SOMALILAND_FOREIGN_AFFAIRS_WITH_INTERNATIONAL_COMMUNITIES

CHAPTER ONE: PROBLEM AND ITS SCOPE

1. introduction;

• Background
• An Introduction to Somaliland;

In this chapter the paper will mainly cover the introduction and the background of Somaliland. From the very beginning to the modern-day Somaliland, it will also examine the relations between the international community and where it all started.

The modern Republic of Somaliland, which declared its liberation from Somalia military occupation and 1^st July 1960 false illegal union on 18 May 1991, is the third incarnation of the territory established by the British in the Horn of Africa toward the end of the nineteenth century. It spans a land area of 137,600 square kilometers, or roughly 22 per cent of the territory of the Somali Republic (637,540 square kilometers), most of which receives less than 300 millimeters of rainfall annually.  In 26 June 1960, after more than seven decades as a British protectorate, the territory received its independence from Queen Elizabeth II. Once one of five Somali entities that aimed to unite under a single flag, it was the only country actually attempt to unite with the trusteeship Somalia, which it did just five days after obtaining its own independence. Following the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, Somaliland announced the dissolution of the 1960 illegal union with Somalia, but its declaration of reaffirming its independence in the 26^th June 1960 has yet to be recognized by a single member of the United Nations. The 18^th May 1991 is the Day of Liberation with the cost of direct death 50 000 Somalilanders and 450 000 indirect death total cost from the exodus to Somaliland to Ethiopia up to 1991.

Britain acquired its Somaliland Protectorate by accident rather than by design. In 1884, the Mahdist revolt in Sudan necessitated the hasty withdrawal of Egyptian garrisons from much of the Horn of Africa, threatening a sudden vacuum. Anxious to secure the supply of meat for its garrison across the Red Sea at Aden and to preempt the territorial ambitions of rival powers in the region (the French to the west, the Italians to the east, and King Menelik of Shoa to the South), the British government entered into treaties of protection with the leaders of local Somalilanders clans: namely the ‘Iise, Gadabursi, Habar Garhajis, Habar Awal and Habar Tol’ja’alo.

Somaliland’s second incarnation, as an independent and sovereign state, was short lived. A Royal Proclamation of Queen Elizabeth II granted independence to the Protectorate at midnight on 25 June 1960, and the State of Somaliland came into being on 26 June. Somaliland’s independence was received internationally as a welcome step in the process of African decolonization, and consequently recognized by a number of foreign governments. 

1.3.       Somaliland union with Somalia

Five days later, on 1 July 1960, the Italian Trust Territory of Somalia also received its independence. The legislatures of the two territories met in joint session in Mogadishu and announced their unification as the Somali Republic. The State of Somaliland was no more. But the process of unification was anything but smooth: Although officially unified as a single nation at independence, the former Italian colony and trust territory in the south and the former British protectorate in the north were, from an institutional standpoint, two separate countries. Italy and Britain had left them with separate administrative, legal and education systems where affairs were conducted according to different procedures and in different languages. Police, taxes, and the exchange rates of their separate currencies were also different. The orientations of their educated elites were divergent, and economic contacts between the two regions were virtually non-existent. 

These problems were exacerbated by perceived southern domination of the new government. Mogadishu became the national capital, while Hargeysa(Somaliland) “declined to a mere provincial headquarters remote from the centre of things. ”Representatives from the former British Somaliland, now known as the ‘Northern Regions’, received just 33 seats in the new 123-member national assembly. The posts of President and Prime Minister were both held by southerners, as were the principal ministerial portfolios such as Defense, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Interior.

The command of the new national army was overwhelmingly drawn from former carabinieri (a member of the Italian paramilitary police.) officers from the south – a source of acute frustration for British-trained military officers from the north (Somaliland). The precipitate nature of the union had also left a number of important legal questions pending. The two Acts of Union approved by the respective legislature’s differed somewhat, and no single legal document actually bound the two territories.  The new national assembly recognized the error and passed a new Act of Union in January 1961, retroactive to the moment of independence, but some observers have argued that, since the two territories were not legally united, the new Act remained without force in the north(Somaliland).

 Public support for the merger was put to the test in June 1961 in the form of a referendum on the new unitary constitution. Whatever enthusiasm for unity had initially existed in the north (Somaliland) seemed already to be fading. The SNL leadership campaigned for a boycott of the referendum and only 100,000 Northerners (somalilanders) actually turned out to vote from an estimated population of 650,000. More than half of the Northerners (somalilanders) who did vote rejected the constitution, reflecting “widespread discontent in the Northern Region (Somaliland) over the economic decline there, and over the growing political influence Mogadishu” .

In December the same year, Somaliland military officers in Hargeysa launched an unsuccessful coup on the platform of a separation between north and south. Such expressions of discontent, however, did not amount to a serious challenge to Somali unity. Northern politicians continued to represent northern interests in both the executive and legislative branches of government, and in 1967 British Somaliland’s independence leader, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, became the first northern Prime Minister of Somalia.

Somali President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was assassinated by a disgruntled policeman on 15 October 1969, and less than a week later the military staged a coup d’état under the leadership of General Mohamed Siyaad Barre. Many Somalis were hopeful that the military takeover would represent an improvement over the decrepit civilian administration, which had become spoiled by corruption and nepotism. The military also embraced a “Greater Somalia” policy of political and military irredentism, which had lapsed in the late 1960s, reviving some of the popular enthusiasm that had underpinned the original union between north and south.

The honeymoon was short lived. The regime’s disastrous defeat in the 1977-78 Ogaden War with Ethiopia, its dependence on select branches of the Darod clan for political support, and its increasingly brutal character all contributed to public disillusionment. An attempted coup by Majerteen officers from the northeast of the country triggered brutal government reprisals around the town of Gaalka’yo and led to the formation of the first Somali opposition group, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). But disaffection with the military regime was felt most keenly in the former British Somaliland: public expenditure in the northwest compared unfavorably with other regions (less than 7 per cent of development assistance was allocated to the north), and the government’s economic policies seemed to be aimed at curbing the influence of the wealthy Isaaq trading community.

In the aftermath of the Ogaden War, approximately a quarter of a million refugees had been settled in the northwest by the Somali government, with the assistance of UNHCR. Most were ethnic Somalis from the Ogaden branch of the Darod clan, although some were members of the Oromo and other Ethiopian ethnic groups. For several years, traditional competition between the isaaq and the Ogaden for pasture and water in the southern Haud had been aggravated by the Somali government’s provision of arms, ammunition and training to the Ogaden fighters of the Western Somali Liberation Front. Although intended for use against the Ethiopian government, this military assistance was often directed instead against Isaaq (Somaliland) civilians in the Haud.  Government favoritism towards the Ogaden refugees, who enjoyed preferential access to social services (provided by UNHCR and its Somali government counterpart, the National Refugee Commission), business licenses and government posts, further fuelled Isaaq(somalilanders) grievances.

In 1981, a group of mainly Isaaq(somalilanders) exiles meeting in London declared the formation of the Somali National Movement (SNM), an armed movement dedicated to the overthrow of the Barre regime. The SNM initially tried to cast itself as an alliance of opposition figures from different clans, but its core membership and constituency was principally Isaaq(somalilanders). The SNM established its first bases in Ethiopia in 1982, and by 1983 it had established itself as an effective guerrilla force in the northwest. In response, government pressure on the Isaaq population, whom it deemed sympathetic to the SNM, took the form of “extreme and systematic repression”.  Summary arrests, extrajudicial executions, rape, confiscation of private property and ‘disappearances’ all became commonplace as the government sought to deprive the SNM of the support of the Isaaq public. The government also enlisted the support of the non-Isaaq clans of the northwest, attempting – with only partial success – to exploit traditional kinship affiliations.

In 1988, following a meeting in Djibouti between Siyaad Barre and his Ethiopian counterpart, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, the Ethiopian government instructed the SNM to cease operations in Somalia and withdraw its forces from the border areas. The SNM, fearing the collapse of its long insurgency, instead attacked the major northern towns of Hargeysa and Burco, triggering the onset of full-scale civil war in the northwest. The government response was fierce: artillery and aircraft bombed the major towns into rubble and forced the displacement of roughly half a million refugees across the border into Ethiopia. Isaaq dwellings were systematically destroyed, while their settlements and water points were extensively mined.

The formation in 1989 (with SNM support) of the southern Somali factions, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and the United Somali Congress (USC), provided the SNM with allies and helped to relieve some of the pressure on its fighters. In January 1991, as USC advances in and around Mogadishu forced Barre to abandon the capital, the SNM staged its final offensive in the northwest. The remaining government forces disintegrated and fled, and the vestiges of civil administration collapsed. 

1.4.         Rebirth of Somaliland

Within months of the SNM victory, Somaliland appeared in its third incarnation. On 18 May 1991, a self-proclaimed independent Republic of Somaliland was announced. Since then, it has followed a very different trajectory from southern Somalia. While the collapse of the Siyaad Barre regime plunged the south into civil war and the kind of institutional vacuum that has since come to epitomize the notion of “state failure”, Somaliland embarked on a period of increasing political stabilization and economic growth. Since 1991, roughly half a million people have returned to their homes, and tens of thousands of dwellings and businesses have been rebuilt from rubble. The majority of militia have been demobilized or incorporated into national armed forces and tens of thousands of mines and unexploded munitions have been removed from the ground.

1.5.       After Civil War & Reconstruction of the nation from 1991 until now:

Somaliland had four presidents since it regain its independents in 199l May 18. The first president was Hon Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuur 28 May 1991 to 16 May 1993; the second president was Hon Muhammed Haji Ibrahim Egal- 16 May 1993- 3 May 2002; the third president was Hon Dahir Riyale Kahin 3 May 2002- 27 July 2010; the current and the fourth president is Hon Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud Silanyo from 27 July 2010 till today.

Under the leadership of Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuur, the local administration declared the northwestern (Somaliland) Somali territories independent at a conference held in Burao between 27 April 1991 and 15 May 1991.  The new President, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali “Tuur”, was a shrewd but uncharismatic former diplomat, who had favored federation over independence and assumed the Presidency of Somaliland through circumstance rather than conviction. He governed mainly from behind closed doors, and his impoverished administration exerted little real control, even of the capital city Hargeysa.

Within a matter of months, the SNM began to suffer from the kind of factionalism more often associated with southern Somali political movements. As tensions within the SNM came to a head, even the illusion of control evaporated and in January 1992 the Movement went to war with itself. The fighting pitted the loosely named ‘national army’ (in reality an alliance of clan-based militias aligned with the Tuur government) against opposition forces led by members of an SNM faction known as the ‘Alan ‘As (Red Flag). The belligerents were all members of the Isaaq; non Isaaq clans chose to remain uninvolved. During the course of the conflict the towns of Burco and Berbera were heavily damaged and tens of thousands of recent returnees from Ethiopian refugee camps were again put to flight. In October 1992, after nine months of sporadic, highly mobile warfare, a delegation of clan elders managed to bring the two sides to peace talks at the town of Sheikh. The conference, known as “Towfiiq”, concluded with a ceasefire and an agreement to reconvene for a more inclusive, ‘national’ conference at Boorama in January 1993.

The 1993 Boorama Conference (properly known as Guul Allah, or ‘God’s Triumph’), which lasted nearly five months and involved hundreds of representatives from all of Somaliland’s clans, is considered to have been a milestone in Somaliland’s evolution as a de facto state. Before they dispersed, the conference delegates managed to conclude a peace and security accord, formulate a new national charter, and establish a new government under the leadership of Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, the former Prime Minister of Somalia.

The primary achievement of the Boorama Conference was the replacement of the factional rule of the SNM with a civilian administration. This new system of government, known as the “beel” system, was a hybrid of Western political institutions and the traditional Somali system of clan representation. Although only intended to function as a three-year stopgap measure, the “beel” system has underpinned Somaliland’s peace and stability ever since.  At the heart of the beel system is a two-chamber Parliament, comprising 82 members each, with seats distributed by clan. While the lower house serves as a legislature, the upper house (known as the Guurti) is charged with maintaining peace and security in the territory. Over time the Guurti, which was composed of traditional leaders or their representatives, has also emerged as Somaliland’s supreme moral authority.

By designating the Parliament as the primary forum for clan representation, the beel system relieved some of the pressure on the executive branch and civil service to fulfil clan demands for representation – one of the causes of war under the Tuur administration. Although the new President remained mindful of the need for a broadly based cabinet, he enjoyed a certain degree of flexibility in ministerial appointments and was eventually able to embark, albeit in a very tentative way, on a course of civil service reform. Likewise, the leadership role assumed by clan elders at the Boorama conference, as well as by the establishment of the Guurti, implied their direct responsibility for the success of the accord and thus helped the new government to secure their cooperation. For example, the authority of traditional leaders was to prove vital in the government’s efforts to disarm and demobilize clan militia. Those who handed in their weapons were absorbed into a new National Army or promised demobilization assistance. Those who declined the government’s offer forfeited the protection of their clans if they disturbed the peace.

As uniformed police replaced the militia on the streets of the major towns, public confidence and pride in the new government grew. The improved security situation encouraged a surge in physical reconstruction: newly built homes began to rise above the rubble and new companies opened for business. Even the United Nations, which disapproved of Somaliland’s claims to statehood and had therefore remained absent from the Boorama Conference, was forced to acknowledge that “the peaceful reconciliation process has moved forward impressively” and “noted the formation of a functioning administration under the leadership of Mr. Egal”

Although peace and stability has successful been maintain, there were still some legal issues still left hanging. To the general public, the substance of the constitution mattered little beyond Article 1, which reaffirmed Somaliland’s existence as a sovereign and independent state. Egal himself encouraged this perception by linking “the transition to a multiparty democracy with Somaliland’s desire to gain international recognition, arguing that the international community would not recognize Somaliland’s independent status unless it adopted such a system”

A report on the referendum by one team of international observers found the linkage to be unmistakable: “A “yes” vote to the constitution was widely perceived as an endorsement of Somaliland’s independence and a rejection of rule from Mogadishu and Somalia”.  In that context, the overwhelming endorsement of the new constitution (over 1.183 million “yes” votes out of nearly 1.19 million ballots cast, or 97 per cent) sent an unmistakable message. Egal himself was unprepared for the landslide, which reportedly dispelled any lingering misgivings he might have felt about Somaliland’s independence: “Whatever he may have believed previously,” one of his Ministers later confided, “from 31 May [2001] onwards he was a Somalilander”

 From there on Somaliland took a step towards nation building and reconstruction of its nation back to what it was long ago and even better and mange on its own for 25 years without recognition. 

The history of international relations based on sovereign states is often traced back to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, a stepping stone in the development of the modern state system. Prior to this the European medieval organization of political authority was based on a vaguely hierarchical religious order. Contrary to popular belief, Westphalia still embodied layered systems of sovereignty, especially within the Holy Roman Empire. More than the Peace of Westphalia, the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 is thought to reflect an emerging norm that sovereigns had no internal equals within a defined territory and no external superiors as the ultimate authority within the territory’s sovereign borders.

The particular European system supposing the sovereign equality of states was exported to the Americas, Africa, and Asia via colonialism and the “standards of civilization”. The contemporary international system was finally established through decolonization during the Cold War. However, this is somewhat over-simplified. While the nation-state system is considered “modern”, many states have not incorporated the system and are termed “pre-modern”.

Further, a handful of states have moved beyond insistence on full sovereignty, and can be considered “post-modern”. The ability of contemporary IR (international relation) discourse to explain the relations of these different types of states is disputed. “Levels of analysis” is a way of looking at the international system, which includes the individual level, the domestic state as a unit, the international level of transnational and intergovernmental affairs, and the global level.

2.2.3. International relations:

2.2.3.1. Definition of international relation;

The simplest definition of IR can be as: The official and non-official interactions among nation-states, IGOs, non-IGOs, NGOs and MNCs are called international relations. However, the international Politics revolves around the international political, social and economic events and thus shapes the changes in IR.

2.3. The history of international relations;

The study of relations among nations has fascinated scholars for several centuries. However, the term international was first used by Jeremy Bantham   in the latter part of the eighteenth century, although its Latin equivalent intergentes was used a century earlier by Rijchare   Zouche . Both of them had used this term in respect of that branch of law which was called law of nations, which later became ‘International Law’. The first Chair in International Relations was established at the University of Wales (U.K) in 1919. The first two occupants of the chair were eminent historians, Professors Alfred Zinmerna  and C.K. Webster .

At that time, International Relations as a subject was little more than a diplomatic history.  During the nineteenth and twentieth century’s, international relations have grown rapidly. Today nation-states have become far too interdependent; and relations among them whether political or those related to trade and commerce, have developed into an essential area of knowledge. In this unit, we are mainly concerned with the political relations among sovereign societies called nations, or nation-states.

 No nation is an island. Because domestic policies are constantly affected by developments outside, nations are compelled to (rather than sit on the fence or out-rightly isolate themselves)  into dialogue with target or initiating entities or form alliance(s) for the purpose of enhancing their status quo (state affairs) or increasing their power or prestige and survival in’ the international system. Because international relations are in transition following emerging realities in the international system, it has become complex and even more difficult arriving at a more universally acceptable definition of the subject. But this is not peculiar to international relations as there are more intense disagreements over the definition of political sciences itself. Nevertheless scholars have persisted in their attempt to define international relations.

The author here explains the needs for interdependency among nations because no nation is an island, thus every nation has to conduct dialogue with target or initiating entities or form alliance with other nations in order to survive or fulfill their national interest because sitting on the fence won’t work in the international system. And that is why international relations concept plays a significant role in the international community.

2.4. Theoretical review

The word ‘theory’ is used in a bewildering variety of ways in the study of international relations. It is applied to propositions and arguments at varying levels of abstraction, and debates over its most appropriate meaning have proceeded apace with little consensus achieved. For most scholars a theory is simply an explanation of an event or pattern of behavior in the ‘real’ world.

Having to understand what theory is, let us now discuss few theories which are related in this study, when they were first suggested and by who and also how it’s related to this paper.

2.4.1. The constitutive theory;

The constitutive theory developed in the 19th century and was closely allied to a positivist view of international law. According to that view the obligation to obey international law derives from the consent of individual states. The creation of a new state would create new legal obligations and existing states would need to consent to those new obligations. Therefore the acceptance of the new state by existing states was essential.

A further argument prevalent during the late 19th century was based on the view of international law as existing between ‘civilized nations’. New states could not automatically become members of the international community; it was recognition which created their membership. This had the further consequence that entities not recognized as states were not bound by international law, nor were the ‘civilized nations’ so bound in their dealings with them.

The formation of a new state is … a matter of fact and not law. It is through recognition, which is a matter of law, which such a new state becomes subject to international law.

Recognition is therefore seen as a requirement of international personality. A major criticism of this theory is that it leads to confusion where a new state is recognized by some states but not others. 

To recognize a community as a state is to declare that it fulfills the conditions of statehood as required by international law. If those conditions are present, existing states are under a duty to grant recognition … in granting or withholding recognition states do not claim and are not entitled to serve exclusively the interests of their national policy and convenience regardless of the principles of international law in the matter.

One of the major criticisms of this law is the confusion caused when some states recognize a new entity, but other states do not. Hersch  Lauterpacht  one of the theory’s main proponents, suggested that it is a state’s duty to grant recognition as a possible solution. However, a state may use any criteria when judging if they should give recognition and they have no obligation to use such criteria. Many states may only recognize another state if it is to their advantage. In 1912, L. F. L. Oppenheim  had the following to say on constitutive theory: International Law does not say that a State is not in existence as long as it isn’t recognized, but it takes no notice of it before its recognition. Through recognition only and exclusively a State become an International Person and a subject of International Law.

By contrast, the declarative theory of statehood defines a state as “a person in international law” if it meets the following criteria:

 1) A defined territory; 2) a permanent population; 3) a government and 4) a capacity to enter into relations with other states

Constitutive theory of statehood is related in this study in way that if a state wants to be recognized it has to be recognized by other states. Other states can or can’t recognize a state only if they want based on their interest. Now what happens if some state especially super powers don’t have any interest in you (Somaliland)? Of course it will be neglected by other states but how long will that continue? Going back to the theory, this theory is biased in a major way or to be precise in an unfair way and it’s safe to say that that is what hinders Somaliland’s recognition till today.

2.4.2. The declarative theory;

An early example of the declaratory theory is to be found in two provisions of the Montevideo Convention:

      The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence … and to organize itself as it sees fit. The exercise of these rights has no other limitation than the exercise of the rights of other states according to international law – Article 3

 The recognition of a state merely signifies that the state which recognizes it accepts the personality of the other, with all the rights and duties determined by international law – Article 6.

The declarative theory of statehood defines a state as a person in international law if it meets the following criteria:

1) A defined territory

 2) A permanent population

3) A government and

4) A capacity to enter into relations with other states

Somaliland having to meet those criteria declarative theory relates to Somaliland directly. . According to declarative theory, an entity’s statehood is independent of its recognition by other states.

The U.N. states, “A sovereign state is a state with a defined territory on which it exercises internal and external sovereignty, a permanent population, a government, independence from other states and powers, and the capacity to enter into relations with other sovereign states.”

Doubtlessly, Somaliland has a defined territory with clear international bounders inherited from the former British Somaliland with permanent population. Furthermore, not only is Somaliland in full control of its territory, but it also permeates democracy and the rule of law throughout the country. Additionally, Somaliland engages other nations bilaterally. Any way you slice it, Somaliland meets the criteria for statehood. 

2.5. Empirical review

2.5.1. History of Somaliland international relations

The history of Somaliland international relations goes back to date Somaliland declared its independency in 1991. The ministry of foreign affairs and international cooperation was one of the five ministries that the government started with. The first state which sent Somaliland    a delegation was Ethiopia. The delegations first come to Somaliland in 1991 to simply evaluate the situation on the ground in Somaliland. After that Somaliland also sent a delegation to Ethiopia mainly because of the many Somalilanders refugee that Ethiopia hosted during the brutal regime of Siad Barre.

The second government which approached Somaliland in a diplomatic way was S. Africa. At that time in 1999 Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma was the Foreign Affairs minister. She sent a delegation of lawyers to find out the situation in Somaliland. “Does Somaliland worth recognition?” after some time the delegation went back to S. Africa and reported back to Dlamini Zuma that after doing full analysis, they found out that Somaliland was worth recognition after all. Nevertheless there was no farther development between the two countries after that, because Somaliland failed to seize the opportunity.

Djibouti was the third country that Somaliland had relation with although it was not diplomatic ties or economy but it more like traditional diplomacy because the citizens of the two countries had ties and used to cross border for each other.

Right from the declaration of independency Somaliland had many relations with the rest of the world. Some of them were the donor relations, some of them were common interest like Ethiopia and some of them were based on the campaign of the Somaliland case of recognition but none of them were official diplomatic ties because of Somaliland lack of recognition. Most of these relations still exist till today.

2.5.2. Somaliland foreign policy:

2.5.2.1. Definition of foreign policy

“Foreign Policy is the use of political influence in order to induce other states to exercise their law-making power in a manner desired by the states concerned: it is an interaction between forces originating outside the country’s borders and those working within them” by Prof. F. S. Northedge

“Foreign policy is the key element in the process by which a state translates its broadly conceived goals and interests into concrete course of action to attain these objectives and preserve interests” by Padelford and Lincolin. In the words of Padelford and Lincoln, “Foreign policy is the key element in the process by which a state translates its broadly conceived goals and interests into concrete courses of action to attain these objectives and pressure its interests”

Padelford and Lincoln went ahead and explained two functions of foreign policy. Its first function is to attain its broadly conceived goals and second function is to pressurize the national interests. So in other words foreign policy’s main functions are safe-guiding the nation’s conceived goals and its own national interest.

2.5.3. Somaliland foreign policy:

Right from the start in May 1991 , Somaliland’s foreign policy’s ultimate goal was the case of the Somaliland recognition , its most important national interest was how Somaliland could have obtain recognition from the rest of the world. “Somaliland government whether it be the foreign ministry, the presidency, or any other cabinet ministers tirelessly and ceaselessly trek the planet exposing to the world the little place called Somaliland, what it has achieved and why it merits recognition.”

“Somaliland foreign policy is guided by the goals of securing international recognition of the sovereignty of the Republic of Somaliland” 

However, one can argue that for a foreign policy of a nation which is safe-guiding its national interest it ought to have more than one goal in its vision and mission. “Somaliland diplomatic activities involve ad hoc arrangements that demonstrate how non recognition is less of an obstacle to normal international relations as first appears. Somaliland’s government sends officials to represent the country’s interests in Ethiopia, Britain, the US and several other countries. Ethiopia maintains a consulate in Hargeisa, the head of which enjoys the rank of ambassador. Somaliland officials have received advice and assistance from the NGO Independent Diplomat to develop a diplomatic strategy and on technical and political aspects of dealing with international bureaucracies”

 The author continues and says that Somaliland the can use these skills to access international organizations whose membership is overwhelmingly but not exclusively made up of recognized states. The author uses examples such as Palestine which is a member of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations, although Palestine is different from Somaliland, because it is recognized as a sovereign state by more than 130 countries. Likewise, the author uses another example which most member states of the African Union recognize it as a sovereign state of Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic which uses same principle of national self-determination that Somaliland officials use to make their case for recognition.

Another example that the author used it Taiwan, Taiwan, joined WTO in 2001 as “Chinese Taipei,” and showed how the international community accommodates non-recognized states to promote good relations and to facilitate trade and investment. 

The author go ahead and says that membership in international economic bodies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) should be within Somaliland’s grasp, as its charter states: “Any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations… may accede” to the WTO.  What we can figure out here is that Somaliland should by any means borders its national interest to many dimensions because it is by doing that it can achieve many goals such as foreign investment which will eventually pave the way for Somaliland international recognition as well as many others

Somaliland and Somalia Talks:

Since the declaration of Somaliland’s independent from Somalia and the fall out of the union, Somaliland has been dealing with rebuilding of its nation removing of the countless of explosive which have been left behind by the ruthless regime of Siyad Barre. Most of the citizens of Somaliland if not all of them remember the bitterness, repression and the genocide which took away countless lives of Somalilanders.

This story has been told repeatedly for the last thirty-some years and still it haunts both the victims and their tormentors, hence, is worth retelling as long as there is a remote possibility of it being repeated. Some of the root causes of the conflict were: first a sense of betrayal in the union as mentioned above. Secondly, an early alienation from the military rule after the execution of the most senior member of the SRC from Isaaq and mass releases from civil service jobs of senior members from the North.

 Thirdly, the concentration of development resources in the south while the north was relegated to a periphery status in state development.  And fourthly, the eventual subjection of the north to a harsh emergency rule which masked a cynic plan of neutralizing the dominance of one “rebellious” clan (Isaaq) through the influx of other clan groups, plundering of the wealth of this dominant clan and an eventual all-out war against it to the level of clan-cleansing. Therefore, this is ultimately the story of human suffering in which victims are still alive and are to be found in all corners of the world and many of them constantly dreading the repeat of the same experience. That explains the reluctance of large sections of the Somaliland population to even think of relinquishing one ounce of their independent status even if the hope for recognition is not bearing fruit.

Some of the human stories include: THE UFO STORY24: The twisting of the UFO group volunteer work into a crime against the state and their eventual incarceration for a decade in high security “Labaatan Jirow” prison, is still a living memory of blatant human rights’ violation against the group and for which no justice has been done yet. THE STUDENT UPRISING: The rioting of school children during the same period and the state response of killing and jailing of many of these children is also a living memory in the streets of Hargeisa and in the homes of their parents if they themselves survived from war.

THE JAZIRA BEACH MASSACRE: The massacre of over forty intellectuals in Mogadishu southern beach under the noses of the international community in 1989 is also alive in the psyche of all Somalis and no justice has been done yet. THE MASSACRE OF BURAO ELDERS: The forty elders and businessmen subjected to kangaroo courts and executed in broad daylight, in the presence of their loved ones and the larger population of Burao still haunts the population of that city. All these cohorts of people killed or incarcerated were all civilians, who had no military connection but simply belonged to the same clan family group and in most cases were not politically active.

 Despite all of that the people of Somaliland moved on and built a nation of their own where they live in peace and harmony with each other. Despite all that happen Somalia has not still let go of the notion of reuniting Somalia (Somaliland and Somalia)

In the year 2000 the creation of Somalia first Transitional National Government (TNG) took place in Djibouti in Arta conference choosing Ali Mahdi as president. Somaliland chose not to participate in the process aimed at unifying Somali factions that was initiated by the government of Djibouti in 2000 in the Djiboutian town of Arta. The conference was organized along clan lines but included a cross-clan delegation of 100 women. A number of key factions and groups were not represented at Arta. The government of Somaliland not only refused to participate in the conference, but its Parliament passed a law that prohibited representatives of the government or private citizens to attend, declaring attendance a treasonable offense. The Arta conference resulted in creation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) that took up residence in North Mogadishu and claimed to represent all of Somalia, including Somaliland

The TNG occupied Somalia’s seats at the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Arab League. Somaliland continues to reject both the Arta process and the government it created, arguing that the independence of Somaliland is nonnegotiable. Somaliland conducted an important referendum on May 31, 2001, which had the effect of endorsing a new constitution and reaffirming its status as an independent state.

The referendum offers some useful insights on the thinking of Somalilanders on the issue of independence The Initiative and Referendum Institute, an international nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C., sent a 10-member team to observe the referendum process from May 28 until June 7. Ninety-seven percent of the voters approved the constitution. The institute believes that the referendum was primarily a vote to show support for independence rather than an endorsement of the numerous provisions of the constitution. It concluded that approximately two-thirds of eligible voters participated.

Somaliland continue to refuse to take part any conference that Somalia would hold and stood firmly on the sovereignty of Somaliland until the London Somalia Conference of February 23, 2012.

To many seeing Somaliland and Somalia in the same conference with the clear title of London Somalia conference seemed a bit of a turnabout and something not seen coming by most people. The times didn’t help. There was that east African drought of 2011 which has hit countries in the region including Somaliland. This coupled with the social chaos in the country—youngsters finishing schools, colleges and then getting killed in the deserts of Libya, Yemen, South Africa, Turkey and just about everywhere in search of whatever they were looking for. The country was beat.

London Somalia conference February 23, 2012 was a case of one pressing national interest running against another pressing national interest. The national interest of gaining recognition for Somaliland clashing with, the other interest of Somaliland which was that of obtaining foreign aid to feed its people and build its infrastructure. The situation was made more urgent when big donors to Somaliland, like the UK was hosting the Somalia conference and Somaliland was being urged to take part. So, Somaliland had to weigh these conflicting national interests

Partake in a Somalia conference and whatever that does to its bid for recognition and thereby maintain favorable standing with your donors. This raises issues of consistency. Somaliland balking on its long stance, of not having to do with anything with Somalia while sticking to its desire for recognition. Or the other alternative remain consistent, not partake in the Somalia talks (and whatever that might do to its bid for recognition) but loose favorable standing with your donors and possible cuts in future donor aid (which with high unemployment and dire poverty in the country was not an option), And so it was a lose- lose situation for Somaliland and for the first time in its history it partook in Somalia talks and maintained its short term national interest of donor aid.

The Somaliland Parliament has passed a resolution, which states “it is allowed to seek the Somaliland interest from anywhere and any group deemed necessary for that purpose”. It has to be clear though, that it is enshrined in the Somaliland Constitution that national sovereignty is sacrosanct. Therefore, the bottom line of Somaliland’s international negotiations is to secure international recognition for Somaliland.

Somaliland Somalia talks have been held at least nine times with no tangible result. The talks failed multiple times for number of reasons. First of all, the Somaliland population, especially the majority Isaaq does not trust their safety and security to Somalia authority and state. This population considers the experience of the civil war, which had all the ingredients of “clan-cleansing” as a proof of their distrust to a central Somali state.

Another reason can be the power sharing, Somalia sees Somaliland as autonomous region part of Somalia and wants Somaliland to be a district part of its federal government. For Somaliland which fulfills the criteria of statehood, that is simply impossible. The 2001 referendum showed clearly the opinion of the people of Somaliland on its sovereignty as a independent state making even more impossible of Somalia dream of renewing the fail and illegal 1960 union. The only acceptable of the citizens of Somaliland is a two-state solution and that is the main reason why Somaliland is willing to sit the table of negotiation with Somalia.

2.7. Somaliland relations in the region:

For many years, the horn of Africa has been characterized by wars, anarchy, terrorism, piracy and instability. Amid the chaos and uncertainty in the region, Somaliland mange to maintain cordial relations with its neighboring countries, Somaliland has always accomplished its affairs in accordance with the large interest of the region. Additionally, Somaliland has carefully avoided any action or utterance that may negatively effect on the stability of the region as well its relations with the countries in the region.

  The denial of the sovereignty of Somaliland as an independent state by the countries in the region is a crystal clear but the question is why? Why has it been proved so complex and complicated? Therefore let’s start with Puntland. “An issue that has a direct bearing on Somaliland’s ability to attract international recognition is neighboring Puntland’s claim to most of Sool and Sanaag Regions, a claim that Somaliland rejects. In 1998, the Harti leaders of northern Somalia and eastern Somaliland declared Puntland an autonomous republic within a federal Somalia. Unlike the leaders in Somaliland, they decided not to opt for independence and oppose the independence of Somaliland. Puntland’s boundaries correspond to those areas where the Harti, a subgroup of the larger Darod clan, reside.

The Majerteen, a subset of the Harti, predominate in that part of Puntland known as northern Somalia, which borders Somaliland. Two additional Harti subsets, the Warsangeli and the Dulbahante, reside inside that part of Somaliland claimed by Puntland. The Warsangeli predominate in the eastern part of Sanaag Region while the Dulbahante predominate in Sool Region. Sool and Sanaag were part of British Somaliland when it became independent in 1960.

Puntland’s claim to most of the two regions, based on clan ties, complicates the issue even though there are differences of opinion among the Harti themselves. The fact that voters in Sanaag and, especially, Sool were decidedly less supportive of Somaliland’s 2001 referendum on the constitution and independence is explained by this clan situation. Both Puntland and Somaliland authorities are trying to increase their support in the two regions. One country that might be in a position to help resolve differences between Somaliland and Puntland is Ethiopia. It has good relations with Somaliland and Abdullahi Yusuf (but not Jama Ali Jama) in Puntland. In fact, Ethiopia has given military support to Abdullahi Yusuf. Ethiopian Dulbahante lives across the border from Sool Region and are part of the same clan structure. So far, Ethiopia has chosen not to help resolve differences between Puntland and Somaliland. A resolution of the dispute with Puntland would enhance Somaliland’s case for international recognition”.   

Ambassador David Shinn discusses in depth the relationship between Somaliland and Puntland and their unsolved border and point out that Puntland hinders Somaliland international recognition. One can even argue that Puntland is the tool that Somalia uses to hinder Somaliland’s international recognition as a sovereign state.

2.7.1. Somaliland and Ethiopia relation;

The next country that the author talks about is Ethiopia- Somaliland relations and he talks about it in many ways. “Somaliland’s longest border is with Ethiopia, and ethnic Somali nomads on both sides of the border regularly cross it seeking seasonal pasturage. Landlocked Ethiopia has made minimal use of Somaliland’s port of Berbera, even after ports in Eritrea became off limits”.

In 2000, a Somaliland delegation led by the second president of the Republic Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal visited Addis Ababa and signed agreements aimed at enhancing trade and communications. Ethiopia was the first country that established diplomatic relations with Somaliland’s capital Hargeisa by opening a consulate which issues visas to Somaliland passport holders, while Somaliland also maintains a diplomatic office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

“An Ethiopian delegation visited Berbera in September 2002 to discuss with Somaliland the expansion of the port and improvement of roads between Berbera and southeast Ethiopia.

 For the first time ever, Ethiopian Airlines has established regular service between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa. Ethiopia and Somaliland have also exchanged liaison offices in their respective capitals. Somaliland sees Ethiopia as an ally in its quest for support and recognition. Although probably sympathetically inclined, Ethiopia is unwilling to be the first to recognize Somaliland. Somalia would immediately attribute nefarious motives to Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland, arguing that it wishes to balkanize Somalia and weaken Somali unity.”

Nevertheless, even though Ethiopia is considered as being directly supportive of Somaliland’s independence claims, there are no signs that Ethiopia is ready to recognize Somaliland as Ethiopia has stated several times that it would be the second country to recognize Somaliland. Ethiopia’s disinclination to be the first country to recognize Somaliland is due to a number of factors:

• Given the historical animosity between Ethiopia and the Somali republic, the subsequent disintegration of the former Somali republic and its support to SNM, the Ethiopian government is not willing to be accused of dismembering Somalia further by recognizing Somaliland.
• The absence of vibrant diplomatic pressure and drastic political bargaining from Somaliland has resulted in the seemingly lack of Ethiopia’s political willingness and enthusiasm in recognizing Somaliland as a de jure state.

2.7.2. Djibouti and Somaliland relation;

Another country which the authors talks about is Djibouti’s relationship with Somaliland. The relationship between Somaliland and Djibouti has never been successful due to Djibouti’s proverbial antagonistic policy towards Somaliland. Djiboutians had received widespread and sustained support from the people of Somaliland during their struggle for Independence in the 1970s. However, when the Siyad Barre’s regime initiated its policy of internal war against the people of Somaliland during the late 1980s, which lead to the massacre of civilians in Hargeisa and other cities in 1988, the Djibouti government was not receptive to the flood of refugees that poured out of the country seeking shelter and safe haven. Therefore most of the refugees sought asylum in Ethiopia rather than Djibouti.(Pambazuka News 2014)

Djibouti borders Somaliland to the north. There are important clan ties between Somalilanders and the some 60 percent of the Djiboutian population that is Somali. Relations between Somaliland and Djibouti are correct but not warm. Somaliland resents Djibouti’s initiative in helping to create the TNG in Somalia and is not comfortable with the current Djiboutian leadership. ( David Shinn 2002)

Since the re-emergence of Somaliland in early 1991, relations with Djibouti have been unstable. There have been a number of military confrontations between SNM fighters based at the border and the Djibouti military. The late President Egal tried to establish better relations with Djibouti and he initiated several measures in this regard, e.g. during a visit by Egal to Djibouti in January 1994 President Abtidon requested President Egal that he remove Somaliland forces based at the border between the two countries. President Egal complied and ordered the removal of the Somaliland forces at the border.

Formal diplomatic relations between Somaliland and Djibouti started early in 1999, when President Egal nominated Ambassador Omer Dheere to officially open Somaliland’s diplomatic office in Djibouti, however, Djibouti has not opened any diplomatic office in Hargeisa. This low-key diplomatic relationship deteriorated in early 2000, when Djibouti was hosting the Somali Peace Conference in Arta, which the Somaliland government boycotted.

 The proposal of the Arta Conference was initiated by President Egal, who visited his counterpart President Ismeal Omar Gelleh in Djibouti and proposed in detail a peace plan for Somalia that envisaged a reconciliation conference for the warring factions hosted by Djibouti – the only Somali-populated country that enjoyed international recognition.

President Egal believed that Djibouti could play a significant role in reconciling the warring factions in Somalia by using its positions at the UN, AU and Arab League to secure the diplomatic, economic and political support of the international community. Unfortunately, Gueleh betrayed Egal and invited Somaliland to the Conference as one of the warring factions of Somalia in direct contravention of their private agreement that Somaliland would not participate at the conferences.(Pambazuka News 2014)

Djibouti continues to have a complex set of financial and commercial links with the TNG. Its commitment to the preservation of Somali unity suggests that it wants to prevent the emergence of a viable and independent Somaliland. Even with the current tension in the relationship, there is considerable informal trade between the two countries, and because taxes are lower in Somaliland, many Djiboutians buy goods there. Somaliland officials argue that Djibouti needs Somaliland more than Somaliland needs Djibouti. They also suspect that Djibouti fears competition from the port of Berbera once it is fully rehabilitated. With so few ships now using the port, there is little incentive to rehabilitate it. (David shinn 2002)

The Djibouti government has been deeply engaged in the politics of Somalia and has hosted a number of peace conferences, notably Arta at which a puppet government was established. More recently, Guelleh was the architect of Sheikh Sharif’s transitional government, which was established in Djibouti. However, Djibouti’s peace efforts have all proven ill-advised and counterproductive. During this period, i.e. 2000 until the present, Djibouti’s political position on Somaliland’s recognition has been ambivalent at best and hostile at worst. Djibouti has not supported Somaliland’s quest for recognition at any international forum, e.g. IGAD, AU, and Arab League, while by contrast, Somaliland has cooperated with Djibouti in securing the Djibouti-Somaliland border for some 25 years.

Presently, Somaliland maintains a diplomatic office in Djibouti confined to minor activities such as welcoming Somaliland delegates to Djibouti. Many political observers argue that Djibouti is very much engaged in thwarting Somaliland’s political maneuvers. For that reason, it is necessary that Somaliland re-assess its diplomatic relations with Djibouti.(Pambazuka News 2014)

 The author here stated many interesting thing and many reasons Djibouti refuses until now the recognition of Somaliland. Although it has been so many years after the author said this, the ironic thing is nothing has change from the past. It’s known to many that Djibouti was and still big supporter of Somalia, reason been that siyad barre was a big supporter of Djibouti’s independent. No matter what reasons may be Somaliland- Djibouti relations has warm up a little bit from where it was from the past but still no major changes and Djibouti still refuses to acknowledge Somaliland’s sovereignty  as a state.

2.7.3. Kenya and Somaliland relations;

Another country in the region with bilateral ties with Somaliland is Kenya. The government of Kenya has announced that it is interested to have close bilateral relation between Kenya and Somaliland and reiterated that it can extend a helping hand in the area of road construction. Ms. Amina Mohamed the minister of Kenyan foreign affairs and international trade has said that there is a need for Kenya to enter a deal with Somaliland.

She stated that Somaliland and Kenya can cooperate in the area of fishing, agriculture, livestock, health, education and even mining. The minister of Kenyan foreign affairs has admitted that there are many Kenyan nationals currently in Somaliland who are here for different purposes. the minister admitted that there are instructors, UN staffers and futher admitted that Kenya has a lot of experts to Somaliland. The statement shows Kenya’s keenness to start cooperation with Somaliland. Although Kenya has officially announced that it will open a consular office in Hargeisa, it has not so far sent her consular to Somaliland. Plans are underway to open a liaison office in Hargeisa

If one asks on what is the Somaliland-Kenya is, the answer that one can obtain from above statement can simply be that the relationship is mainly based on interest in both sides.

2.8. Somaliland case of recognition as an independent sovereign state:

Since 1991 when Somaliland has regained its independent, Somaliland governments, politicians, diplomats, academics, diasporas, elites and its populations has busy promoting Somaliland sovereignty to the rest world they conducted so many campaigns over the years that it will be difficult to write or talk about it in this essay. Many authors have written about the Somaliland case of recognition and it will be impossible write about all of the in this paper but will cover some of them. The key questions that the study will examine will be examine here will be, does Somaliland have a legal ground for its international recognition?  If it does why has it been proved so difficult, complex and complicated for the rest of the world to recognize Somaliland as an independent state? The paper will try and examine many things in this section and look things in different sides.

Somaliland is NOT a secessionist, as it gained independence at 26^th June 1960. And, it liberated its country from trusteeship Somalia illegal fail union of 1^st July 1960 and its military occupation in the territory of Somaliland at 18^th May 1991 of long bloody military campaigned.

The use of colonial boundaries to form independent states was a principle supported by the Organization of African Unity, known today as the African Union (AU), in 1964. The contemporary African Union continues to maintain the position that its member states respect the borders with which they achieved independence. Although the State of Somaliland fulfils this requirement, however, the politicians of Somalia misinformation claim the international community should respect a false doctoring SYL group illegal document of 1^st July 1960.

Once again Somaliland is not secession case and never was in any sense of legal and international relationship terms. The Republic of Somaliland is older than Somalia as it is gained its independence at 26^th June 1960, five days earlier than the so-called parent state, trusteeship Italian territory from the United Nations, which support the Somalia subjection of Somaliland. This state of limbo in Somaliland’s recognition has no legal grounds.

Under the international laws, Somaliland should regain its independence of 26^th June 1960 who suffer genocide at 1988, where the international community failed to provide protection for peoples who suffer extreme persecution such as gross violations of fundamental human rights. The case of Somaliland is beyond self-determination or secession since Somalia try to annexe and failed to deliver a legal union acts since 1960, Somalia occupied another completely country militarily and created misinformation of Greater of Somalia or so-called “Somaliyeed” notion equal expansionism fascism ideas or the laughable Somalia affirming the territorial integrity.

The notion of acceptable recognition may apply to the people of Somaliland in a number of ways. The inauspicious constitutional foundations of the Somali Republic suggest violations of the right to self-determination for the people of Somaliland. The basis of the union was a treaty ratified without the participation of the northern legislature and made retroactively binding for the entire republic, followed by a constitutional referendum rejected by this population and yet imposed upon it through the strength of the southern vote. The subsequent dictatorship of Major General Mohamed Siyad Barre, October 21, 1969 – January 21, 1991, impacted the second aspect of accepting Somaliland recognition, gross violations of fundamental human rights. The latter years of Barre’s dictatorship resulted in the formation of the Somali National Movement (SNM), one of a growing number of internal movements aimed at toppling the dictatorial regime. As the regime destabilized throughout the 1980s, the SNM expanded its armed incursions from Ethiopia in the Somaliland region. The central government responded with increasingly draconian measures to control the region, including rampant human rights violations culminating 1988 in indiscriminate raids and bombing campaigns killing 50,000 and displacing 750,000 more.

Somaliland may face a number of challenges in pursuing international legal principles in the case for its recognition. First and foremost, abandon Somaliland as a case secession are not directly addressed in international law; rather point out Somaliland recognition at 26^th June 1960 must be discussed and managed through the principles of territorial integrity and right to reaffirm Somaliland recognition.

Uti possidetis, the principle protecting colonial borders for the formation of new states, may be impacted by the brevity of the independent experience for the State of Somaliland using pre-existing colonial borders.

Moreover, the case for remedial justice may be met with the reality that the Barre dictatorship was oppressive to multiple Isaaq groups across Somaliland, ultimately resulting in the outbreak of civil war. Somalilanders, although unique in experiencing focussed full scale military action by the central government, were unique in suffering genocide level and much more human rights violations from the dictatorial regime. Additionally, the people of Somaliland reverted to the colonial boundaries of the state following the collapse of the Barre government.

While the people of Somaliland faced political and financial challenges and indirect ethnic cleansing to their right to self-determination from the foundation of the Somali Republic, it was not until the dictatorship of Major General Mohamed Siyad Barre that they were subject to gross violations of their fundamental human rights like the final solution genocide activated at 1988. Somalia was after the territory of Somaliland without its people before 1960 and after the illegal union.