Somaliland National Referendum

31 May 2001

1. Introduction

The Initiative and Referendum Institute (the Institute), an international non-profit organization based in Washington, D.C., observed the May 31, 2001 referendum in Somaliland, which unilaterally declared independence from Somalia in 1991. The borders of the country are the same as those of the British Protectorate of Somaliland that gained independence in 1960, when it united with the previously Italian Somalia later that same year. The referendum was called by the Parliament of Somaliland to ratify the constitution that was initially adopted in February 1997. At the invitation of the Somaliland government – with assistance from members of the Somaliland Diaspora organization known as the Somaliland Forum – the Institute observed the pre-polling, polling, ballot counting, and related political activities from May 28th to June 7th 2001.

The ten-person Institute delegation consisted of eight delegates from the United States, one from Britain and one from Switzerland. The delegation leader in Washington was Dane Waters, president and founder of the Institute, and the delegation leader in Somaliland was Dennis Polhill, chairman of the board. The Somaliland National Referendum Committee and the Somaliland Forum briefed the Institute delegation about election procedures, the constitution, and the background and history of the referendum. Upon arriving in Somaliland, the Institute delegation met and coordinated observation activities with a group of observers from South Africa. The Institute delegation observed 57 different polling stations in five of Somaliland’s six regions.

It is important to note the limitations of this report. With 600 polling stations in Somaliland, the Institute delegation made their best effort to get a truly representative sampling with only ten observers. In addition, the Somaliland government provided all transportation and translators. Although the observers generally agreed that genuine and sincere efforts were made to give us access to the polling stations the Institute wished to observe, and that our guides seemed to be giving us honest and accurate translations and explanations of events, our observations were nonetheless restricted by the circumstances. The Institute chose not to send any observers to the Sool region, which borders the breakaway Puntland region that is attempting to achieve an autonomous status within Somalia (Puntland claims some areas of Sool and Sanaag as part of its territory). The Sool region was considered to be the most volatile region of Somaliland with opposition to the referendum, and the most isolated and farthest away from the safety of the capital of Hargeisa. Similarly, in the Sanaag region where there was also some opposition, the Institute sent only one observer. Because of poor or non-existent transportation options, observers could not be sent to the more remote polling stations, which served many of the country’s nomadic and rural people. This report takes no position on Somaliland’s constitution, its independence, or its desire for international recognition. The job was simply to witness and view the referendum, and report on the conduct of the referendum, and whether and how it adhered to the legal procedures established for the referendum.

To develop a fuller understanding of the country and people, the Institute delegation met together and individually with scores of government officials, including President Egal, members of the Somaliland National Referendum Committee, the Speaker of the Somaliland House of Representatives, representatives from the Ministry of Information and the Ministry of the Interior, the Foreign Minister, various cabinet officials, the regional governors, and mayors. The delegation also met with business leaders, health community members, representatives of the local and international press, and members of non-governmental organizations providing international aid to Somaliland. The Institute delegation received an English translation of the constitution as well as primers on the history and economy of Somaliland.

Most people in the central and western districts, which are dominated by the majority Isaaq clan, were passionately in favor of the referendum. A “Yes” vote to the constitution was widely perceived as an endorsement of Somaliland’s independence and a rejection of rule from Mogadishu and Somalia. There was also widespread common sentiment that a “Yes” vote would send a message to the world that Somaliland deserved to be recognized. There was, however, political opposition to the referendum in some areas. This limited opposition appeared to be based more on a rejection of the current administration than on a rejection of the notion of an independent Somaliland. In the Sool and Sanaag regions in the east, which are heavily populated by clans other than Isaaq, some do not recognize the independence of Somaliland from Somalia and continue to consider themselves part of a larger Somalia.

While all members of the Institute delegation volunteered and donated their time for this two-week endeavor without compensation – many using their own vacation time

– the Somaliland Forum paid for coach-class airfare from the United States and Europe, and paid for all food and lodging expenses while the delegation was in Somaliland.

Again, it is important to reiterate that this report seeks to give an objective, analytical and critical commentary on the referendum and how it was administered, without supporting or opposing Somaliland’s move for independence, its quest for international recognition, or the content of its proposed constitution.

III. Brief Overview of Somaliland History and People

Like other African countries today, Somaliland is a product of a combination of forces at play in Africa over the last two centuries: an underdeveloped vestige of the European colonial system – at times a casualty of despots and superpowers during the Cold War – and a victim of civil wars and autocratic military regimes. Formerly the British Protectorate of Somaliland, today’s Somaliland Republic is a nation that unilaterally declared its independence ten years ago, after fighting with rival clan factions from southern Somalia who had bombed and destroyed its main cities and killed thousands of its people. Although it has been peaceful for the past several years – while Somalia, particularly in the capital Mogadishu, continues to erupt in daily fighting between rival clans and warlords – Somaliland has yet to receive international recognition of its withdrawal from its union with Somalia. The United Nations, fellow African countries, and others within the international community have been reluctant to recognize Somaliland’s independence.

Similar in geographic size to the American state of Florida, Somaliland is located on the strategic Horn of East Africa just north of Somalia. It’s on the eastern border of Ethiopia and to the south of the Gulf of Aden. Its official language is Somali, though English is increasingly spoken among its educated population. Despite regional clan differences, the overwhelming majority of Somaliland’s population has Cushitic ethnic origins, and is united by Sunni Islam with its adherence to Sharia Islamic law. Although the ethnic composition of Somaliland is almost entirely indigenous Somali people, the population stretches across several patrilineal clans, including the Isaaq, the largest in Somaliland, and the Gadabuursi, Ciise, Dhulbahante, and Warsangeli clans, all of which have fiercely defended their regional territories and interests over the years. Somaliland is moving away from its long tradition of a hierarchical society of competing clans that were often susceptible to political disharmony. The country is moving towards a more representative – one man one vote system – dominated by national political parties that cut across clan and regional loyalties.

The eastern part of Somaliland consists of a hot, arid coastal salt plain that receives less than four inches of rain annually. Due to its location off of the Indian Ocean, it has remained quite susceptible to the monsoon season in the wetter spring and the contrasting drought devastation that occurs every few years during the summer. With limited precipitation, nomadic pastoralism dominates the central and northern part of Somaliland, with agricultural farming predominant on the southern plateau and foothills where rainfall more regularly averages 20 to 30 inches per year. The capital of Somaliland is Hargeisa, with a population of approximately 400,000. Other major cities include Burco in the country’s center, Berbera, the country’s main oceanic port, the university town of Boorame, and the cities of Gabiley, Ceerigaabo, and Lass Cannood.

With a population between 3 million and 3.5 million people, the precise population of Somaliland is still unknown. There has never been a census. The best source for generally recognized statistics is “Somaliland in Figures,” published by the government’s Ministry of National Planning and Coordination in 1997, and revised in 1999. The constantly changing and itinerant nomadic population compounds the lack of an accurate census. About 55 percent of the people are nomad herders who drift freely across unmarked borders. The population estimate in 1997 was approximately 3 million.

Life expectancy is between 45 to 50 years, with a birth rate of 4.46 percent and a death rate of 1.32 percent. With an estimated population growth rate of 3.1 percent, these numbers yield a 2001 population of approximately 3,390,000 people in Somaliland.

Of the 3,390,000 people, any male or female over 18 years of age, and who is not certified as insane or serving time in prison, may vote in Somaliland. However, there are no written birth records, and few know the actual date or year of their birth. The United Nations, in cooperation with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, estimates that 45 percent of Somaliland’s population is under 15 years of age, and approximately 47 percent of the population is over 18. Matt Bryden, a Canadian contracting with the Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development and an acknowledged Somaliland expert, estimates the over-18 population at roughly 60 percent. Giving equal weight to both estimates yields an approximate eligible voting population of 1,814,000. Thus, with 1,187,833 voting in the referendum (according to the certified vote tally approved by the Somaliland Supreme Court on June 14, 2001), the approximate voter turnout of the eligible population was 66 percent, slightly higher than the 60 percent turnout the government expected.

During the European colonial rush to expand their influence in Africa, Somaliland came under British colonial rule in 1886 through a series of British treaties with different ethnic clans giving them protectorate status under the British crown. Britain’s primary interest in the area was in big game hunting and the livestock trade to provide meat to their forces stationed in Yemen and throughout the Gulf of Aden. In their 86 years of colonial control, the British fought against internal uprisings in the Dervish Movement from 1899 to 1920, and Italian fascist occupation from Ethiopia upon Britain’s retreat from Somaliland during World War II. Hundreds of Somaliland people fought on behalf of the British in the Pacific theater during World War II. Despite decades of British rule, the British left Somaliland with little in the way of administrative, educational and economic structure compared to other British colonies.

As the anti-colonial movement grew after World War II, Britain began to prepare Somaliland for its independence by instituting universal suffrage in 1958 under separate ethnic electorates from different regional clan groups. As a result of the Arabian oil boom in the 1950s, demand for Somali livestock skyrocketed, with the cities of Berbera, Hargeisa and Burco becoming hubs of this unprecedented livestock trade.

Nomadic pastoralism – particularly goat, sheep, cow and camel herding – supports 70 percent of Somaliland’s population, but agriculture has proven to be widely unpredictable over time. The country possesses significant mineral deposits, particularly near the salt plains, and is considered by some to rest on developable supplies of oil and natural gas similar in size to those of Yemen. However, because the rights to oil and gas leases were last negotiated during the 1980’s under the previous Mogadishu regime, Somaliland has had difficulty convincing oil companies to enter into leases with it, largely as a result of a lack of international recognition and the uncertainty of the legal enforceability of leases with an unrecognized state. Today, Somaliland’s oil and gas reserves, if any, remain unexplored.

During the Cold War, Britain proposed the unification of all Somali people under one country from the five different countries that Somali people lived in at the time, uniting them with Somalis from British Kenya, Italian Somalia, French Djibouti and Ethiopia. Because both the French and Soviets viewed this as amassing a Somali nation under British influence in the strategic Horn of Africa – despite the potential of uniting all Somali people under one flag – they bitterly opposed Britain’s idea of Somali unification.

Instead, on June 26, 1960, British Somaliland gained its independence. Conversely, it lasted for only six days. On July 1, the former British protectorate officially joined with Italian Somalia, under European encouragement, to form the united Republic of Somalia. Although it unified two of the five Somali regions in the area, the union was established much to Somaliland’s detriment. Italian Somalia (in the south) procured most of the senior executive positions in the new government that was centered in the southern capital, Mogadishu, and greatly outweighed British Somaliland in parliamentary seats, 99 to 33. Although more than 60 percent of Somalis in Somaliland voted against the referendum held in 1961 to ratify this proposed union and its constitution, the more populous southern majority carried the vote, muffling Somaliland’s discontent.

What ensued was a 30-year period marked largely by political and economic unrest, much of which occurred during the two decades of brutal rule by Siad Barré’s Mogadishu-based regime. Rising to power via a military coup in 1969, Barré organized a militant administration under his Somali Revolutionary Socialist party that extended its grip over neighboring areas in Djibouti and Ethiopia where related Somali clans lived. With the help of the Soviet Union, Barré built up one of the largest and best-equipped armies in sub-Saharan Africa. Full-scale war with Ethiopia broke out in 1977, but the Soviet Union eventually turned on Barré and sided with Ethiopia, leading to the ultimate rout of the Somali army and forcing Barré to capitulate.

Due to the war with Ethiopia, a massive human influx of refugees poured into Somalia, most of them ethnic Somalis, and by 1981 approximately 400,000 Ogaden Somali refugees had settled in the north, in Somaliland. Related to southern Somali clans, these refugees over-burdened the north’s resources and eventually began to receive most of the choice state patronage positions from their ethnically related Somalis from the south, causing northern Somalis in Somaliland to lose jobs and preferential government contracts and licenses to refugees from Ethiopia. With so many refugees, international aid that would otherwise have benefited natives from Somaliland was diverted to handle the flood of refugees, further straining Somaliland’s limited resources.

Compounding the refugee problem, Barré placed growing restrictions on livestock exports critical to the economic health of northern Somalis. But in 1981, Barré’s government arrested a group of Hargeisa intellectuals on trumped up charges of subversion, pushing separatist groups in the north – led by the influential Isaaq clan – to coalesce into the Somali Nationalist Movement (SNM). Protesting years of death sentences, torture and other serious human rights abuses throughout the 1980s, the SNM eventually launched their first armed opposition against Barré’s regime in 1988, killing several government officials. The Mogadishu-based regime, comprised largely of the Daarood clan, responded brutally with ground and aerial attacks on the north that killed more than 50,000 Somalis and sent another 500,000 fleeing to Ethiopia. Many of the largest northern cities and villages were completely destroyed, famine swept through the country, and Barré had the north strewn with hundreds of thousands of landmines. The SNM regrouped with guerrilla forces in Ethiopia to recapture northern cities in Somaliland, overthrowing the government and forcing Barré into exile.

With famine sweeping the country and international food aid disrupted by the civil war, President Bush sent American troops to Mogadishu in December 1992 in a military relief effort known as Operation Restore Hope. Along with troops from other United Nations countries, American marines ensured that food reached the starving and helped stabilize parts of southern Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu where rival clans and warlords were openly fighting. Eventually, the American presence included more than 26,000 troops stationed throughout Mogadishu and the southern part of the country, and food distribution was restored and the famine subsided. None of the international troops, however, were stationed in Somaliland. But by the time American troops pulled out of Somalia fifteen months later in March 1994, Somali warlords and their factions had killed 17 American soldiers.

Representatives of the communities of the north convened in Burco in early 1991 in a conference that declared independence from Somalia, and agreed upon the following:

• Reconciliation of the warring parties to the conflict;
• Disbanding the 1960 Act of Union with Somalia;
• Establishment of a transitional two-year rule by the SNM, and accommodation of the non-Isaaq clans into the government structure;
• Initiation of a separate reconciliation process for the Sanaag region.

Despite a promise of peace and reconciliation, clan clashes continued throughout Somaliland and Somalia as a result of the depletion of natural resources, a lack of international aid, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of refugees. A 1992 cease-fire lasted until tensions erupted into further civil conflict in 1994 in Somaliland. Sporadic fighting lasted until a final peace accord was reached in Hargeisa in February 1997, whereupon a conference achieved the following:

• Cessation of all hostilities and military demobilization;
• An interim constitution to be valid during a three-year transition period;
• Re-election of President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, with a new vice president, Dahir Riyaale Kahin, for a five-year term;
• An accommodation of Somaliland’s minority clans with increased political representation in the House of Parliament.

Since the 1997 national conference in Hargeisa, peace has flourished throughout Somaliland while clan and rival warlord factions continue to destabilize Somalia and Mogadishu. President Egal’s administration has fostered economic development of the regional livestock trade and agriculture in Somaliland’s southern mesa. Despite internal debt and inflation, reforms have liberalized the economy and reduced state intervention in the growing free-market economy. International oil companies, which explored for oil and gas in the mid-1980s, have renewed their interest in the Somaliland coastal regions and offshore leases, given the topographical similarities with oil-rich Arab nations across the Gulf of Aden.

Because past clashes have been deep-seated in clan controversy, the national conference strove to make changes in the government more accommodating to clan interests including dissolving the national assembly, increasing regional bodies and drafting a new constitution. Despite regional contention in Somaliland, a parliamentary system was agreed upon with a declaration of human rights and a system legalizing the creation of political parties. President Egal restructured his cabinet, continuing the devolution of power to the clan regions and guaranteeing the individual rights of liberty, freedom of the press, and protection against arbitrary search.

In August 2000, President Egal’s government distributed thousands of copies of the proposed constitution throughout Somaliland for consideration and review by the people. One critical clause of the 130 individual articles of the constitution would ratify Somaliland’s self-declared independence and final separation from Somalia, restoring the nation’s independence for the first time since 1960. In late March 2001, President Egal set the date for the referendum on the Constitution for May 31, 2001.

1. Analysis of the Election Procedures

The Somaliland National Referendum Committee, charged with planning the country’s first national referendum in 40 years, faced – and largely overcame – numerous obstacles. The primary challenge of extending suffrage to all eligible Somaliland people was complicated by a number of factors, among them: widespread illiteracy, a large population of nomadic and semi-nomadic citizens with no voting experience, myriad logistical difficulties, a lack of accurate census data, and the overwhelming costs of holding a national referendum in accordance with generally accepted standards (particularly given that many international organizations the Somaliland government approached for assistance on the referendum refused to provide assistance because Somaliland is not recognized internationally). Despite these obstacles, the government did an admirable job designing procedures that were simple but fair, widely understood by the first-time voters of Somaliland, and easily implemented consistently and uniformly by regional officials in the six regions of the country.

As an indication of its seriousness, the Somaliland Parliament allocated almost five percent of its annual government revenues – more than $650,000 – to carry out the referendum. The procedures, modeled on national elections elsewhere, were drawn by experts appointed by the government and formally approved by both Houses of Parliament in March 2001. During the debate on the procedures, Parliament voted to change the color of the ballot boxes from red and green to black and white, fearing that red and green, both prominent colors of the Somaliland flag, would confuse voters. Moreover, black and white were the colors of the ballot boxes used in the 1961 referendum uniting Italian Somalia with British Somaliland (that was defeated in the Somaliland region, though passed due to the large Somalia population in the south). The Parliament’s decision to reuse these colors seemed appropriate and fair.

Eligibility

Voter eligibility and Somaliland citizenship are determined by paternal lineage according to the pre-independence colonial borders separating Italian Somalia and British Somaliland. The election law gives voting rights to anyone over the age of 18 who descends from people residing in Somaliland prior to June 26, 1960, and who is not certified insane or serving a prison sentence. The Somaliland National Referendum Committee considered providing voters with photo identification cards, but dropped the idea when the expense was determined. Given the lack of voter identification and the absence of prior voter registration, the procedures gave clan elders the authority to determine citizenship through specific questions to ascertain inclusion in one of Somaliland’s handful of recognized clans. Unregulated and in the absence of qualified cultural anthropologists, such a system invites the possibility of politically motivated decisions that could unjustly exclude certain citizens from voting. However, the Institute delegation found no evidence or complaints that the provision was misused in any way to exclude potential voters. Many Somalilanders stated that eligibility could be easily determined through accent or dialect alone. Additionally, voters were allowed to present to the polling station chairmen witnesses to attest to their age and citizenship. On the whole, the system seemed to work relatively well, with few problems reported. In the future, it may be wise to create a system of voter registration that would allow voters to verify their eligibility prior to the election and to cast a provisional ballot subject to verification of their eligibility.

Polling stations

Unsurprisingly, the allocated number and location of polling stations were two of the most contentious issues in the months leading up to the referendum, and served as a rallying cry for disparate groups opposed to the vote. In the 1961 referendum, there were only 150 polling stations in the Somaliland region. For the 2001 referendum, Parliament requested 700 polling stations but the Minister of Finance, citing fiscal constraints, scaled back the number to 600. Most regions requested more stations than the number allocated. The final distribution was decided by having the six members of the Somaliland National Referendum Committee – one from each of the six regions – allocate what they felt was a fair distribution of ballot boxes, and then taking an average of all six. Parliament approved this scheme only on the condition that it not be the basis for future elections, such as the presidential race. From the limited information provided the Institute delegation about the population distribution in Somaliland, the compromise and distribution of stations seems reasonable. However, the Institute agrees with members of the Somaliland National Referendum Committee who feel that, ultimately, 1,000 polling stations would be a more appropriate number if the financial considerations could be addressed in the future. An additional consideration would be to use the turnout from the 2001 referendum as a basis for ballot box distribution in future elections.

Materials

The voting materials and procedures were adequate and simple. Printed ballots from a sequentially numbered pad were stamped with the number of the polling station and distributed to each eligible voter to be deposited in either a white “Yes” box or a black “No” box. The materials arrived at each station in a locked box containing sealed envelopes of ballots and supplies. There were no reports of tampering and few scattered reports of inadequate supplies (including an insufficient number of ballots when more voters showed up then expected).

Voting procedures required each voter’s hand to be marked with indelible ink to prevent multiple voting. In some instances witnessed by the Institute delegation, the ink used washed off somewhat easily. In the future, the Institute recommends that the procedure be changed to mark the voter’s thumbnail which can more easily be stained than the skin on the back of a hand. International observers from South Africa told us that this procedure worked well in South Africa’s election, using the same type of ink.

Staffing

The provisions for polling station workers and security forces at each polling station were well thought out. Polling station workers, consisting of a chairman, an assistant and a secretary at each station, were helpful and well informed. In future elections, it may make sense to have more than one person assigned to logging in registered voters in order to speed the process and shorten the lines. One or two armed security officers at each polling station maintained order in a non-menacing fashion and kept the line moving orderly, and did not create an atmosphere of intimidation. The procedures clearly spelled out hierarchical decision-making authority and mechanisms, through simple majority voting, for dispute resolution.

However, the Institute delegation noted two problems with the staffing arrangement: the lack of back-up staff and the absence of domestic monitors. The 12- to 16-hour polling day schedule requires either a back-up staff or a system allowing the polling station staff adequate and organized breaks. Also, the Institute delegation felt that future elections would benefit greatly from domestic monitors. The Somaliland National Referendum Committee coordinated the delegations of foreign observers and some women’s groups acted on their own behalf as domestic monitors in the Hargeisa region, but a more thorough domestic observation system could help things run more smoothly in the future.

Vote Counting

The procedures did not provide clear steps for the counting of ballots. After arriving at the regional district referendum offices via armed escort, the counting teams were to count all of the “Yes” votes and then all of the “No” votes, polling station by polling station. However, the Institute’s delegation reported considerable disagreements over exactly what the Somaliland National Referendum Committee intended. Some regional chairmen argued the votes were to be counted one by one, while others thought all “Yes” votes were to be counted for the entire district and then all “No” votes in the district. In interviews following the referendum with members of the Somaliland National Referendum Committee, there was wide agreement that the procedures should be clarified for future elections. On the whole, the district chairmen improvised acceptable methods for counting, and the Institute delegation found neither gross irregularities with the counting process, nor evidence to suggest that the final results were altered as a result of slight variances in the counting procedures.

1. Analysis of Efforts to Educate the Citizens of Somaliland about the Referendum and Constitution

Despite its limited resources, both financial and technological, the government of Somaliland employed a surprisingly wide array of resources to educate its people on the referendum on the constitution, from simple traditional posters and clan meetings to more modern media, including newspapers, radio, television – even the Internet. However, while the methods and modes of information and education on the referendum were impressive, the absence of a politically sophisticated and mature civil society separate and distinct from the government, as well as the absence of organized political parties that could articulate opposition to government policies, prevented the people of Somaliland from receiving much substantive and meaningful analysis of the various articles of the constitution.

One important caveat should be noted: the Institute’s understanding of the extent of the government’s efforts to educate the people of Somaliland on the referendum and the constitution came largely from information provided by the government itself. Simply put, due to the short stay in Somaliland, the Institute delegation was not in the country early enough to conduct a direct assessment of the educational campaign and the government’s message. Furthermore, because this was not a typical partisan election with clearly delineated sides campaigning for or against a particular issue or candidate, the referendum was devoid of traditional stakeholders who could air their supporting or opposing viewpoints.

Educating Through the Traditional Somali Clan System

With an estimated budget of $650,000, to fund the entire referendum effort, a small portion of that budget was reserved for educating the people on this vote. According to Hassan Horri, the Director General of the Minister of Information, his ministry received $15,000 to conduct the education campaign.

Compounding the difficulty of the government’s education campaign is the fact that the Somaliland people are approximately 55 percent nomadic, making communication with them difficult. There is no national or local mail system in Somaliland, no tax rolls and no census. The government’s Ministry of Information printed 12,500 copies of the proposed constitution in August 2000, of which 10,000 copies were printed in Somali and 2,500 in Arabic. Yet, despite historic literacy efforts during the 1970s, there remains an estimated illiteracy rate of 70 percent throughout Somaliland according to the Ministry of Information. Given such illiteracy, the Ministry of Information realized that a sizable portion of the educational effort would need to be conducted through traditional clans, communicated from elders verbally to their clan members.

With the distribution of copies of the proposed constitution in August 2000, the six-person national Somaliland National Referendum Committee recognized that there might have been too much lag time between the distribution of copies of the constitution and the actual election date, not scheduled by President Egal for the May 31, 2001 date until late March. According to Abdulgadir Haji Ismail Jirde, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and a member of the six-person Committee, there was concern that too much time between the distribution of copies of the constitution and the actual election date might diminish the interest of the people to vote. Copies of the constitution were also made available to Somaliland natives living abroad through postings on the Internet at SomalilandForum.com and at the government-owned radio station’s Internet site, RadioHargeisa.com.

To address this, in December 2000, the Ministry of Information held a two-week long seminar in Hargeisa for the mayors and regional governors on how to educate the people. Given the high rate of illiteracy and the nomadic population, their goal was to teach the 33 district mayors, the six regional governors and most schoolteachers about the constitution and the referendum. These trainees then returned to their regions and districts to educate the clan elders. In time-honored Somaliland tradition, clan elders have always met with members of their village or clan to discuss issues affecting the clan, the village or the nation, and it is through this traditional network that the Ministry of Information sought to spread information on the referendum.

The government took efforts to communicate directly with clan leaders in the troubled area of Sool. Given that Sool had the largest number of nomads in the nation, and given the problems that had arisen in the Sool region near the disputed borders with Puntland and Somalia, members of the Somaliland National Referendum Committee traveled to the region on May 29, 2001 to seek support for the referendum from the clan elders there. Abdulgadir Haji Ismail Jirde, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, met with clan leaders of the Dhulbahante clan, which is based in the Sool region. After speaking to the elders, they asked Abdulgadir Haji Ismail Jirde to step outside while they discussed the issue. While some sub-clan leaders wanted to postpone the vote, the elders told Abdulgadir Haji Ismail Jirde that they would agree to support voting in the referendum, but would not advocate for their people to vote “Yes” or “No.” (While the referendum was overwhelmingly peaceful, there was one reported incident in Sool, Abdulgadir Haji Ismail Jirde told the Institute, in which someone unsuccessfully tried to steal one of the ballot boxes on election day, only to be wounded in the following minor skirmish.)

Such personal diplomacy on the part of the government reflected their appropriate concern for this troubled region: according to the certified results, the Sool region had the highest percent of negative voting, with 16 percent of the region voting against the constitution, compared with the other five regions which voted an average 98 percent to approve the constitution. In the Las Anode district in Sool, 45 percent voted “No,” and in fact, the “No” vote prevailed in nine of the 23 polling stations there.

Modern Electronic Media

The Ministry of Information also sought to employ radio, television and newspapers to spread information on the referendum. The principle medium used to disperse information was Radio Hargeisa, a government-owned station which has a long and rich history in Somaliland. The radio station was the first in all of East Africa, set up by the British in 1942 during World War II. After the station was bombed in 1988 by the Barré regime, the Somaliland National Movement (SNM) built a mobile station in three roving trucks that could evade destruction by Barré’s regime. Today, its transmitters are powerful enough to reach all of Somaliland, the Puntland region, and parts of Ethiopia.

The station plays traditional Somali and other African music, features discussion topic “talk” programs, news, and other programming.

Three weeks before the election date on May 31, the government increased the broadcasting capacity of Radio Hargeisa and set aside 80 percent of its programming for coverage of the referendum, incorporating discussions of the various articles of the constitution, debates on independence, plus the views of those who were against independence or the constitution. However, because of language barriers and time constraints, the Institute was unable to determine, even approximately, how much time was allowed on Radio Hargeisa for airing the views of those opposed to the Constitution or independence. (Yet, in a broader effort to provide equal voice to all clans, the Somaliland National Referendum Committee was made up of six members, each representing one of the six major clans in Somaliland; only the Habar Jeelo, a sub-clan of the majority Isaaq clan, was not represented on the Committee).

It was not surprising that the government would use Radio Hargeisa – a government-owned and controlled radio station – to disseminate information on the referendum. However, the government did not make an effort to take advantage of the widespread BBC radio service aired in the Somali language to disseminate information to the people on the referendum. There was a large amount of distrust of the BBC by both government officials and Somaliland people. The Minister of the Environment, who spoke English well and was educated in the United States, said many Somaliland people joke that the BBC’s initials stand for words in the Somali tongue meaning “Lie after Lie Radio,” because of what many view as inaccurate and erroneous reporting by the BBC regarding the referendum and their disputed independence.

Mr. Horri of the Ministry of Information stated that the government did not work with the BBC to educate the people because it did not trust the BBC. (Indeed, there appears to have been a legitimate basis for their distrust: After the referendum, the BBC aired an individual’s comments from Puntland [which opposes Somaliland independence] who stated that there was no voting in the Sool and Sanaag regions that border Puntland. This, however, was demonstrably false, as the Institute delegation had an observer in Ceerigaabo in the Sanaag region, along with three South Africans from another delegation, but the BBC did not verify or attempt to confirm such an easily verifiable fact before they aired such a dubious allegation). Mr. Horri, quoting numbers from the BBC, told us that 73 percent of Somaliland people listen to the BBC’s Somali Service, which is the largest percentage of any country in the world listening to a BBC broadcast, Mr. Horri said. Each day at 5:30 p.m. and repeated at 9:30 p.m., the BBC airs domestic and international news in the Somali language. Abdulgadir Haji Ismail Jirde spoke to the BBC in April, prior to the referendum in May, to confirm that President Egal had chosen the date of May 31 for the referendum. Beyond that, the government did not utilize the BBC to educate the people about the referendum, and perhaps in future elections, it may be helpful to work directly with the BBC to provide voter education information, and to ensure the accuracy of election news.

Despite a dearth of televisions in Somaliland homes, the government utilized “Somaliland TV” to educate voters. A number of restaurants and cafes had one television that would be on during the evening, often carrying CNN or Somaliland TV. Known as “SLTV,” the privately-owned station broadcasts from 6:30 p.m. until 11:00 p.m. SLTV broadcasts can be received only in the capital Hargeisa and in Burco, the only other major city in Somaliland which is often referred to as Somaliland’s “second city.” The government purchased 20 minutes of airtime on the station for three months before the referendum, at a cost of $3,000. The government paid the station to read five articles of the constitution each day, and prepared “man on the street” style interviews to discuss the various articles. People were solicited in the streets to voice their views on the articles, the constitution in general, and independence.

According to the Ministry of Information, opposing views were included (though our Institute delegation was unable to confirm this) and there were many heated debates on the referendum aired on SLTV.

The Press and Other Media

As with SLTV, the government purchased space in the three newspapers in Somaliland that are widely distributed throughout the country. There are two privately- owned newspapers in Somaliland: Jamhuuriya (The Republican), which is published six days a week in the Somali language and in English on Saturday, has a circulation of between 2,000 to 5,000 and is the largest paper in Somaliland; and Himilo, which is published three days a week. Another government-owned newspaper, Maandeeq, is published four days a week and has a circulation of approximately 1,000 to 2,000.

One month prior to the referendum, the government spent $4,000 to purchase editorial and advertising space in Jamhuuriya, which is often considered by the government to be opposed to certain official government positions and policies. There was tremendous widespread coverage of the referendum in Jamhuuriya, and the paper frequently ran critical or comical editorial cartoons in the months before the referendum. Because several families from different clans jointly own Jamhuuriya, it often has a broader perspective on Somaliland politics than the other two newspapers. The government also ran editorials in its own Maandeeq newspaper, and many of the articles and editorials from the various newspapers were included on the Somaliland Forum website on the Internet.

The government also employed colorful posters as another tool to educate the people about the referendum. According to Abdulgadir Haji Ismail Jirde, the government printing office printed 13,000 posters with six different messages, distributed throughout the country two weeks before the referendum. Some posters simply encouraged people to turn out and vote, including a poster of men waiting in line at a polling station which read in Somali, “Go out to the referendum and show your feelings.” Another poster of men and women standing in line at a polling station underneath the Somaliland flag read: “Make sure you vote. The choice is for the people.” Other posters seemed to push for a “Yes” vote on the referendum and independence. One poster, of a dove sitting on eggs in her nest, stated, “The only way we have is the referendum,” evoking the desire of many in Somaliland for peace after the bombings and killings of the Barré regime from southern Somalia. Another poster that pictured two ballot boxes asked rhetorically, “Which one will you choose if you have your senses?” – as if the choice should be clear and obvious. One poster stated, “One day for victory. Try to vote in the Right Way,” possibly implying “victory” over Mogadishu. The reference to a “right way” of voting was further indication of the peer pressure – to vote to approve the constitution and independence – that was very evident throughout the country.

Representatives of the Ministry of Information readily acknowledged that the government encouraged people to vote “Yes” to approve the constitution and independence. Frequent references throughout the government’s educational campaign were made to the vast destruction from Siad Barré’s 1988 bombing attacks, as well as the mass graves of Somaliland people killed by the Barré regime and the hundreds of thousands of landmines laid by Barré that still maim and kill Somaliland people today. Radio Hargeisa repeatedly played the national anthem and patriotic songs, and SLTV similarly ran video footage of the massive bombings during the 1988 attack by southern Somalis and mercenaries hired by Barré. On the whole, though, there was little of what one might consider overt and over-the-top propaganda to coerce people to vote “Yes” on the referendum, though this was clearly what the government encouraged and promoted.

The government also used cars and trucks with loud bullhorn-style public address speakers to drive through towns and villages with benign messages and reminders the day before and the day of the referendum. “It’s your day,” one message was repeated over and over again, as well as “Everybody has the right to vote.” They also played patriotic songs and the national anthem on the mobile public speakers.

Voting for the Constitution, or Voting for Independence?

In discussions with Somaliland people at the polling stations throughout the country, there was a wide consensus among the Institute delegation that the referendum was more of a vote on ratifying independence and separation from Somalia, rather than on the various articles of the Constitution itself. It was clear in reports of referendum observers that there was widespread voter support for approving their independence, but little debate or discussion regarding the separate articles of the constitution or the appropriate form and structure of government. The government devoted a limited effort to foster substantive debate or discussion on the separate articles of the Constitution or the ramifications and responsibilities of independence, and largely distilled its educational campaign into short, simple, easily understood platitudes on the importance of voting, self-determination, and patriotism.

To be fair, given that Somaliland is an aspiring democracy with little to no tradition of representative government, and given that it has a largely unsophisticated and under-educated electorate that was formerly governed through traditional clan structures, the government’s methods were understandable, if not entirely appropriate under the circumstances. Moreover, with very scarce resources available to fund a comprehensive educational campaign, the government’s efforts to encourage voting – while also providing easy access for individuals to read or discuss the constitution – proved that, notwithstanding the country’s financial and technological limitations, it was money wisely spent.

Turnout: Proof in the Pudding

The government’s educational efforts seem to have been quite successful at generating a high voter turnout. The government expected turnout to be around 60 percent, but after the referendum, the turnout appeared to be more than 66 percent of the estimated voting-age population (see Section II, Brief Overview of Somaliland People and History). This in a country that is largely nomadic and during a very hot part of the year that may have kept some in the cool mountains from coming down to vote in the hotter cities, particularly in Berbera. Indeed, some opposed to the constitution or independence may have expressed their opposition by simply not voting at all. But with 97 percent of those voting approving the constitution, this solid turnout of nearly two- thirds of the adult population only reinforces the country’s overall support for the constitution and independence. Similarly, threats aired on the BBC by southern Somalis from Somalia and Puntland that the referendum could lead to war seems to have had little or no effect at keeping people away from the polls, even in the Sool and Sanaag regions that border Somalia.

VII. Conclusion

Overall, it is the opinion of the Initiative and Referendum Institute that the constitutional referendum held on May 31, 2001, in Somaliland was conducted openly, fairly, honestly, and largely in accordance with internationally recognized election procedures. However, it must be noted that no national election, no matter where in the world, is conducted without allegations and instances of irregularities, mismanagement, human error or fraud. The referendum in Somaliland is no exception to this rule, but from our observations, the Institute cannot see any basis for questioning the final results of the referendum, or any reason to cast doubt on the integrity of its outcome.

Given the financial and logistical limitations challenging the Somaliland government – particularly because there have not been any elections in the country for more than 40 years – the Institute’s delegation commends the Somaliland government on the great lengths it went to ensuring a peaceful referendum, free from violence and widespread abuses or fraud. Based on our observations, the Institute finds that the Somaliland constitutional referendum was conducted in a legitimate and open manner, and in most instances, followed the pre-established election procedures mandated by Somaliland law.

While finding the referendum to have been conducted fairly, the Institute’s delegation stresses that it takes no position – directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly

– supporting or opposing the contents of the Somaliland constitution or Somaliland independence and its quest for international recognition.

Though it is the Institute’s official position that the referendum, overall, was conducted fairly, election irregularities and instances of possible fraud should not be overlooked.

As stated earlier in this report, due to the small size of the Institute’s delegation, the team was limited in its ability to observe a large number of polling stations and ballot counting locations. In the locations that were observed, the Institute did see instances of deviations from election procedures, unexplained irregularities, and to a much lesser extent, minor instances of what could be perceived as fraud. However, irregularities and procedural deviations were de minimus, and the occurrences of fraud were insignificant and very rare. Although there is ample room for improvement, the Institute strongly believes that based on observations, these negligible deviations and irregularities did not undermine the integrity or legitimacy of the referendum, and in no way would have changed the overall outcome of the vote.

Most of the irregularities and procedural deviations that were observed are items that could easily be corrected prior to the next national election. Specifically, polling station workers frequently would pre-stamp ballots, a deviation from the election procedure. Because of the long lines of voters waiting to vote in the hot sun, there was an understandable effort by polling station workers to hasten the voting registration process, including pre-stamping ballots. The ballots, however, should have been stamped one at a time, and handed to a voter right before entering the voting booth.

In observing the ballot counting, there were perhaps three or four instances where observers found what appeared to be dozens of ballots “stuffed” into a “Yes” ballot box as if entered all in one instance, instead of votes cast individually. These instances can be attributed to an over-zealous polling station worker, or an individual swiping a pile of pre-stamped ballots while the polling station worker was not watching. At most, it is our opinion that this may have affected no more than 50 to 100 votes, and that the pre- stamping of ballots may have contributed to this.

Another irregularity suggested both by the team’s first-hand observations and by our analysis of the results is an inconsistent poll closing time. Observers witnessed first- hand polling places that stayed open after the designated closing time even when lines had dissipated as well as ballot boxes arriving at counting stations at times that meant they must have left the polling place before 4:00 p.m. – well before polling should have closed. Further, perusal of the results shows a number of polling places used the number of ballots the polling place was allocated. We suspect that a significant number of polling places simply stayed open until they ran out of ballots, whether that was earlier or later than the official poll closing time. Although we have no reason to believe that this significantly impacted the results of the referendum, we would recommend that this problem be avoided in the future by providing all polling places with ample ballots to stay open all day and ensuring that they close according to regulations so as to provide all regions an equal opportunity to vote.

Another problem the team observed was the process of discerning a voter’s age. Several members of the team noted a number of questionable instances in which some underage Somalilanders may have been allowed to vote. By speaking with some underage Somalilanders, observers learned that some had illegally voted in the referendum, though this seemed to have occurred without any regularity. Without birth records or identification, this was not unexpected. Indeed, there were many instances when polling station workers turned away underage voters. More importantly, no eligible voters were observed being turned away from voting because of their opposition to the constitution, Somaliland independence, or the administration of President Egal. There did not appear to be significant numbers of ineligible people voting, and those eligible to vote could do so freely.

Additionally, the team observed only two or three instances of people attempting to vote more than once. In a few instances, the polling stations were not diligent at painting the backs of hands of people who had voted, due in part to inattention to the procedures and the confusion resulting from long lines of people waiting to vote. Indeed, the indelible ink was not difficult to wash off. Still, we do not believe that multiple voting was a problem, and when it occurred, it seems to have been very rare, and in our opinion would not have impacted the results in any significant way.

Another area that should be addressed in future elections is voter privacy. The degree of privacy for voters in the voting booth varied from polling station to polling station, with some polling stations not having, in our opinion, effective privacy. In many instances, there was limited privacy because the ballot boxes were not securely shielded from the view of others. Indeed, on several occasions, it wasn’t that difficult for the observers – and Somalilanders themselves – to see how a voter cast his or her ballot. Given the overwhelming support for the constitution and independence, a lack of privacy could possibly have prevented someone opposed to the constitution or independence from feeling free to cast a “No” vote for fear of pressure or reprisal. However, at most of the polling stations, the voting booths were sufficiently curtained or designed to allow for privacy.

In summation, the irregularities discussed in this report, however benign, can sometimes cast doubt on an election, and allow for an appearance of illegitimacy. However, given that no election has been held in Somaliland in four decades, such irregularities are to be expected and should not, in our opinion, cast doubt on the legitimacy of this election.

More importantly, the referendum was conducted peacefully and without violence. Except for one instance, observers did not see the government, or individual Somalilanders, pressuring others on how to vote or whether to vote, nor did anyone suppress the opinions and speech of those opposed to the constitution or independence. In fact, every observer noted that there was an overwhelming sense of joy, passion and excitement for the opportunity to vote and the prospects of independence. Observers witnessed impromptu singing and dancing outside the polling stations, underscoring that for the vast majority of voters in Somaliland, the referendum – in and of itself – was cause for celebration.

Not only can election irregularities cast doubt on an election, in some cases the actual vote outcome itself can raise questions of the legitimacy of an election. It is unfortunate, but the reality is that throughout the world, when a candidate for office or a ballot question receives near-unanimous approval, the legitimacy of the election is often questioned and in this election where 97 percent approved the constitution and only three percent opposed it that point is proven. However, Institute observations and understanding of the election can help place this overwhelming vote in context. Approximately two-thirds (66 percent) of those eligible voted, while a third did not vote. With only 600 polling stations in a country the size of Florida, getting to a polling station on a hot day may not have been easy, particularly for nomads who make up a large part of the voting population, and therefore could help account for the 34 percent that did not vote.

More importantly, the 97 percent approval was attributable in part to, in our opinion, to a highly emotional desire for a free and independent Somaliland. After years of civil war, famine, bombardment and destruction by the south, the voters’ passion for separating from Somalia was distinctly palpable. Rather than an endorsement of the various provisions of the constitution, this was a clarion call for independence based on Institute observations. Every observer was struck by the voters’ passion and enthusiasm for this referendum.

Furthermore, it is possible that those who did not vote were showing their opposition by exercising their right not to vote or go to the polls at all, and there were some anecdotal reports to support this “culture of abstention.” For example, in the Las Anode district in Sool, a region where, according the election results, there was the most opposition, voter turnout was 31 percent lower than the national average. In fact, one counting district in Sool recorded that not a single “No” vote was cast, while another station recorded a total of merely 105 votes cast, a fraction of what most other polling stations around the country reported. Of the 14 polling stations in Las Anode, there were only 7,261 votes cast altogether, further indicating slight voter turnout in this region. Indeed, in the last election held in Somaliland 40 years ago to ratify the union between Somaliland and Somalia, there was little support for such unification in Somaliland, and only about 100,000 people in Somaliland cast votes in that election, as most boycotted that referendum altogether. It is possible that many of those who didn’t vote this time were likewise boycotting this referendum.

The opposition, however, was not unified around one issue. Some were opposed to Somaliland breaking away from Somalia, while others supported Somaliland independence, but were opposed to the current administration of President Egal. In short, even if one assumes that the 34 percent of the Somaliland eligible voters that did not vote in the referendum were opposed to the Constitution, independence, or the current administration, nonetheless, there was nearly 66 percent of the eligible voters who clearly supported the constitution and independence.

Given the limitations of a ten-person delegation, it cannot be said unequivocally that no other instances of fraud or irregularities occurred. As noted earlier, no election is conducted without a certain degree of irregularities. However, based on these observations, the Institute concludes that, on the whole, the constitutional referendum held on May 31, 2001, was conducted fairly, freely, and openly, and largely adhered to the election procedures set down by the Somaliland parliament and in accordance with internationally accepted standards.

The names of the Constitution Preparation Committee: This is the Committee which prepared the Constitution at the 1997 Hargeisa Conference

( Note: All the spellings of the names are in Somali Script) 1. Sh. Cabdilaahi Sh. Call Jawhar Chairman
2. Maxamed Axmed Cabdulle Deputy Chairman 3. Clqaadir X. lsmaaciil Jirde Secretary
4. Sh. Maxamuud Suufi Muxumed
5. Maxamed Siclid Maxamed (Gees)
6. Sh. Call Sh. Cabdi Guuleed
7. Faysal Xaajl Jaamac (Counsel)
8. Cismaan Xusseen Khayre (Judge)
9. Prof. Faarax Cabdllaahi Farlid
10. Prof. Maxamuud Nuur Caalin
11. Xasan Cabdi Xabad
12. Axmed Macaim Jaamac
13. Yuusuf Aadan Xuseen
14. Cismaan Cali Blue
15. Maxamed Jaamac Faarax

The Constitution Revision Committee The House of Elders:

(Mud is short for Mudane “the honorable” – a title used by members of Parliament)

• Siclid Jaamac Cali, Chairman
• Axmed Nuur Aw Cali, Secretary
• ClLaahi Sh. Xasan,
• Siclid ClLaahi Yaasir
• Call X. Cabdi Ducaale
• Clraxmaan Axmed Areye
• Maxamed Clise Faarax
• Yuusuf C/Laahi Cawaale
• Muxumed Aw Axmed
• Maxamed Gaaxnuug Jaamac
• Maxamed Cismaan Guuleed

The House of Representatives

• Xasan Axmed Ducaale, Chairman
• Cali Maxamed Cumar, Secretary
• C/raxmaan Xuseen Cabdi
• Maxamed Xuseen Dhamac
• Cabdi Daahir Camuud
• C/Laahi lbraahim Kaarshe
• Axmed C/Laahi Cal
• Faysal X. Jaamac
• Maxamed Aadan Gabaloos
• Cumar NuurAare
• Yaasiin Faarax Ismaaciil
• Mud, Yaasiin Maxamuud Xiir
• Cali Obsiiye Diiriye

The Committee for Corrections, Authentication and Production of Copies of the Constitution who also appended their signatures:

• Axmed Maxamed Aadan, Speaker of the House of Representatives
• Mud Axmed Nuur Aw Cali, Secretary of the House of Elders
• Mud C/ILaahi Sh. Xasan, member of the House of Elders
• Maxamed Xuseen Cismaan, Secretary of the House of Representative.

SIGNED BY: Sh. Ibraahim Sh. Yuusuf Sh. Madar, Speaker of the House of Representatives. Axmed Maxamed Aadan, Speaker of the House of Representatives

The Secretariat of the Constitution Committee:

• Faisa Maxamed Axmed
• C/risaaq Siciid Ayaanle