. The study to further utilize the port of Berbera is still going on. It deserves to mention both the economic and political relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland is growing and encouraging, where the economic transactions between the two countries amounts millions of dollars per annum, such as Chat, and other commodities which Somaliland imports from Ethiopia including Wheat, Onion, Potatoes, and Livestock as well22. It is also important to mention that Ethiopia is trying to block the goods coming from the border of Somaliland and getting into Ethiopian territory, by regarding these goods and commodities illegal and contraband. This is the major challenge which is against the trading activities and need to remove it, in order to encourage the business transactions occurring between the two countries.

With the lack of international recognition to Somaliland, the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) is working with the Somaliland Central Bank. Hence, the growing relations between the two sides are better than previous relations between Ethiopia and Somalia.

5.2 Ethiopia’s Recognition to Somaliland: De facto or De jure?

Since its unilateral declaration of independence on 18 May 1991; Somaliland did not manage to attain an international recognition from any country or inter-governmental organization, including the neighboring states. In this regard, no country has showed interest that involved de facto recognition with the exception of Ethiopia. The regional governments strongly advocated and supported united Somalia, particularly, the Arab countries, such as Djibouti and Sudan which are members both of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the League of the Arab States.

As it was observed from the previous discussion, although Somaliland did not acquire an international recognition from the international community, one can argue that Ethiopia offered de facto recognition to Somaliland. Ethiopia has been in a dilemma to de jure recognize Somaliland. In this regard, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi echoed that the recognition of Somaliland as a separate and independent state from the rest of Somalia remains in the hands of the Somalis by referring to the chaotic situation of Somalia and the challenges from ONLF which aspires for the Ogaden independence from the rest of Ethiopia. This is situation forced Ethiopia to work with Somaliland for its national interest. Regardless of these, Ethiopia did not take the first initiative as it affects its interest nationally and internationally if it recognizes Somaliland25.

Interestingly, Ethiopian Prime Minister issued a decree from his office few years before persuading that all state-owned companies, such as Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation (ETC), and Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO), and so on so forth, to use their import activities through the port of Berbera. This is an indication of certain degree of recognition and implies Ethiopia’s inclination to recognize Somaliland indirectly. But, the major aspect of this decree was in essence to illustrate Ethiopia’s role and its willingness to support Somaliland in order to attain de jure recognition. Moreover, the issuance of this decree from the Office of the Prime Minister was intended to attract the attention of the international community to reconsider their stance towards Somaliland. In other words, when Ethiopia opted to get access to Berbera port; it implies the legitimacy of the accord between the two sides. This invited the private sector in Ethiopia to contact Somaliland officials and their counterparts to involve in conduct trade activities far beyond the transactions taking place in the eastern part of Ethiopia. In response to the call, for example Ethiopian Banks moved to the Ethiopian border close to Somaliland and established their branches in Togochale.

Moreover, as one of Somaliland cabinet member indicated; in 2004, Somaliland delegation visited Ethiopia and met with the Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi; and discussed Ethiopia’s role in the recognition of Somaliland as a separate state from the rest of Somalia. But, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi emphasized that Ethiopia faced many condemnations from different sides when they allowed Eritrea to separate from the rest of Ethiopia. In this regard, the Ethiopian Prime Minister mentioned that Ethiopia is not going to be the first state to recognize Somaliland, and Ethiopia is not ready to take another accusation concerning the issue of Somaliland.

In the same way, since the ruling elites both in Ethiopia and Somaliland are former rebel groups of the two countries, they lack experiences and knowledge among each other, because they had lived in Somalia and Ethiopia respectively as a dissident groups. In relation to this, one of the SNM senior officials argues that the current leaders of Ethiopia are mostly engaged in southern Somalia politics, emphasizing that they know more about the southern part of Somalia and Mogadishu than the north and Hargeisa. Therefore, he elaborates that if Mengistu Hailemariam is on power with assurance he would recognize Somaliland as an independent state from the rest of Somalia.

Given Ethiopia‟s position as the seat of the African Union (AU) it could have helped to convince the other countries or the international community in general not to force Somaliland to go back to the failed union of the 1960 with Somalia. Moreover, as frequently reiterated by Ethiopian officials, it is not ready to be the first state gives de jure recognition to Somaliland. In other words, Ethiopia is trying to give mush respect for the feelings of the African states since it is the Headquarters of the African Union. Despite the consequences of the previous discussion, Ethiopia is also attempting to pay close attention to its domestic policy and dynamics due to the existence of article 39 in the Federal Constitution, which advocates the secession of Ethiopia‟s regional states if they fulfilled preconditions of secession.

Regardless of the above-mentioned argument, it is possible to argue that Ethiopia hesitated to offer Somaliland de jure recognition. It seems that it wanted to kill two birds with one stone, it wants to extend respect to both Somalia and Somaliland; since it shares border with Somalia. However, this is a kind of loose and weak recognition; it is severely unbalanced and unjust.

As far as the issue of recognition concerned those in charge of Somaliland refer the case of Eritrea as a typical example. Eritrea has a clear advantage over Somaliland with regards to international recognition. In May 1993, Eritrea translated de facto into de jure statehood. In this regard, Eritrea‟s and to a lesser extent Somaliland‟s claims to self-determination is grounded on a historic consciousness of oppression, surviving military annihilation perpetuated by indigenous systems of oppression. Unlike Biafra and Katanga, Eritrea and Somaliland also have stronger juridical claims: each had existed for eighty years or more as a distinct colonial territory (Adam, 1994).

6. UNDERSTANDING THE GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE CITIZENS

As many Ethiopian individuals and business communities indicate, there is the existence of good and brotherly relations between the two neighboring countries. Similarly, the Ethiopian society that inhabits the border area when they cross the border to buy goods inside Somaliland feels like they are in their own country. These shows there are no problems between the two societies; there is no phobia and hate between the two communities. The Ethiopian Birr is circulating in the Somaliland business centers along the border areas, where the two countries are currently interacting as a single state. Because of these and many other attachments, some Ethiopian people argue that the people in Somaliland are different from other Somalis in regards to treating and interacting with the Ethiopian people.

It worth to mention that the Somaliland society in Togochale are the prime customers of the Ethiopian Banks, where the business activities are mostly taking place along the Somaliland part of the border. With the existence of strong and growing relations between the two sides, it is important to mention that it is difficult to differentiate them as Ethiopians or Somalilanders, having two different nationalities. Nonetheless, it deserves to respect the relations between the two sides and to appreciate such relations between the two communities and countries and expressed their happiness to see these growing relations between the two sides get solid.

Furthermore, as widely repeated by the Ethiopian communities living in the border town of Togochale; the relations are basically brotherly and amicable. Likewise, Somaliland communities also use the services of the Ethiopian Banks, and they have opened their own accounts. In addition, they argued that if the border businesses were closed, no one is going to remain there; and mentioned that it will be a disaster to the communities living that area34. On the other hand, the smuggling of the Ethiopian currency to and from Somaliland creates confusion and makes it difficult to control as they are interdependent for many things.

Similarly, the communities living around the border areas were allowed to use their vehicles, both in the territories of Somaliland and Ethiopia in peaceful manner. Ethiopian citizens indicate that they export Chat, Vegetables, Potatoes, Wheat, Onion and Coffee to Somaliland, and need to exchange and buy from Somaliland the goods and commodities they need35. Therefore, the openness of the border between the two sides and the activities going on are showing how far the relations between the two societies has been deepening, and mostly they argued that if there is no mutual understanding and interest between the two sides the border would not be open.

Currently, the Federal Democratic Government of Ethiopia is going to finish the construction of the asphalt road which will connect Jijiga – the Capital of the Somali Regional State – to the border town of Togochale. The Transit, Shipping and Forwarding agencies of Ethiopia are waiting until the road was completed. This will increase the trading activities between the two sides, and will create opportunities both the communities of the two sides.

On the other hand, the view of the Somaliland citizens towards Ethio-Somaliland relations is not different from the Ethiopian nationals‟ expression towards the relations between the two sides. Somaliland citizens argue that Somaliland in general and as a business community in particular needs to satisfy and supply the demands of Ethiopia in general and the eastern Hararghe in particular, since landlocked Ethiopia with above 73 million population needs sea outlet. In addition, business communities in Hararghe preferred sea outlet near to their business bases; where Somaliland both as administration and as business communities are eager to take that opportunity and responsibility to welcome their neighbors. In this regard, they argue that they legally interact with Ethiopia using Letter of Credit (LC) and they not excluded the existence of contraband and illegal business activities, but they indicated that it is not equivalent the legal business activities taking place between the two societies, rather they argued that it is a minor issue38. Therefore, the only chance which Somaliland business communities have is both the public and the private banks which are open in the Ethiopian part of the town. These banks intensified interactions between the two societies and introduced each other, at the same time tightened the security of the town.

Moreover, Somalilanders argued that they depend upon their Ethiopian fellows both as a business aspect and as a security matter, since Somaliland authority is fragile economically and cannot afford to carry out activities as Ethiopian government do. Hence, the two societies have mutual interest and when it comes to the issue of security, Ethiopia and Somaliland have common enemy, such as terrorist groups.

In spite of the above-mentioned discussion, most Ethiopians in the heart of the country cannot distinguish Somaliland people from those who came from Puntland41, Somalia and even the Somalis living in the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia. These could be attributed to the failure of the government officials to disseminate their views regarding Somaliland to the Ethiopian society at the grassroots‟ level, and that remains the major problem which caused the lack of Ethiopian community to have sufficient knowledge towards Somaliland facts. However, there is no hate and phobia between the two communities, rather than the failure of the state actors and leaders to introduce their two communities to each other.

7. CHALLENGES AND OBSTACLES

The extremism and jihadist ideology which is spreading over the Somali state may challenge and disturb the relations. Similarly, since Somaliland did not attain an international recognition, Somaliland is prone to face disenchantment from the community at the grassroots‟ level. This may precipitate the persuasion of the people particularly the youth to join the hardliners camp, as they live between hope and despair almost 20 years. This is mainly because of the failure of the international community to appreciate and support the successive stories of Somaliland. Conversely, the growing Islamists all over the world are getting support from some Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Sudan. Hence, if these movements which engulfed many parts of the Muslim states including Afghanistan, Yemen and the most strategic locations of the southern part of Somalia, could manage to remove the power from the civil authority in Somaliland, Ethiopia cannot escape the violent acts emanating from Somaliland, as Ethiopia’s lifeline to the sea could be hampered. In relation to this, some scholars argue that Ethiopia has failed to appreciate and support the role of Somaliland in maintaining Ethiopia’s peace, security and the regional stability as well.

On the other hand, some local scholars argue that if Somaliland fails to maintain peace and stability, Ethiopia would try to contain the instability not to spread out into its territory, because of the relations started collaborating between the two armed forces in the areas of concerned security issue.

As the practices of the two countries has demonstrated so far, if the Ethiopian government attempts to support the ruling authority in Somaliland to remain in power, by defying the demands of the general public and the political parties that collectively waving slogans for change, this may challenge the relations between the two sides. In the same way, currently while it appears there is no problem from the Ethiopian side, but, the invocation of past positions causes suspicion, challenges, mistrust and hostility in the future.

Therefore, while there is no doubt about that the existence of strong growing relationship between the two societies at grass-root level, however, some argue that there are no effective people-to-people relations, except in the eastern part of the country and the border areas which indicate strong and extensive activities going on. In order to expand the relations, a cultural means is missing; for instance, the Ministers of Culture and Tourism of the two countries did not visit each other’s country, and rather the relations remained at higher level in the political and economic sphere only.

Contrary to these views, some scholars argue that the existence of cultural integration going on between the two societies. As one of the Ethiopian citizens living in Somaliland argues, Ethiopians like to speak Somali, eat Somaliland food and want to know Somaliland cultures, where the Somaliland people speak Amharic, and mostly like the Ethiopian songs.

Similarly, the failure of the authorities at port of Berbera to reciprocate by establishing their own office in Addis Ababa to conduct its activities related to its services in order to satisfy and attract customers from all over Ethiopia, who eager to use the services of the port, remain one of the negative impacts of the growing economic relations between the two societies and countries. In addition, others argue that if Ethiopia attempts to barricade the business transactions between Somaliland and the Somali Region in Ethiopia, it also would deteriorate and escalate the situation.

In the same manner, as some local scholars argue that if Somalia-Somaliland relations recovered and the southern part of Somalia was stabilized, it could greatly challenge Ethio-Somaliland relations. On the other hand, the division among the Somalis remains one of the main challenging factors that have led Ethiopia to take fluctuating position to appease both parties to remain as an ally on issues of mutual concern. On the other hand, since Ethiopia is a state with diverse ethnic groups, some argue that if the balance among the nationalities changed, it may challenge the relations between the two countries. Although it appears to be that there is no political and economic problems challenging against Ethio-Somaliland relations at the present time, the failure of Somaliland to obtain an international recognition may limit Somaliland’s activities to overcome such challenges in the future.

8. FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE ETHIO–SOMALILAND RELATIONS

With the existence of shared culture between Ethiopia and Somaliland, every regime that come to power in the two countries are expected to maintain and respect the affinity and mutual understandings that has been going between the two sides for centuries. Moreover, whatever regime comes to power both in Ethiopia and Somaliland, the relations between them would not go back, and it will remain as it is depending on mutual interest of the two countries.

In the same way, since the two countries share people and culture, the leadership of the two countries needs to encourage and enhance the relations between the people by build schools; health centers along the border areas of the two sides. These move would help them to teach the students of the two countries different literatures, including Amharic and Somali languages to get opportunities in the two neighboring sister countries.

From the above discussions one can observe that, in the contemporary complex and dynamic world, there are various regional problems which may derail the prospects of Ethio-Somaliland relations. Especially the relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland are subject to the outcome of the coming election in Somaliland. Many local scholars argue that if the absence of authority occurs in Somaliland it may be a golden opportunity for the Islamists to take that chance to occupy the space. Furthermore, the relations are also subject how Ethiopia would ride both horses, namely Somalia and Somaliland with impartiality. Besides, the future prospect of Ethio- Somaliland relations depends on the leadership of the two countries and how these two countries will manage to recruit visionary people56.

9. CONCLUSION

The Horn of Africa is one of the most strategic regions globally. It has many characteristics which distinguish it from the other regions of the world, such as the abundant of natural resources and arable land which can grow different kinds of grains and cereals if wisely utilized. In addition, the region is rich with fresh water resources, where the largest rivers such as the Nile, Wabe Shebelle and Dawa-Genale rivers originate. On the other hand, it has diversity in terms of culture, ethnicity and religion.

It deserves to note that the countries in the Horn of Africa were the epicenter of the Cold War era and became the proxy agents both for the West and the East which devastated the environment and impoverished the people. Ethiopia and Somalia remained the hub of those conflicts between the two superpowers till the demise of the USSR. Somaliland which was part of the Somali state claimed its independence from Somalia in 1991 after clan- based armed militias ousted the military ruler General Mohamed Siad Barre. In the same year, a new regime emerged in Ethiopia succeeding the military junta that ruling the country since 1974.

It is important to mention that Ethiopia has supported the Somali National Movement (SNM) by harboring, training, arming and allowing access to Media for propaganda purpose that contributed its part in toppling the Barre military government. These support served as a milestone in improving Ethio-Somaliland relations. Consequently, Ethiopia and Somaliland managed to establish close relations to eradicate the political hostility between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa. In addition, they substituted the hostile relationship to mutual understanding, the phobia and suspicion to friendship and brotherhood.

While Ethiopia did not officially recognize Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state, it maintained close relations with that de facto entity based on economic, political and social aspects. These relations eliminated the fear and suspicion between the two societies and governments. However, the major threat and challenge in the future is the growing influence of the Islamists in the southern Somalia, which cites Somaliland‟s ties with Addis Ababa as evidence that Ethiopia seeks to break up Somalia, while arguing that Ethiopia has always been Somalia‟s historical and traditional enemy.

To conclude, Ethiopia‟s position to recognize Somaliland as an independent state remains in dilemma, while Ethiopia frequently indicated that Ethiopia is not going to be the first state that recognizes Somaliland. Ethiopia‟s relation with Somaliland in a certain degree inclined to recognition. However, the ideas indicated in the body of the paper concerning the role of Ethiopia are contradicting. Some scholars argue that Ethiopia‟s role is positive and encouraging, while others argue that Ethiopia is not interested to spearhead Somaliland‟s recognition, and Ethiopia adopted wait and see policy for the reasonable factors. In this regard, Ethiopia is not going to leave Somaliland without a friend in the world and at the same time Ethiopia‟s position regarding Somaliland and Somalia is to kill two birds with one stone.

By Nasir M. Ali