Integrated Peace Building in Somaliland

1. Introduction.

Somaliland is a quasi-­state that wants to separate from the main Somalia. As part of Somalia, Somaliland has experienced several decades of the dictatorship of Sayed Barre as well as the war that overthrew Barre in 1991. Somalia has been into decades of civil war which has costed thousands of lives and millions of displaced people. As for today, Somalia is still one of the weakest and most unstable states in Africa. Yet, the Northern part of Somalia, Somaliland, has taken a different path by being able to manage and solve major clan conflicts with very minimal intervention from the international community. Today Somaliland is pronounced by many scholars as a progressive democracy (Ahmed, 199; Lewis, 2008; Moe and Simojoki, 2013). This paper will discuss and analyse the conflict as well as peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Somaliland and discuss the means for success.

For years there have been a debate among conflict resolution and peacebuilding experts, scholars and practitioners about which models and mechanisms for peace and stability in war torn and fragile state, that are the most efficient. There is no consensus on the matter as conflict situations differ from one to another. Some commentators have been critical to the liberal approach of building a strong state as a way of consolidating peace. They have instead advocated for the bottom up approach as the better alternative to top down which according to them, have failed to stabilize many states in conflicts to a large extent.

In this paper, I am taking a point of departure from this debate, by discussing the flaws of the state centric approach to peace building, by proposing an integrated approach as Baker and Scheye (2007) advocates for. Later I will discuss the case of Somaliland; the political and social history. I will analyse the conflict by using Levinger´s (2013) four steps analysis to explore what divides the people of Somalia and what connects them which includes an investigation of actors, dividers, connectors, drivers for peace or conflict and possible windows for peace or vulnerability. At last I will argue for an integrated approach to peace building against the purely state centric in a discussion of the literature in relation to the case study of Somaliland.

• Core concepts: Authority and legitimacy, state and state formation in Africa, and security and peacebuilding in fragile states.

It is important before analysing civil wars, fragile states and peacebuilding in Africa, (Somaliland in this case) to explore the essence of these wars, in order to draw a theoretical framework that can enable the analysis of the case of Somalia. This part of the paper, is going back into history during state formation in Africa. It will explain the weaknesses of the process, where the states get their authority and legitimacy from and why many African states have been plunged with internal conflicts.

Marx Weber characterized authority in traditional authority, rational authority and charismatic authority. Rational authority functions in the bureaucracy that is run according to rule of law, and to him this is the highest form of authority. In Charismatic authority, the ruled are obsessed by rulers because of their personal traits like being a good warrior, eloquent, wise etc. Traditional authority is what he refers to be primitive source of authority, occurred in mediaeval Europe and contemporary tribal societies. Although Weber characterized authority in these three branches, still he recognized that to some extent they may overlap each other (Hoehne, 2011)

Herbst argue that “The fundamental problem facing state builders in Africa – precolonial kings, colonial governors or presidents in post­colonial, has been to project authority and legitimacy over their territories”. (Herbst, 2000:11). He continues by arguing that there are three sets of state building that determine authority of the state over its territory:
“The nature of national boundaries; the cost of expanding domestic power infrastructures; and the design of the state systems” (Herbst, 2000:13).

African nations’ boundaries came from artificial colonial imagination and their strategic resource needs during the 1885 Berlin conference. The nations’ boundaries that were inherited by African states after the independence did not consider the African societies boundaries. Hence, some tribes were found in more than one country (Thies, 2007) like the Masai and Luo who resides both in Kenya and Tanzania. However, this was not the most severe problem according to Thies (2007), the problem of colonial boundaries is, they expelled “interstate conflicts over boundaries (apart from very few cases) which have prevented African states from developing “nationhood” to replace competing ethnic affiliation” (Thies, 2007: 718) in contrast to European states which had to go to war with neighbours over boundaries and control of trade. Wars among European states led to the consolidation of nationhood among those who lived in particular state boundaries (Thies, 2007, Herbst, 2000). In Africa the project of nationhood building was not there, this has led people to identify and align themselves more to their tribes and ethnics than to the nation according to Thies.

European states exercised authority and control even to remote parts of their territories for tax collection and mobilization of soldiers, but also because of the threat of losing those areas to neighbouring states. Kaldor argues that “the rise of modern states (referring to Western states) was intimately connected to war. In order to fight, rulers needed to increase taxation, borrowing, eliminate crimes, regularize police and armed forces and to eliminate private armies, mobilize popular support in order to raise money and men” (Kaldor, 1999:05). That kind of necessity to expand state control over the territory has never come into being in many African states. African governments had/have control just couple of hundred kilometres from the capital. Many remote areas have historically been more or less governed by traditional authorities and some of them still are to some extent. There has been no urgency need to protect these areas from losing to neighbor states or raise money from these remote communities as the African states receive massive aid and support from their Western allies and the aid industry (Thies, 2007).

With weak threats from neighbouring states and minimal control and legitimacy over their territories, Many African leaders in the early post­Independence period turned violent against their own population, they induced violence upon their own population to crash any kind of opposition. Leaders started to draw their legitimacy from their own tribesmen and those who allied with them. The state therefore lost legitimacy to the areas that were supposedly opposing the status quo.

“African politics were the exact opposite of traditional political science models of domestic and international politics: the politics between countries was extremely well ordered (as opposed to Hobbesian model of international relations) while domestic politics did not evidence many signs of stability” (Herbst, 2000:109).

This state system which was created during the heydays of independence lasted for only few decades before the eruption of civil wars in most African states. Upsalla dataset shows that in Africa there were 12 armed conflicts in 1986, 16 in 1991 and then the number went down to 11 in 1995­1996 and rocketed to 16 in the period of 1997­2000 (Wallensteen, 2012). It has been argued by many scholars like Kaldor (1999), Wallensteen (2000) and Akkerman (2009) that the increased number of intrastate conflicts was due to the end of the cold war. It meant at the time, the end of unquestioned support from Moscow and Washington to African governments, and the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) by the Bretton Woods institution contributed to the collapse of many regimes (Duffield, 2007).

After many African states fell into civil wars, it was again the moral responsibility of the international community to support resolving conflicts and to build peace. The Donor community, Western countries and the African Union (AU) engaged in stabilizing failed states and states in civil wars. The model adopted, was to support and build a strong state (state centric model) as the best approach for sustainable peace and development to all societies (Boege et al, 2009). Boege and others criticize this liberal approach to conflict resolution and peace building by arguing that “Mainstream responses to the questions posed by the need for a restoration or new formation of political community have been cast in terms of liberal state­building as the path towards peace, stability, development and rational governance” (ibd:599). They argue that this approach has not produced enough stability hence they advocate for a new paradigm.

In the following part, I will bring the discussion around the two models of peace building adopted by the international community, the Security Sector Reform (SSR) and the United Nations peacebuilding missions.

2.1 Security Sector Reform (SSR).

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a liberal approach to development and security which aim to
“assist donors and developing countries to increase effectiveness of the efforts to prevent conflicts and improve security” (OECD, 2004:02). Since the 1990s the OECD governments through the Assistance Committee (DC) adopted the Security Sector Reform to help partner countries establishing structures and mechanism to manage change and conflict through democratic and peaceful means (OECD, 2004)

SSR implementation is very vital in every post conflict and fragile states. SSR has been implemented in many post conflict situations, from the Balkans states to African states. However, in recent years there have been criticisms of the SSR policies and its implementation, among the major critics is the lack of local ownership and the state centric view as the ultimate security provider by undermining other actors like traditional authorities (Baker and Scheye, 2007). In the SSR implementation, it was meditated that with more non state actors in the security sector will weaken the state. Hence, there is a high probability that a country returns to war. David Chandler refers to the SSR approach as a “solutionist” approach model to problems by Western powers that provide a model of how a state “should be” based on narrow liberal thinking which does not necessarily fit the context of the countries in conflict (Chandler, 2015:71). It has generally been argued that the failure of SSR programs is due to lack of political will and commitment of the recipient state on democratic values and good governance, but the common mistake of SSR implementation is to ignore local people and local forms of authority (Baker and Scheye, 2007)

Recently OECD has reviewed its guidelines on Security System and Governance Reform by defining the security sector reform as follows; “[it] includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well­functioning security framework” (OECD, 2004:01). The new guideline hasn’t yet been adopted for implementation but it shades light for future engagement by considering grassroots movements and civil society

2.2 UN peacebuilding in post conflict states.

United Nations has since the 1990s, become the primary actor in conflict interventions and peace building in war torn areas. In his publication “Agenda for Peace” the former secretary of United Nations Boutros Boutros­Ghali (1996) (in Steinert and Grimm 2014:02) states “democracy within states fosters the evolution of the social contract upon which lasting peace can be built. In this way democratic culture is fundamentally a culture of peace”. This was the revival of the liberal approach to war torn and fragile state that the liberal democracy was the only way to peace and stability, as the civilization mission during colonial conquest Boege et al, 2009a). Since then, UN missions have concentrated on reinstating states, support states apparatuses like armies and police, support elections and funds governments. According to this approach the state should become able to exercise democratic values and stable governance. Democracy is therefore reduced to coalition governments, elections and functioning bureaucracy without involving the people in the valleys and hills of the particular state (Blanco, 2015).

Several studies have been conducted in relation to democratization packages of UN missions, especially those where UN claimed to include democratization missions for example in Sudan, Liberia, Afghanistan, Timor Leste etc. The study by Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) as quoted by Steinert and Grimm (2014:3) states that:

“UN interventions have not improved democracy levels; in fact, such project has even brought about a moderate decline in democracy, and the target of intervention by the UN, fare no better and generally do worse than would have been expected if had they not suffered intervention”.

Weinstein further nullifies the claim that international intervention can bring democratization to undemocratic states, he introduces the concept “autonomous recovery” where he claims that UN interventions have negative repercussion in post war settings and it undermines local processes and capacities (Weinstein, 2005:08). From that point of departure of the two approaches, the SSR and UN peace building, in the next part of this paper will discuss what is called the integrated peace building by focusing on Baker and Scheye´s multi layered security and justice in post­civil war setting.

2.3 Integrated peace building: Baker and Scheye´s multi layered security and justice

The above discussion does not rule out the state. The state is unquestionably important for stability and peace. However, when discussing weak or fragile states, it means that there are other actors who can be even more powerful than the state (Chandler, 2015). Therefore, instead of adopting the narrow view of state centrism, scholars like Boege et al (2009a), Volker Boege, M. Anne Brown and Kevin P. Clements (2009b), David Chandler (2015) and Bruce Baker and Eric Scheye (2007) suggest other ways by considering the political reality of the countries referred to be weak/fragile.

It is argued that in post conflict situations and fragile environments, security and justice systems are not only carried out by the state. In many fragile states, people have experienced violence or repression from the state, and people do therefore not always trust the state as a security and justice provider (Baker and Scheye, 2007). Rather they return to traditional systems which have survived colonial oppression and configured themselves to the present era according to Boege et al and Baker and Scheye:

“In Africa, customary courts, traditional societal structures (extended families, clans, tribes, religious brotherhoods, village communities) and traditional authorities (village elders, headmen, clan chiefs, healers, bigmen, religious leaders) are often the dominant form of regulation and dispute resolution, covering up to 90% of the population” (Ibd: 512, Boege et, 2007:603).

In his book “Interventions: A Life in War and Peace”, Kofi Annan further explains the cultural relativism of traditional African conflict resolution mechanisms.

“In fact the values of pluralism and collective decision making are ingrained in our (African) oldest traditions, identifiable in the deepest vestiges of African culture across the continent. The traditional means of conflict resolution is to meet on the grass, under a tree and stay until the solution agreed. In reality, African communities from village level upward have traditionally decided their course through free discussion, carefully weighing different point of views until consensus is reached. Even in the system ruled by chiefs, the leader still had to govern with the will and support of the people otherwise the chief could be removed” (Annan, 2012:172).

These arguments suggest that it is a fallacy to bypass mechanisms that only emphasize the state centric perspective. The alternative paradigm to SSR and other liberal interventions is the integration of multiple layers/actors found in a particular conflict area. The argument is that:

“There are many reasons for the vitality and strength of non­state service delivery, including their: physical, linguistic and cultural accessibility; legitimacy; efficacy; timeliness of decisions; low transactional costs; support for restitution and restorative justice rather than punishment and incarceration; and degree of participation afforded to disputants” (Baker and Scheye, 2007:512)

Recognizing the importance and adoption of these structures is vital in peace building and development of fragile states. “The capacities and legitimacy of non­state providers of security and other public goods have to be acknowledged and integrated into processes of building political orders beyond the Western model of the state” (Boege et al 2009:20).

Somaliland has demonstrated remarkable progress through an integrated approach to reconciliation and peacebuilding. In the next section I will explore the case of Somaliland in relation to history, the conflict, and peacebuilding. It is not possible to discuss Somaliland case without touching Somalia, but for the sake of this paper, the focus is on Somaliland.

• Somaliland. Political history and social structures.

Here I will analyse the case of Somalia and Somaliland in particular. I will make a brief introduction to the historical development in order to understand societal structures. Then I will use Levinger´s four steps to analyse the Somali conflict and I will discuss the literature on liberal and integrated approaches to reach an understanding of the development in Somaliland

The area that today is known as Somalia and some parts of the horn of Africa were occupied by the nomads who are categorized as Somalis. These societies were organized based on clan families, sub­clans, primary lineages, and “dia­paying” groups (Jilib/bah) (Ahmed, 1999). It is important to note that Somali societies share common ethnic and linguistic identity but differs from each other by lineage, history and customs. The today’s Somali society is divided into five major clan families, “the Hawiye, Daroq, Isaaq, Dir and Rahanwein” (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995:05). With the absence of centralized institutions, the Somali societies bond themselves to patrilineal kinship (tol) and customary laws (xeer). The dia­paying which comprised of several hundreds to thousand members is the closest social formation where members enter into a social contract of dia­paying (collective payment) if anything (like murder) committed by or to one of the members (Lewis, 1965; Ahmed, 1999). As mentioned, the groups rarely had a single centralized chief/leader. Instead, the leadership was organized by the council of elders in which every male Somali could become a member depending on the persons knowledge of the clan (Bradbury, 2008; Hoehne, 2011).

3.1 The history of State formation in Somalia.

Somalia territories were colonized and divided in the British Somalia and Protectorate, Somalia Italiana, Cote Francais des Somaliens (modern day Djibouti), the Ethiopian Ogaden and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya (Bradbury,2003). Since 1827, imperial powers fought and signed dozens of treaties to claim patches of Somali territory. It was until 1897, a very important year in horn of Africa’s imperial history, when the boundaries agreement was made. Italy got 180 miles from the coast to Juba river, North of Bardera. Ethiopia got the Ogaden area, the French got the Djibouti and the rest the rest of Somalia by the British including the Northern frontier district of Kenya (Lewis, 1965).

After the WWII, Britain maintained Somaliland and Italy was given the rest of Somali territories by the United Nations as protectorate colonies prepared for Independence. It was this period when independence movements gained momentum in all Somali territories (Djibouti, South Somalia and Somaliland) (ibd).

Both Somaliland and Somalia got their independence in 1960 from the British and Italians respectively. Five days later after independence, they announce unification of the two Somali ethnic states. Djibouti which received its Independence in 1977 decided not join because of the union problems between Somaliland and Somalia (Loubser and Solomon, 2014).

The capital was decided to be Mogadishu hence reduced Hargeysa (the Somaliland capital) to a region office. Southerners took all major posts in the government like the president, vice president, in the cabinet of fourteen ministers only 4 were from Somaliland and only 26 percent of the parliament seats were allocated to Somaliland (Bradbury, 2008). Moreover, neo­patrimonial relations between the government officers and their clans became the order of the day. A study by Mohamed Jama Urdoh, a Somali journalist, as referred by Elmi and Barise (2006), observed Somalia’s police forces in 1967 “that more than 70 per cent (51 out of 71) of police­station chiefs were members of the same clan as the then police chief” (Elmi and Barise, 2006: 33)

Barre took power in a bloodless revolution in 1969 and promised to take the Somali state and politics to the other level. He suspended the constitution, detained leading politicians and banned all political parties (Bradbury, 2008). He adopted Scientific Socialism as state ideology for development, “blending concepts of wealth sharing and self­reliance with Marxism­Leninism, Islam and anti­imperialism, the revolution agenda that struck a sympathetic chord with Somali public” (Bradbury, 2008: 36).

Barre´s heydays did not last long, as opposition started emerging from different groups in the Somali societies, Islamic groups started to revolt against his “liberal” reforms like women empowerment and changing Somali alphabets to Latin ones. At the same time some clans (Isaaq, Ogaden, Hawiye, Digil and Mirifle) complained to be discriminated from assuming public offices (ibd)

In this case the state lost legitimacy and support from these clans, and hence turned violent against its own people. The regime used excessive force to suppress the opposition. This followed with a failed coup in 1978 and the formation of Isaaq clan political movement (the Somali National Movement, SNM) in London in 1981 (Elmi and Barise, 2006). More clans formed their own movements like Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) by the Majerteen clan, the USC (the Hawiye clan’s opposition party) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) (the Ogaden clan’s party) and started to fight against the regime (ibd). Due to hostile relation between Ethiopia and Somalia, Ethiopia hosted these groups during their fight against the regime until its fall in 1991 (ibd).

3.2 The peacebuilding process in Somaliland

After the fall of the Barre regime in 1991, Somaliland announced its departure from the Union and started its own reconciliation and peace building process in its territory (Richards, 2015). In this section, I will focus only on Somaliland’s process to reconciliation and peacebuilding since Somaliland is a unique case of integrated approach to reconciliation and peacebuilding.

Somaliland as other part of greater Somalia, has just came from a long civil war and dictatorship regime. In 1988 when the government of Mogadishu started to bomb the northern (Somaliland) towns, a lot of northerners took refugees in Ethiopia and many joined SNM to fight the regime. Also a council of elders called ´Guurti´ from the Isaaq clan (the biggest and influential clan) was formed to advise the SNM (ibd). After Somaliland’s independence declaration from the greater Somalia, the council of elders expanded to include other clan and took advisory role to the council of representatives.

After defeating Barre’s troops, SNM which was composed mainly the Isaaq clan decided to cease hostility with other clans in the north like the Dhulbahante, “Instead of projecting the SNM´s authority through force, which might have ignited new war, the SNM leadership consented to a reconciliation process initiated by elders” (Bradbury, 2008:79)

In May 1991, elders of Isaaq, Harti and Dir clans and the leadership of SNM converged the what called “The grand conference of the Northern people” (Shirweynaha Beelaha Waqooyi) in the town of Burco (ibd). The conference attended by intellectuals, artists, militia, commanders, religious leaders, delegates from diaspora and business people (ibd). Richards argues that:

“the reconciliation actions of the SNM, particularly in allowing for a reconciliation process led by clan elders rather than asserting its authority in the territory through force. Indeed, the SNM’s policy of ‘peaceful co­existence among the northern clans and the decision to break with Somalia created an environment that was relatively stable” (Richards, 2015:10)

After the grand conference, followed several grassroots conferences like the 1992

Tawfiq Conference in Sheikh, and the 1993 Borama Conference. Furthermore, in 1993 the second grand conference was held, known as Sanaag Grand Peace and Reconciliation

Conference (ibd). It is important to note, that all these conference and the process were minimally sponsored by the international community except with minimal support from the Danish refugee council (Moe and Simojiki, 2013).

The peace process in Somaliland utilized traditional practices and institutional peace­making by using Elders (caaqilo) of diya­paying groups, council of elders (guurti), religious leaders (wadaado) and heads of clans (suldaano) at assemblies (shir) and came to political agreements (xeer) between the clans (ibd).

4. Somali Conflict Analysis.

Analysing the Somali conflict, I will use the four­step assessment process used by Levinger
(2013) in his book “Conflict Analysis: Understanding causes and unlocking solution”. First by observing dividers and connectors, Actors, drivers for conflict and peace and at the end, windows of vulnerability and opportunity.

1. Dividers and connectors.

Since the civilian government was overthrown in 1969 by Mohamed Barre, Somalia entered into severe clan division whereby clans close to and supporters of Barre received favours from the regime. Many of those who were employed in the public sector and acquired

lucrative business deals were clans associated to the regime. Clans like the Isaaq, one of the biggest clans in Somalia, were marginalized by opposing regime´s policies. Bradbury
(2008:45) explains that “clan identity, officially prescribed since 1970s, resurfaced as the main political and economic security. Clans privileged by the regime received preferential disbursement of development aid”

Colonialism legacy also contributed to the Somalia crisis. Inconsiderate boundaries drawn around states in the horn of Africa, indirect rule by the British which favoured some clans over others and inheritance of colonial institutions like laws for example, the new republic inherited four different legal arrangements, The British common law in Somaliland, Italian law in the south and the common Islamic and traditional customary laws to name but a few of its impacts(Lewis, 1965). This has brought confusion in serving justice especially to people of Somaliland who were a minority in the government hence they start to lose faith in the Union and question its legality and can be seen as a dividers in the conflict (Elmi and Barise, 2006). Other dividers includes extreme poverty, environmental degradation, increase of Islamic extremism and neighbour’s influence for example the role of Ethiopia and Egypt in the conflict (Hoehne et al, 2011).

However, in many ways people in Somalia are connected more than they are divided. They are the largest single ethnic group in Africa which speak almost the same language with little slight dialects (Lewis, 1965). This solves the problem of communication when coming to dispute settlements. Majority of Somalis share the same (religion) which facilitate the possibility of solving disputes through Islamic laws. And they have similar traditions of solving internal conflict by using clan elders and the dia­paying system (ibd). These ethnic and religious similarities of the population can be seen as connectors in a conflict resolution situation.

II. Actors

The Somalia conflict is one of the very complex conflicts when it comes to actors ( Hoehne, 2011). In this case I will mention few actors from local level to international level who are contributing to conflict and peace. Among actors that contribute to the conflict, there are warlords from different clans, Islamic extremist groups like El­Shaabab, business people who profiteering from the conflict, Barre´s regime, Ethiopia by supporting the rebel clans and hijacking the peace process after the Cairo conference and Somali in diaspora (Richards, 2015). Actors who contribute to peace includes clan elders, civil society groups, religion, the African Union, donor community and the United Nation (Hoehne, 2011).

III. Drivers of conflict and peace

In Somalia, warlords and some of the big clans use the war to push for their own agenda. Al­shabaab use religion to fuel the conflict against democratic process by telling their followers it is against Islamic values. Businessmen are racketeering the need for food and arms, so the war for them, it means good business. The Barre regime used the clans that supported it to fight against the clans which were against (Boege et al, 2009a)

Peace promotion hasn’t been unanimous throughout Somalia among actors. Yet, in Somaliland and Puntland, religion and tradition has contributed to bringing people together for reconciliation, and customary laws and Islamic sharia have been the main legal instruments for solving conflicts and peacebuilding (Johnson and Smaker, 2013).

IV. Windows of vulnerability and opportunity.

The situation in South Somalia is still not stable, as Al­shabaab and clan’s fractions are frequently attacking the Mogadishu government, and the government has minimal control outside Mogadishu. The situation is different in Somaliland. In 2002 after the death of President Mohamed Egal, many observers thought that it was a turning point and escalation of the conflict because it was few months before a general election. But these expectations were not met , as Somaliland conducted a peaceful and democratic election (Johnson and Smaker, 2011). Though Somaliland is still in a very fragile situation this analysis has shown that, the holistic bottom up approach in conflict resolution and peacebuilding has created ownership and tolerance between clans and among politicians (ibd).

• Approaches for Peace building in Somaliland: A Discussion.

Since Boutros Ghali´s introduction of the concept peacebuilding in his book “Agenda for Peace”, there have been massive involvement of international community in building peace instead of peacekeeping as it used to be in war torn states. As I have discussed at the beginning of this paper, the liberal state centric approach to peacebuilding have yield less on building peace in many conflict states with exception of few states like Liberia. The

Somaliland case contributes to the bottom up­top down integrated approach to peace building.

Burgess argues that “grassroot stability, development of civil society participation and service delivery by the government are more likely to bring stability and peace” (Burgess, 2013:319). Bradbury (2008) adds that the grassroots process disempowers warlords who tend to utilize local marginalized communities to join their fraction. Somaliland’s reconciliation begun at grassroots level with all the clan meetings to solve their differences using customary and Islamic laws which are widely acceptable by all and then build the government that is responsible and accountable to the people. The SNM government, apart from being involved in the reconciliation process, furthermore focused on building infrastructures like roads, enhance security in livestock markets and opened the port of Berbera which is crucial for business between Somaliland and the gulf countries. “In the nearly two decades since Somaliland seceded from Somalia, it has managed to develop the port of Berbera and to enforce an acceptable level of security on the paved roads linking it with Ethiopia for the traders to adopt this route” (Azam, 2010:02)

Traditional systems and authorities are still widely acceptable social structures in many African societies (Moe and Simojiki, 2013). Although they have undergone massive modifications since colonialism, people have faith on them especially when the government fails to provide security and deliver development. “In the absence of effective government people placed their faith in their customary institutions to resolve and manage conflict” (Bradbury, 2008: 106). Therefore, it is a fallacy to leapfrog these mechanisms and jumping on creating strong state institutions. This does not mean that the process should focus only on traditional mechanisms, but the state institutional and traditional mechanisms should work in a syndicate and delicately balanced to achieve stability as Baker and Scheye (2007) argues.

“Since 2000, Somaliland has consolidated its state­building accomplishments in an impressive manner, attracting the attention of even hardened skeptics. It made a successful transition from clan­based representation to multiparty democracy, holding local, presidential, and legislative elections; it resolved a disputed, extremely close presidential election without violence; and it executed a peaceful, constitutional transfer of power upon the death of President Mohamed Egal in 2002” Menkhaus, 2007:91)

Another important area in integrated peacebuilding is the funding of the peacebuilding process. It has been observed for example in East Timor where the UN and international community used huge amounts of resources on building peace in East Timor state. The amount of resources used stability achieved, It shows that pumping funds to a fragile states doesn’t necessarily contribute positively in security and stability of a particular state. East Timor is still not a stable state apart from millions of dollars used (Ofstad, 2012). Again Somaliland provide a lesson on importance of using local funding and resources in reconciliation and peacebuilding.

“Key differences between the peace process in Somaliland and the external peacemaking in Somalia were that the former were locally designed, managed and financed; that they generally involved the participation locally selected leadership (not warlords); that they accept the need for a long timeframe; and involved broad public participation” Bradbury, 2008:107).

In connection to above, neither the state centric nor a purely bottom up approach have proven to be the best approach to peace building. Yet, the combination of the two strategies considering the social, economic and political setting of the particular state is more likely to succeed in creating sustainable solutions for peace. “Justice and security architecture cannot be adequately understood in terms of clear­cut categories of ‘state’ and ‘non­state’ providers, or the idea of ‘parallel’ and distinct justice systems” (Moe and Simoji, 2013 :396)

6.Conclusion.

This paper is analysing the conflict and peacemaking in Somaliland. Levingers theory is used to analyse the conflict and it suggests that the conflict is complex when it comes to actors, drivers of conflict, connectors etc. From my discussion and arguments in the analysis, a multi­layered integrated approach to reconciliation and peace building provides promising results as Somaliland displays an example of. Reconciliation and peace building mechanism should be more local (grassroot) oriented by considering culture and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.

By Dr Samwel Moses Ntapanta