“Thanks, But No Thanks”:

Self-Led State Formation and International ‘Non- Intervention’

in the Creation of Somaliland

In 1991 Somaliland, a former British Somaliland, reclaim its independence of 1960s illegal union from the troubled Somalia and, after rejecting international assistance, embarked on a project of creating a state on its own. For all pretences, Somaliland is a separate entity from its southern neighbour, and is often referred to as the ‘model’ of state formation in Africa as its success in creating a liberal democracy is unparalleled. Although as yet to be recognised, many lessons can be drawn from Somaliland’s experience and success that can both comment on and inform current state-building practices. Drawing on local capabilities and capacities, those leading the creation of Somaliland formulated and established a system of governance inclusive of both traditional and modern (Western) practices and structures. It is this hybrid system that is both deviant and the key to success: in including traditional governance in the central government Somaliland deviates from the normative state-building blueprint, yet it is this deviation that is lauded as the key to success. This paper will examine the impacts of Somaliland’s rejection of international assistance in its state formation project, and will also examine its self-led, self-socialised project of creating a modern democratic state. In addition, this paper will comment on deficiencies in international intervention and state-building projects in failed, collapsed and fragile states, as well as deficiencies in normative frameworks or blueprints concerning state-building and how to be a successful or acceptable state.

The 1991 failure and collapse of the state in Somalia ushered in what was to become a long- term and largely unsuccessful effort aimed at internationally driven post-conflict state reconstruction and state-building. Since 1992 Somalia has been the subject of numerous peace conferences and a succession of attempts at re-establishing the state apparatus and a government. The current government in Somalia continues to be plagued with difficulties, and its return from more than a decade in exile in Kenya was met with such uncertainty and unrest that Somalia’s leaders opted to base the government in Baidoa, nearly 160 miles away from the capital city of Mogadishu. Today’s unstable and unpredictable situation in Somalia leads one to question the sustainability of the current incarnation of the government and, more broadly, of an externally created government within the archetypal failed and ‘anarchic’ state. Whilst international attempts at stabilising and rebuilding Somalia persistently fail, where the international community is absent pockets of locally created governance have emerged. In the northeast province of Puntland, a long-standing regional government offers basic services and security to the population. In many areas outside the major cities, clan governance continues to provide social and physical stability and security to the people. And in the northwest territory of Somaliland, the most organised and developed of these, a new ‘state’ that exhibits the central democratic government that has thus far eluded the south is emerging. It is here that an extraordinary project of state formation is taking place within the larger failure of Somalia.

Throughout the literature on failed states and that of state-building, the on-going project in Somalia is a constant point of reference. Within these studies the self-declared independent territory of Somaliland is often referred to as a rebel region or as a deviant breakaway territory that refuses to engage with the wider project of reconciliation and rebuilding. Whilst it is true that there is a refusal on the part of both Somalia and Somaliland to engage with each other in negotiations or discussions on the nature of Somaliland’s status, the attachment of the rebellious or deviant label creates a situation in which the causes for Somaliland’s secession and the successes in creating a state are not acknowledged. Instead, the existence of an independent Somaliland is problematic for the long-standing goal of re-establishing a government able to exercise its power throughout the entirety of Somalia. The insistence on the territorial integrity of Somalia coming from the West as well as strongly from the African Union ensures that very little official attention is paid to the state formation process in Somaliland. It therefore remains conspicuously absent from much of the state-building policy, practice and literature.

The stated goal of creating a modern state is the same in both Somalia and Somaliland, but Somaliland has taken a drastically different path to achieving this and has set about creating a state on its own. Its self-imposed exclusion from the wider Somalia project and therefore international state-building efforts has meant that the territory has been subjected to little direct interference from the international community. This isolation has allowed for Somaliland to create its own path to statehood and to define its own conditions for the introduction of demands for modern statehood, including democracy, in the governing structure and practices of the territory. The formation of the state in Somaliland reflects not only the normative dominance of the idealised acceptable or successful modern statehood, but also adapts these demands to Somaliland society. What is being created is a hybrid government that is inclusive of both familiar traditional governance structures as well as newly introduced modern democratic government. Those leading the creation of Somaliland formulated and established a system of government that is both deviant and stabilising: in including traditional governance in the central government Somaliland deviates from the normative state-building blueprint, yet it is this deviation that is lauded as the key to its success. Although this deviation from the normative ideal was pivotal to the creation of the Somaliland state, it is argued that this would not have been possible without Somaliland’s isolation. This paper seeks to examine the impacts of Somaliland’s rejection of international assistance in its state formation project, as well as examining its self-led, self-socialised project of creating a modern democratic state. In addition, this paper will comment on deficiencies in international intervention and state-building projects in failed, collapsed and fragile states, as well as deficiencies in normative frameworks or blueprints concerning state-building and how to be a successful or acceptable state.

Situating Somaliland

The insistence on an externally-led project of creating a central democratic state in Somalia reflects the current development trend of promulgating a universally applied, or as Chesterman et al identify (2005, p. 4), the ‘one size fits all’ style of state or approach to statehood. What is being espoused is an idealised notion of the liberal democratic state; one that reflects Western statehood and is familiar and accessible to the leading donor states. These conditions underpin the state-building projects that began with Somalia, as well as inform development and reform policies; the response to what are seen as financial, political social and security concerns, deficiencies or problems is a prescribed path to and form of statehood.

This ‘ideal’ state conforms to liberal notions of acceptable statehood, exhibiting not only a democratic government and a secure territory, but also expected to exercise good governance, engage in the international economy through liberal policies and show eagerness for political interactions with other states and international institutions. In other words, the ‘ideal’ state is one in which political, economic and security threats are eliminated and the practices, policies and structures of the state are familiar and easily accessible to, and controllable by, the international community, particularly the West. It does not reflect an already existing state structure, but rather comprises a wish list of sorts; it is a composition of factors that together would make the perfect acceptable or successful state not only for security, but also for political and economic relationships with powerful actors in the international community. The promulgation of the ideal state is more a liberal tool than an achievable reality.

Although the ‘mythical’ ideal state is a reflection of desires, this rubric of statehood is exhibited in policy as the desired outcome of interventionist actions and espouses expectations for a continuation of assistance. This expectation of statehood also pervades academia, with literature on subjects such as state failure and fragility being rife with what it means to be an unsuccessful, and therefore undesirable, state. The dominance of this style of state in the normative liberal framework guiding international relations creates an environment in which alternatives to or deviations from this blueprint of statehood and the path through which to reach it are rarely trusted, regardless of any success that may be exhibited. As such, international norms of what it means to be a state also direct domestic policy within developing states and, in particular, unrecognised states seeking sovereign statehood. For the latter, conforming to these acceptable standards of statehood, or at the very least appearing to conform, is considered vital as it ‘proves’ worthiness to be a state. Whilst utilising the normative values of acceptable statehood is not a simple or straightforward action and indeed involves complex considerations such as government legitimacy and societal accountability, the balance between internal needs and external expectations and demands defines modern state formation practices; instances where involvement of the international community is negligible. The aspiring state itself must appeal to those both outside and inside the state, incorporating elements of both domestic and international demands that sometimes complement, but also sometimes contradict each other. The inseparability of the two facets means that modern state formation is a complex process involving a multitude of internal and external interests interacting within the structure and function of the state. Although this balance is a key component of state formation projects, in state-building projects the internal-external considerations are often deficient in the quest to realise the externally espoused ‘ideal’ at the expense of individual internal conditions, resources, capabilities or necessities. By looking at a case of modern state formation, the value of the internal-external balance in establishing a stable state-entity becomes apparent. An ideal case study for examining the internal-external balance is Somaliland. A territory that is a separate entity from its southern neighbour and ‘parent,’ Somalia, Somaliland is often referred to as the model of stable state formation and state-building in Africa. On empirical grounds it “fulfils the principle criteria for statehood” and ticks the boxes of what a stable, modern state should be (Bryden 2003); by all pretences it is a state, albeit one that lacks international recognition of sovereignty. Whilst Somaliland follows the blueprint of the ‘ideal’ to an extent, though, the centrality of its traditional governance institution in the emerging government creates a divergence from the norm. Although Somaliland is on the path towards a democratic government and modern statehood, it is doing so in a way not defined by the international community but rather by Somaliland itself. Because of its deviant inclusion, however, the success of the Somaliland challenges the dominant perception of the acceptable modern state. In its quest to balance a desire for recognition of sovereign statehood with the need to create a stable governing structure in Somaliland, the case of Somaliland raises interesting questions concerning not only dominant state-building and state formation discourse, policy and practice, but also questions the ‘cookie cutter’ approach commonly found in both literature and policy.

The Somaliland Experience

The January 1991 collapse of the Somalia government not only began Somalia’s existence as a ‘failed’ state, but it also marked the dissolution of the unified Somalia – a construction established in 1960 upon the independence and subsequent unification of the former Italian colony of Somalia and the former British Protectorate of Somaliland. The uneasy marriage of the two former colonies was problematic from the start, and the 1991 Somaliland declaration of independence both symbolically and practically ended the union; although Somaliland continues to territorially be a part of Somalia, in practice it is, and has been since 1991, completely separate from the south. During the nearly decade long Somalia civil war, Somaliland fought against dictator Siad Barre through the Somali National Movement (SNM), a liberation group that fought alongside those from the south in the struggle to oust the dictator. Although the original intent of the SNM was not secession but rather installing a federal democratic government throughout the entirety of Somalia, popular demand in the former British Protectorate led to the May 1991 declaration of independence. Since then, Somaliland and its leaders have worked hard to bring an end to fighting and maintain peace, reconcile with its legacy of war, and construct a functioning state.

Following the declaration of independence in 1991, Somaliland quickly established a government formed from the SNM leadership. With an executive and a bicameral legislature, this new government was rooted in the pervasive Somali clan system as well as a desire for modern democratic governance. The liberation movement had always advocated that the clan could not be ignored in Somali politics, as “the clan system lay at the root of political stability, social cohesion and economic activity,” (Bradbury 1997, p. 21) but it also aspired to bring democratic government to the people of Somalia. In the first government structure, which later translated into the constitutional government structure, the modern and the traditional were intertwined in the legislative branch: the Lower House of Parliament was the House of Representatives whilst the Upper House of Parliament was the House of Elders (Guurti). Tasked with ensuring peace and stability as well as continuity of government, the Guurti empowered the government and facilitated the introduction of modern democracy; the SNM government was ‘given’ the right to rule by the elders and the first civilian government of the territory was appointed by the Council of Elders, both at national reconciliation conferences convened by the clans. Some say that the government has its roots in the Guurti, making the traditional institution one that exists both within and outside the government. This hybrid government is unique to Somaliland, and is often credited with the maintenance of peace and stability in the territory.

The inclusion of the permanent Guurti in the government enabled the drastic changes to governance and society that took place following the end of the war and the declaration of independence. As one Member of Parliament stated, it is the spine that is holding the government up. (Personal Interview 2006) The state being created in Somaliland reflects the centrality of the elders to the reconciliation and state formation processes and the clan to society: as a hybrid creation mixing both traditional Somali practices with modern democratic practices and principles, the government in Somaliland reflects the centrality of the clan and tradition in Somaliland society and balances this with the internal and external desire (or need) to adopt the preferred attributes of the modern democratic state in terms of structure, function and provision. Although constantly flexing and adapting to changing circumstances and both internal and external demands, the hybridity of Somaliland’s government – holding onto tradition but still ‘moving forward’ – sets it apart and facilitates its stability and success.

With increasing importance placed on achieving recognition of statehood rather than solely establishing a peaceful and functioning state for the people of Somaliland, this government structure is being tested. However, as Somaliland continues to grow and strengthen, the hybridity of the government continues to prove invaluable.

What has worked for Somaliland is a tailored fit. Its importance is not that it has created a new blueprint for state formation or state-building, but that what has been created, characterised by balances between the old and the new as well as internal and external needs and demands, works for Somaliland. Because Somaliland is subject to minimal international assistance or presence, the process of creating the state was undertaken by the Somaliland leaders; a process that could only succeed as it did if the Somaliland people viewed what was being created as beneficial and legitimate. As here the onus for legitimacy is domestic before it is external, local capabilities and resources – financial, political and social – were central to the creation of the state. As the “clan is everything” (Personal Interviews 2006) in Somaliland society, and as traditional mechanisms and institutions had been vital throughout Somaliland’s history in the state of Somalia and especially during the liberation struggle, the inclusion and centrality of the trusted clan body made sense for the Somaliland state. The presence of the trusted elders in the government – one with democratic practices and principles unfamiliar to the people who had had brutal experiences with centralised rule – created a bridge between war and peace as well as between the old forms of governance and the new way of governing. The familiar reference point of the Guurti and the reconciliation work undertaken by its members facilitated building the SNM’s dream of democratic government as well as its evolution as Somaliland seeks recognition of sovereign statehood.

Throughout the literature on Somaliland it is common to see reference to the territory as being a model for state development in Africa. (Bradbury et al 2003; Bryden 2004; Evans 1997; Horner 1997; Drysdale 2000; Gees 2006; Othieno 2008). Indeed, the project in Somaliland has been able to foster what many other development or state-building projects in Africa have not been able to achieve: peace, stability and growth. As Mohammed Said Gees contends, what has been achieved in Somaliland is remarkable and encouraging, and much of the credit for this success goes to the lack of international involvement. He states that the “lack of recognition and the absence of international involvement and support have given the people an opportunity and freedom to craft an indigenous form of social and political organization with a democratic framework.” The freedom experienced by Somaliland in creating its state allowed for the hybrid creation that Gees claims is the only form of state that could survive within the “dominant Somali clan culture” (Gees 2006). Despite the success in Somaliland, however, Gees also maintains that Somaliland is not a model of statehood; a sentiment shared by many. Indeed, the “imperfection of the Somaliland state” and the unfinished yet ongoing state formation process are evidence that putting Somaliland on a pedestal would be a mistake (Gees 2006; Personal Communications). Still, much can be gleaned from Somaliland’s state formation process. Rather than debating whether or not Somaliland is a model, perhaps the more appropriate question to ask is what kind of model can Somaliland be?

State-Building and Its Discontents

In today’s increasingly interconnected world, states cannot function in isolation. Even those states or entities not in direct contact with international institutions or developmental organisations are still subject to being externally influenced by normative standards and policy precedents. State formation projects and indigenous development programmes are not exempt from this; international norms of what it means to be an acceptable or successful state dictate domestic policy within developing states and, in particular, unrecognised states. For the latter, conforming to acceptable standards of statehood is perceived as vital to attracting and maximising investment and developmental assistance that can only be obtained following recognition of sovereignty. For some, therefore, the style and functions of the state become a tool for economic and political survival.

Like many unrecognised states, Somaliland’s government outwardly exhibits compliance with many international norms of acceptable statehood. The reflection of the demands of acceptable statehood, coupled with statements made by political leaders and the government’s active and aggressive promotion of statehood, indicate that now for Somaliland the style and structure of the state are seen not only as desired by the territory but also as key to attracting recognition of sovereignty. In other words, the type of state that has been created has become a tool in Somaliland’s strategy for obtaining legal statehood and all that encompasses, particularly inclusion in international political and financial networks and institutions. The creation of a state may be a means to an end, but the process of creating that state and factors such as resolving internal security problems and the embedding of the state in society go beyond merely creating an attractive prospect for external political or economic investment. The state presented by Somaliland is not a pretence: the creation of an acceptable state and the continuing development of that state indicate a more subtle yet also more involved process than economic posturing. Gaining international recognition, whilst clearly implying some material benefits, is a complex process of political and social transformation that cannot be reduced to simply economic gain or political interactions; the strategy cannot be a facade and what is created through that strategy becomes a tangible reality. In the case of Somaliland, the introduction of modern government and the process of democratisation is not simply a strategy for gaining recognition; the relationship between the old and the new, and the lasting impacts on the social and political relationships resulting from this must also be recognised.

Pegg and King note that many unrecognised states undergoing state formation and seeking recognition benefit from the support of a strong parent state (Pegg 1998; King 2001, pp. 524- 552; Lynch 2004). Somaliland, however, does not have this level of backing. Even though Ethiopia and Djibouti have fostered diplomatic ties with Somaliland, neither acts as a parent state for the territory. For Somaliland, support and legitimacy for the state must come from within if the project is to succeed. The need for the establishment of a modern acceptable state and the quest for recognition are therefore directing the relationship between Somaliland society and the forming state; a relationship that is being cultivated through a negotiated co- existence and co-dependence between the modern and traditional structures. What is emerging in response to both domestic demands and international desires is more ensconced than a superficial strategy for recognition. Rather, the strategies for international inclusion and interaction, together with domestic acceptance and support, encompass the political practices and structures of the territory. In an international environment focused on an ideal style of statehood and demanding acceptable governance and government, and with continuation of the state formation project dependent upon continuing support from the domestic population, external considerations alone are not sufficient for fostering beneficial relationships. With the desired end result being an external economic and political relationship dependent upon both domestic and external political relationships, political structures, government actions and state-society relationships both become vital components of sustaining the forming state and attracting external attention.

Somaliland deviates from the normative blueprint of state-building in that it is meeting the demands of modern statehood in its own way that bolsters domestic support and legitimacy for the unfamiliar modern practices. Whilst the government begins to demonstrate its capabilities to provide security and other public goods for the population, the government is inclusive of, and in some ways dependent upon the traditional governing structure and influences of the Somali clans. The marriage between the old and the new was vital to establishing peace and stability in the territory, and has been integral to all that Somaliland has achieved thus far. The government structure reflects the best of both worlds that many

Somalilanders, and the Somaliland state, live in: it reflects modern normative values of acceptable statehood but is also grounded in and inclusive of Somaliland society and traditional practices. As the state continues to grow and develop, however, this hybridity as it currently stands is being tested. With internal pressure for further modernisation of the government increasing, tensions between the old Somali style of governance and the new democratic institutions in the government are becoming more apparent. It must be remembered, though, that creating a state is a lengthy and tumultuous process and encountering some obstacles must be expected. In spite of the hurdles, though, important lessons can be taken from the case of Somaliland in regards to the process of creating a state as well as what a successful state can look like.

Claiming that the Somaliland state can be a model for state formation is at the same time imprudent and meritorious. It is erroneous to say that the process Somaliland is going through in creating its state can be dissected and the resulting components and practices can be applied elsewhere. The Somaliland state cannot be a new blueprint for state formation or even state-building; it is tailored specifically to Somaliland’s society and the specific circumstances of the territory and therefore cannot be transposed onto another situation. What has worked in Somaliland, namely the inclusion of traditional authority in the central government, may not be appropriate for a territory with a contentious relationship with traditional governance or for a territory with an ethnically divided population. Conversely, the deviance of the Somaliland state can offer valuable lessons, specifically that the creation or development of a state can and should reflect the unique history, society, traditions, cultures and practices within the territory; a practice that is has not been a primary component of current policy. Although some, such as Ghani and Lockhart, maintain that a future model for ‘fixing’ states must be flexible through “stitching together local capabilities and resources and tailoring tactics to context,” these solutions continue to depend upon pre-existing guidelines and frameworks and therefore do not go far in granting autonomy and independence that would allow for deeper inclusion of individual contexts. For Ghani and Lockhart, state-building is about “closing the sovereignty gap” between the juridical and the empirical, and the way to best do that is for external actors to “fix” empirical weaknesses identified as inhibiting success (Ghani and Lockhart 2005; Ghani and Lockhart 2008). Although they also maintain that within local capabilities and resources “[b]ackwardness can actually offer some advantages,” theirs is a technocratic guide offering a framework that does not venture beyond technical components of the state such as economic capacity or physical infrastructure (Ghani and Lockhart 2005, pp. 225, 226). Indeed, what they offer is reflective of what Bendana summarises as the dominant approach to peace-building: “top down, externally guided, supply-driven, elitist and interventionist” (Bendana 2003, p. 4). This type of “fixing” a state, however, does not guarantee the gap between the empirical and the juridical will be bridged. Reflective of much of the stance of those engaged in state-building literature and practice, Ghani and Lockhart do not acknowledge that valuable local capabilities and resources may also include indigenous or traditional systems of governance that will challenge the dominant accepted framework of modern government, but may also be key to creating stable governing structures within non-Western states. As a form of collective memory, tradition involves organizing the past in relation to the present: “[t]radition represents not only what ‘is’ done in a society but what ‘should be’ done” (Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994, pp. 63, 65). The prominent placement of a ‘backwards’ traditional institution or structure, as Somaliland shows, can be a crucial piece of state-building or state strengthening projects.

Within Ghani and Lockhart’s discussion on externally-led projects and closing the sovereignty gap, as is often the case in reform, state-building and development literature, there is another key omission: their offering does not take into account the sovereignty exercised by external actors and the power relationships that come with that. The involvement of international actors in a state-building project creates an element of competition over power and resources, with rewards going to those chosen by the external actors at the expense of others. Often the domestic winners are those who need to be quelled and brought on board a project, resulting in fragmentation and often further violence as competition increases. This can be identified in numerous projects, including those in Somaliland’s regional neighbours. This competition breeding violence has been identified in interventions in Ethiopia during the conflict with Eritrea (Kahn 2008; Duffield and Prendergast 1994), as well as in projects in Somalia and Sudan. In the former, both the empowerment and exclusion of warlords within state-building attempts have resulted in increased violence and fragmentation within the state (Hansen 2003, pp. 57-78, 63-68). In Darfur, as Young notes, a flawed and narrow approach to intervention has resulted in the concentration of power in the hands of “belligerents” who have not discounted continuing violence (Young 2005, p. 100). In externally-led projects, inclusion occurs on the terms of the external actors involved and as such creates the potential for continuing instability once those external actors exit. Both Sudan and Somalia show how damaging this can be as political problems at the root of a conflict are often not addressed or resolved (Smith 2007).4 Domestically led state formation projects, on the other hand, benefit from not being directly subjected to this complex and often damaging ‘external factor.’ Although exclusion from direct international intervention can create difficulties, removing the complexities of an agenda-driven international actor operating under set guidelines or expectations can prove highly beneficial for an emerging or rebuilding state. Somaliland is such a case.

D.I.Y. State-Building

Certainly, state formation in Somaliland has not been problem free, and the vision of how the state will function in relation to both domestic and international concerns has been altered from its original form to reflect the changing circumstances in and around Somaliland. Whilst democratic government has always been the stated goal of the leadership in the territory, the internal dynamics impacting upon how the democratic component can and will function have also changed. The advantage of the Somaliland state, however, is that it can account for the flexibility needed to incorporate these necessary changes in a way that would not be assured if the state formation process had been externally guided or imposed. The Somaliland state has a significant amount of latitude in the exercise of sovereignty stemming from the presence of the traditional authority in the government. This inclusion creates a level of central governance that not only resides within the government but also exists despite it, ensuring that during periods of transition or in the event of a political crisis the government would continue to exist through the traditional institution. In its place both within and above the government, internally rather than externally rooted sovereignty exercised by the traditional authority is extensible, creating a situation in which the Guurti is able to fill the gaps when the government is weak, absent or vulnerable. The inclusion of the clan institution also serves to ease fears about centralised rule; including the powerful and familiar clan elders in the government created a body tasked with guidance as well as restraint. By including this Somali component of governance alongside modern institutions in the central government, the founders of Somaliland created a safeguard for the post-conflict forming state in which past experiences had made the population wary of strong centralised rule. By institutionalising the traditional, the founders of the new Somaliland state created an internal safety net not only for central governance within the territory, but also for the continuum of government during the introduction of a democratic government. For Somaliland, the utilisation of traditional authority was the best, and possibly only, option for the stabilisation of a contentious and potentially volatile society during that period of extreme transition. The vital role of this ‘deviant’ and ‘backwards’ inclusion on the path to today’s state must not be overlooked.

Somaliland was able to achieve its remarkable successes largely because it was able to create a government structure that reflects the territory and population’s particular circumstances and demands. However, hesitancy surrounding the utilisation of tribal or clan systems in a central government, particularly within Somalia, would have ensured that the institutionalisation of the stabilising traditional would have been difficult, if not impossible, if the international community had taken command over the creation of the state. In state- building and development discourse and practice there is a fear of the unknown or uncontrollable elements of indigenous governance structures, practices and techniques in a central government. Shils reflects Weber’s characterisation of traditional legitimacy as the
“eternal yesterday” in noting that discourse and practice have long been at unease with empowering such structures as the dominant emphasis is on moving forward and improvement – modernising – rather than existing in the past with tradition (Shils 2006; Shils 1995; Weber 1967). Ironically, what is perceived of to be an unpredictable, uncontrollable or non-modern factor was the key to stability of the modern in Somaliland. Whilst those in the government are adamant that the presence of the central Guurti is not hindering its campaign for recognition, they are equally certain that the inclusion of the body would not have been a reality if the UN had taken control of rebuilding Somaliland. Indeed, many in Somaliland view the numerous failed attempts at state-building in the south as evidence that international involvement would have been devastating for the north. One of the most advantageous decisions made by the founders of the Somaliland state, therefore, was the rejection of UN assistance offered through its UNOSOM missions in Somalia.

A remarkable facet of the Somaliland state is that its founders created a relatively stable democratic government virtually on their own. Undoubtedly, there are consequential detriments to the lack of foreign involvement, such as a lack of monetary investment and, according to some, a lack of guidance in introducing democracy. Here the benefits far outweigh the costs, though: both political and traditional leaders were able to undertake the process of introducing the new in their own way, at their own pace and without the conditionality that international involvement in the process of creating a state would entail. This is not to say that the Somaliland state was created in an environment of isolation; the indirect influence of international norms of statehood certainly impacted upon the process and the decisions made in regards to the shape and functions of the government. Rather than having this directly imposed on them through an externally led state-building project, though, Somaliland’s leaders were able to adapt these influences to suit the needs of the people and the territory and to work in conjunction with its traditional governance structures. In deviating from the pre-established path determined by the international community and implemented through state-building projects, the Somaliland state not only challenges the people to accept a new way of governing but also challenges the dominant modern conception of what it takes to be a state and the means through which to achieve that. The hybrid Somaliland state not only works for Somaliland, but is often lauded as the most stable political entity in the Horn of Africa. What does this say about the path to modern statehood and the normative values surrounding what it takes to be a successful or acceptable state?

The successes of Somaliland “going it alone” (Prunier 1998) permit comment to be made on the dominant practices of state-building and conditional governance reform within ‘failed,’ ‘fragile’ or developing states. Without direct interference, leaders in Somaliland have created, or have made great strides in creating, a desirable end result and have thus far avoided the catastrophic attempts at imposing an externally created government that have characterised interactions with post-1991 Somalia. Although Somaliland does have the significant political and economic motivation of recognition of sovereignty impacting upon the process, that does not negate the willingness demonstrated by not only the leaders of Somaliland but also the people to engage with the international community’s terms and yet still maintain autonomy over the process of creating a state. It cannot be said that all states or territories would show the same success if similarly left alone, but the case of Somaliland does warrant a reconsideration of dominant conceptions of what it takes to be successful and how to get there. Within discourse and practice there has emerged a framework for how to achieve an acceptable or ‘ideal’ state, with stipulations and conditions to be met. Historically and globally, however, this ‘ideal’ state does not exist in practice, but rather exists as a tool of liberal interventionism, creating a situation in which it is questionable as to whether or not the ‘ideal’ can actually be achieved. State-building practice is wrought with failure and reform policies targeting the creation of an idealised acceptable state show varied and restricted success. With these limitations considered, the issue of what it means and takes to be acceptable deserves to be re-addressed.

Learning from Somaliland

Using the terminology of Finnemore, Somaliland is both “learning” and being “taught” statehood. At the same time, however, Somaliland is also contributing to the practice of
“teaching” statehood (Finnemore 1996). In her comparative examination of Western and non- Western approaches to the study of international relations, Bilgin argues that there is an unwarranted distinction between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ approaches as they are
“almost the same but not quite” and often produce similar outcomes (Bilgin quoting Bhabha 2008, p. 6). Whilst Bilgin is obviously discussing analytical and theoretical approaches to the study of IR, the notion of “almost the same but not quite” raises interesting considerations for practice, particularly in relation to state formation. As the case of Somaliland shows, the
“almost the same but not quite” state can produce similar functions and outcomes to those desired by the international community. Bilgin’s conclusion can be identified more broadly, however, particularly in her identification of a suffused or increasingly symbiotic relationship between the Western and non-Western. It has been argued that western demands dominate policy leading to the exclusion of the unknown or unfamiliar. At the same time, however, seemingly non-Western approaches have been incorporated into practice, albeit in a very limited capacity. Recent trends include the inclusion and utilisation of traditional structures in local governance building and localised development projects (Duffield 2007; UNECA 2007; UNECA 2004; Linder and Lutz 2004). This acknowledgment of the benefits afforded by indigenous structures and practices shows a willingness to engage with these structures, although only on a level that is supportive of the agreed normative consensus of the acceptable modern state. The utilisation of both Western and indigenous structures and practices, however, can be beneficial not only to local development projects, but also to both internationally and domestically led state formation or state-building projects.

The apparatus and functions of a state cannot be treated in isolation to local and regional contexts and considerations. In reference to state-building policies in Afghanistan, Cramer and Goodhand note the exclusion of more localised considerations; an exclusion that they argue has significantly contributed to difficulties in the state-building project (Cramer and Goodhand 2002). Although this critique identifies a problem with the limited scope of current policy, it is also noted that much of the widespread deficiencies, particularly in regards to state-building, are due to the “state of knowledge and practice regarding the establishment and/or reconstitution of effective governance in post-conflict and war-torn societies is still in its infancy.” As such, “[n]ation-building templates, particularly when they reflect particular ideological biases, risk oversimplification and conflation and tend to discount the impact of the situational and historical factors” (Brinkerhoff 2005, pp. 3, 13). Governance reform in relatively stable states is an established practice that is promoted for continuing stability and economic growth and has shown a degree of success for the international community. State- building, on the other hand, has a failing record. As Ottaway notes, this is largely due to overambitious policy, creating a situation in which an acceptable result becomes unattainable as the necessary resources are unavailable (Ottaway 2003). In responses to state failure, collapse, weakness or fragility, as well as poor or weak governance, current international policy is often plagued by tunnel vision in regards to the best approach, often resulting in what Coyne terms the “nirvana fallacy” (Coyne 2006). There is an ardent focus on what is perceived to be necessary as guided by the conception of success and how to achieve or control this, thereby overlooking, disregarding or bypassing individual needs or desires. As a result, overambitious, unattainable and sometimes damaging policies are implemented, pushed and maintained. As such, within policy there is a need to reconsider not only global and regional political and security contexts, but also to intricately involve the complexities and domestic capabilities of individual cases when addressing state-building projects (Ottaway and Mair 2004).

The current predominant guidance for creating governments in the ideal or the familiar conception of the modern state falls short of establishing an international environment conducive to accepting and integrating the distinctiveness of individual states and societies within practice. This is a failure of policy, but that is secondary to failures stemming from the inflexibility of the liberal normative framework of statehood. Where some actors are viewed as acceptable and empowered in these projects, others are excluded in what can be described as a means of governance. With state-building practices bounded by comfort in the known and the familiar, uncertainty in going beyond that can inhibit a more specialised approach to state-building or reform projects in contentious or turbulent territories; an approach that considers not only regional factors, but also domestic circumstances, characteristics, structures societies, cultures and traditions.

Therefore, one of the key criticisms to be made to the current conception of acceptable statehood is its rigidity. But within that and in relation to policy there is also a lack of trust in actors, structures or practices that cannot be found in or that contravene what is perceived to be right for a state. However, these perceptions are based on what is known in the world that is imposing the norms – the West. As such, those supposed backwards, unpredictable, uncontrollable or even powerless factors are often seen as posing a threat to the expected stability of what is perceived to be successful. Somaliland has shown that the inclusion of one of these factors – traditional governance – in a central government is not a weakness but rather a strength, and that autonomous compliance with normative values can occur in a government structure that is inclusive of an indigenously based and devised ‘backwards’ institution. Somaliland’s demonstration of trust in and of willingness to engage with international norms, however, has not been reciprocated by the international community. Even though the stability of Somaliland is broadly recognised, the value to be found in Somaliland’s hybrid system has yet to be widely acknowledged. At this point, Somaliland’s quest for international engagement has gone beyond instrumentality and has moved into questions of trust and partnership. Until the West is willing to look outside the narrow vision of what is acceptable, increased engagement is unlikely as there will be hesitancy to form a partnership with the uncertainty and the unknown that Somaliland’s government presents. Somaliland’s success, however, shows that the traditional is not something to instinctively reject, and it opens the possibility for an element of trust in local capabilities and capacities that does not exist within the current dominant framework.

Approaches to creating states would benefit from a less restricted approach. Othieno argues as much, stating that donors need to address the needs and desires of society rather than becoming involved in a situation or crisis with the narrow focus of the “traditional response to crisis” (Othieno 2008) Whereas the international community should recognise that alternatives to the current model of acceptable statehood would increase stability in areas, such as many states in Africa, where the Western model has met the standards of success, the international community is far from establishing an environment in which alternative conceptions of successful statehood could be attained (Herbst 1996-97, p. 144). There is reluctance on the part of international organisations and donors to relinquish control of internationally funded projects or to invest in what is perceived to be a risky or unknown situation; control of the process is a form of tutelage in the scheme of liberal intervention. But stepping outside these confines by incorporating regional or domestic factors and concerns into state-building is necessary if such projects are to be effective. This is not to suggest that the international community adopt a hands-off approach, as international security concerns and agendas ensure that this is unlikely and impractical. However, a reconsidered approach must not be dictated by a blueprint, a template or an idealised and unattainable model, but rather should reflect the individual needs and demands of the state or territory in question. As evidenced by failed state-building projects, the supposedly modern state is not the curative it is expected to be and can instead prove to be dysfunctional or destructive in many instances. Ghani and Lockhart, as well as Brinkerhoff, are correct in arguing that there needs to be a re- examination of a state-building policy and that reconsideration should include local and regional considerations in addition to international desires and demands (Ghani and Lockhart 2005; Brinkerhoff 2005). They are also correct in identifying that there is no state without inclusion of the public or society and all that goes with it; externally imposed state-building or reform projects in a contentious or post-conflict territory will always be prone to failure as long as they do not engage with or account for the local population, the local history and specific local circumstances.

However, these reconsiderations must go beyond the frequently espoused technocratic components of policy. In being more inclusive of those factors outside the scope of the acceptable framework, in reflecting society and in taking into account the specific context and history of the territory, state-building policies must begin to increase domestic investment in the project and therefore increase the chances of ‘success.’ Interventionist policies must move beyond the template and the established steps and restrictions in order to be conducive to policies that allow for a more open posture. They must be aware of their own power effects and try to minimise them in order to over come the power-blind approach espoused by those such as Ghani and Lockhart. They must work to support an inclusive process and avoid rewarding violence, and like the elders in Somaliland, involved actors must also work on establishing a consensual means to curb unrestricted power and violence. Finally, international policies must be grounded in trust rather than solely seeking specific outcomes. Although these desires and demands admittedly are utopian in nature, they indicate a way in which international actors should consider their actions and policies. Perhaps the emphasis, therefore, should be less on state-building and more on state formation, with the process being assisted by the international community but the state being created from within. Broadening the conception of what is acceptable for the state and how to obtain this will allow for an acceptance of the indigenous, local or traditional as an important component of fostering – not imposing – success.

Somaliland’s fate if it had accepted the UN’s initial offer of international assistance cannot be known. It can be assumed, however, that the territory would not now be lauded for its accomplishments or stability. In grounding the state in society and by utilising a familiar governing structure, those involved in the creation of Somaliland found their key to success. The lack of resources available to Somaliland ensured that political and traditional leaders would have to depend on domestic capabilities and support in order to create the state, and internalising the state formation project entrenched the state in society and society in the state. Because of a lack of funds for security, traditional methods of reconciliation were used to demobilise the militias and help prevent the fighting that raged through the south. Invoking a common memory of isolation and brutality that was experienced during its time in the unified Somalia created a sense of Somaliland identity around which the people could rally and which would create a link between the project and the people. Finally, including the pervasive clans in the forming government ensured continuity and trust throughout the process. Minimalist international involvement placed the state formation process in the hands of the people and leaders, meaning that not only could the state reflect Somaliland but also that the society was invested in the outcome. The fine balance in Somaliland was not achieved without sacrifice, but the stability and security in Somaliland throughout the process proves that the balance reached has been effective. The Somaliland state truly belongs to Somaliland.

Despite the centrality of the clan system in the formation of Somaliland, there is no guarantee that Somaliland will never eliminate or alter the place of the traditional within the government. Whilst the loss of the clan institution in the central government would mean losing what has been an integral component thus far and what characterises the Somaliland project, it could also be determined by the leaders in Somaliland that the clan institution was a part of the process of state formation but not the resulting state. The path to democracy in Somaliland was dependent upon the Somaliland clans. Now that democracy is taking root, however, the government in Somaliland must decide what the future role for the clans is. It would be a worrying loss if the Guurti was ousted because of internal pressure stemming by interpretations of what is desired to become a modern state, as premature removal of a pivotal component of the balance could prove disastrous for the state. However, it is possible that leaders in Somaliland will determine that the stabilising influence of the clan is no longer needed. Whatever the future, one thing Somaliland has shown thus far is that no decision will be made without lengthy debate and consensus from within the state. Even if the Guurti is removed or altered from its present form, the inclusion of and dependence on the traditional institution throughout the state formation process in Somaliland shows the value of this local dynamic and the vital role it played in creating a state.

The Road Less Travelled

Whilst Somaliland’s state formation process has not been entirely isolated from external demands, it also has not been directly commanded, a factor which has contributed to its successes. As such, the best path for Somaliland is to continue to go its own way; international meddling in the consolidation of the state would threaten to destroy what has been achieved. As the state grows, important decisions will have to be made concerning the future composition and function of the government. The next big challenge for Somaliland is to find a way of achieving this without losing what works for the territory, and that is something that would only be complicated by the intrusion of international actors.

For Somaliland, the internally driven state formation process has been successful and has created relative stability for the territory and its population. For the international community, Somaliland has proven the value of indigenous action and institutions and that a beneficial compromise can be reached between the known and the unknown: one does not have to be marginalised or excluded for the sake of the other. The introduction of democracy has shown success, and current trends within Somaliland show an increasing desire for a continuation with the democratisation process. Experience from the past shows that the clans cannot be excluded, and experience from the present proves that their inclusion is beneficial. The next tasks for the Somaliland state, therefore, are to ensure that the government continues to reflect society, to ensure continued stability and to ensure the fostering of not only domestic but also international trust in this emerging state. Somaliland can be a model for state- building, but it cannot and should not be new blueprint or template. Instead, it can serve as an example that going off plan can work. The created state is an indication of the realities of what is possible in state formation but is also both an anathema to and a reflection of the path to the frequently espoused yet unattainable ideal. Somaliland did not follow the prescribed path to success, but instead took an alternative yet parallel route. Whilst Robert Frost may have waned poetically about the road less travelled by, for Somaliland it was this road that made all the difference.

By Dr. Rebecca Richards